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Abstract 
Water wars are coming! Water is the defining security threat of the 21st century! The future 
belongs to the water-rich! These types of warnings are frequently proclaimed, urging 
attention to looming water conflict, which will occur as stores of freshwater diminish in both 
quality and quantity. Yet the issue of water security is far more complex than as an inevitable 
source of future violent conflict. Water is a central component to all aspects of life and 
planetary health and thus it contains within it a multiplicity of social and political meanings, 
pivotal to our understandings of security. This dissertation begins with an acknowledgment 
that conceptions of security are conditioned by larger understandings of being and reality, 
and that water security in particular is emblematic of traditional allegiances within the 
subject of international relations that are resistant to change. At its core, it is designed to 
answer the question: What are the relationships between water and security? It adopts a 
critical security approach to excavate traditional security narratives and then construct and 
identify emancipatory visions immanent within relationships over water. It argues that an 
emancipatory vision of water security that is inclusive, communicative, and cosmopolitan is 
desirable and possible in human water relations. It concludes by identifying various 
contemporary water relationships that offer potential emancipatory appellations of water 
security.  
 
 
Keywords 
Critical Security Studies, Emancipation, Environmental Security, Hydrosolidarity, 
Securitization, Water 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction: Water, security, and 
emancipation 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Water wars are coming! Water is the defining security threat of the 21st century! The 
future belongs to the water-rich! These types of warnings are frequently proclaimed, 
urging attention to looming water conflict, which will occur as stores of freshwater 
diminish in both quality and quantity. For the past three decades, the story often told has 
been one of a “coming anarchy,” where a host of environmental problems, in which water 
factors significantly, inevitably erodes the state’s capacity to govern.1 According to this 
type of interpretation, this will eventually lead to an upswing of violence as states and 
groups fight over access to and control of dwindling natural resources, while at the same 
time experiencing their effects as conflict multipliers, coalescing with simmering ethnic 
and historical tensions. 
The persistence of this type of thinking has led to the conclusion that water will drive 
conflict in the future, and is likely to lead to instability, state failure, and increase regional 
                                                 
1
 Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273.2 (1994): 44-77; Michael T. Klare. 
Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001); Thomas 
Homer-Dixon. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases.” International 
Security, 19.1 (1994): 5–40; Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. (Princeton N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas Homer-Dixon. “Terror in the Weather Forecast” New York 
Times 24 April 2007 Online. 14 February 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/24/opinion/24homer-
dixon.html>; Gwynne Dyer. Climate Wars (Toronto: Random House, 2007); CNA, 2007. National Security 
and the Threat of Climate Change. Report from a panel of retired senior US military officers. Alexandria, 
VA: CNA Corporation, April 2007. Online. 14 February 2013 <http://www.cna.org/reports/climate>; 
Defence Intelligence Agency of the United States (DIA). Global Water Security: Intelligence Community 
Assessment. ICA 2012-08. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2012. 
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tensions.2 However, the continued reliance on familiar tropes of water scarcity leading to 
war and conflict is problematic in a number of ways. First, it ignores the historical record, 
which displays a distinct absence of water wars.3 Secondly, freshwater scarcity and 
ecosystem degradation hold far more importance as an inevitable source of conflict than 
“21st Century oil.” Water is more important than other resources, including oil. As 
Steven Solomon puts it, “Oil is substitutable, albeit painfully, by other fuel sources, or in 
extremis, can be done without; but water’s uses are pervasive, irreplaceable by any other 
substance, and utterly indispensable.”4 Thirdly, focusing upon historically absent and 
hypothetical future water wars obscures the complex relationships individuals, 
communities, and ecosystems have with scarce water sources; relationships that defy 
simple classification as competitive and protectionist.5 The result is that it diverts 
attention away from more pressing concerns related to the sustainable management of 
water resources and the integration of holistic water practices ensuring equitable 
distribution, which is fundamental to empowering individuals so that they may live a 
good life. Finally, it reflects an uncritical allegiance to state-centric, traditional security 
                                                 
2
 DIA, 2012; Ban, Ki-Moon. “Address as prepared for delivery to the Davos World Economic Forum.” UN 
News Service 24 January, 2008. Online. 5 January, 2013. 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=177>; Association of American 
Geographers. “United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan addresses the 97th Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Geographers” [Transcript of speech]. Association of American Geographers. 
2001. Online. 5 January, 2013. 
3
 Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways,” Water Policy 1.2 (1998): 
251-262; Lucia De Stefano, Paris Edwards, Lynette de Silva and Aaron T. Wolf. “Tracking cooperation 
and conflict in international basins: historic and recent trends.” Water Policy 12.6 (2010): 871-88. 
4
 Steven Solomon. Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power, and Civilization. (New York: Harper, 
2010): 367. 
5
 Mark Zeitoun, Naho Mirumachi and Jeroen Warner. "Transboundary water interaction II: Soft power 
underlying conflict and cooperation." International Environmental Agreements 11.2 (2010): 159 - 178 
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approaches to managing security, approaches that have been clearly ineffective for most 
individuals on the planet. Narratives that causally link water scarcity and conflict 
reinforce the deeply embedded assumptions of just what security means (survival) and for 
whom it exists (states).  
Despite the tenuous links between resource exploitation and conflict, there has been a 
continued tendency to situate resource wars as a prevailing fact of history and an 
inevitable focus for the future. Various UN organs and institutions have debated the 
concept of water security. In 2012, it was the subject of a major national security report in 
the United States.6 In 2007, The Government of Australia detailed A National Plan for 
Water Security.7 And certainly a large number of think tanks, NGOs, and academic 
studies have pointed to water as a major threat to security. Much of the talk of water is 
deeply connected to a growing awareness of the dangers posed by climate change. In 
February 2013, for just the third time in its history, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) met to discuss and debate the security implications of climate change. The 2013 
meeting was galvanized by an increasing awareness that the frequency and severity of 
climate change effects, like hurricanes, wildfires, droughts, monsoons, and flooding, 
required a new sense of urgency. Given the deep connections between climate change 
security and water security, it is obvious that the issue will be of paramount importance in 
the coming years. 
                                                 
6
 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Global Water Security.” Intelligence 
Community Assesment. ICA 2012-08, 2 February 2012. Online. 1 February 2013. 
<http://www.dni.gov/nic/ICA_Global%20Water%20Security.pdf>> 
7
 Government of Australia. A National Plan for Water Security. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2007. 
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However, there are developments that point to alternative understandings of water 
security in an international context. In December 2010, the United Nations General 
Assembly proclaimed 2013 as the United Nations International Year for Water 
Cooperation.8 Launched at UNESCO headquarters in Paris on 11 February 2013, there 
are four messages of the International Year: The first is that water cooperation is crucial 
for poverty alleviation, and social equity; the second, that there are tangible economic 
benefits; the third, that it protects water resources and the environment from degradation 
and overuse; and perhaps most importantly, that water builds peace.9 Such timing is 
reflective of a growing awareness that water is a central component for sustainable 
development, including the eradication of poverty, the improvement of human health and 
well-being, and for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. It also 
suggests the growing weight of a counter-narrative to the dominant water wars thesis: one 
that recognizes water as having the potential to bridge divides and encourage 
cooperation. Such an acknowledgment is crucial in an increasingly vulnerable age; where 
the challenges of meeting rising water demand are exacerbated by degraded and 
dwindling water resources.  
There are 276 international river basins in the world today and 148 riparian countries. 80 
percent of the world’s freshwater originates in basins that traverse through more than one 
                                                 
8
 United Nations General Assembly. “International Year for Water Cooperation, 2013 (A/RES/65/154).” 
United Nations (20 December, 2010) 
9
 Gretchen Kalonji. “Editorial: We shall sink or swim together.” A World of Science UNESCO, 11.2 
(2013): 3. 
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country and approximately 2.75 billion people live within transboundary river basins.10 
The sheer number of people and countries that are directly impacted by transboundary 
water relationships makes the stakes all the more important. Yet for all of the debilitating 
fears of potential conflict, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggest that water has ever 
directly led to war. In fact, cooperation is far more common. The most comprehensive 
study of water conflict and cooperation ever undertaken found  
The incidence of acute conflict over international water resources is overwhelmed 
by the rate of cooperation. The last 60 years (1948-2008) have seen only 44 acute 
disputes (those involving violence), 30 of which occurred between Israel and one 
of its neighbours. The total number of water-related events between nations of 
any magnitude is also weighted towards cooperation: 759 conflict-related events 
versus 1705 cooperative ones, implying that violence over water is neither 
strategically rational, nor hydrographically effective, nor economically viable.11  
The UN’s designation of 2013 as “The International Year for Water Cooperation” may 
have few tangible effects in alleviating water problems. It is also unlikely that the 
designation itself will be successful in overcoming the intuitive sense that the less water 
there is, the more valuable it becomes and the more probable it is that people will fight 
over it. But it does point to something important - the sense that alternative conceptions 
of water security are not only possible, but also necessary in an age where climate 
change, resource exploitation, and the continuation of volatile regional disputes threaten 
                                                 
10
 Lucia De Stefano, James Duncan, Shlomi Dinar, Kerstin Stahl, Kenneth Strzepek and Aaron T. Wolf. 
“Mapping the Resilience of International River Basins to Future Climate Change-Induced Water 
Variability.” Water Sector Board Discussion Paper Series The World Bank 15 March 2010.  
11
 Annika Kramer, Aaron T. Wolf, Alexander Carius, and Geoffrey D. Dabelko. “The key to managing 
conflict and cooperation over water.” A World of Science UNESCO, 11.2 (2013): 7. [Emphasis added]. See 
also Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.” 
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to undermine human potential and environmental sustainability. It is at this juncture that 
this dissertation hopes to add significantly. 
1.2 Problem Question  
Robert Cox claims that, “ontology lies at the beginning of an inquiry. We cannot define a 
problem in global politics without presupposing a certain basic structure consisting of the 
significant kinds of entities involved and the form of significant relationships among 
them...There is always an ontological starting point.”12 It is true that the continued 
frequency of popular warnings that privilege Malthusian concerns over dwindling water 
supplies and increasing human needs reflect deeper-rooted philosophical allegiances. 
When a wide range of world leaders, including the past three UN Secretary Generals, at 
one point or another, raise dire warnings of impending violence over water, they are 
reflecting long-held assumptions about the purpose and possibilities of international 
security, itself symptomatic of much deeper beliefs. When the United Kingdom’s 
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Davey, warned an audience in 
2013 that “water wars are just around the corner,”13 he was not simply reporting facts, but 
was signalling a commitment to water security defined and held within a traditional 
ontological interpretation of state self-preservation, political enmity, and human control 
over nature.  
                                                 
12
 Robert Cox. “Towards a posthegemonic conceptualization of world order: reflections on the relevancy 
of Ibn Khaldun.” Approaches to World Order R.W. Cox and Timothy Sinclair (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996): 144.  
13
 Fiona Harvey. “Water wars between countries could be just around the corner, Davey warns.” The 
Guardian 22 March. Online 7 February 2013. 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/mar/22/water-wars-countries-davey-warns>  
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The resilience of the traditional interpretations of water security prepares the way for a 
particular comprehension of the problem, as well as arranges the types of responses 
considered appropriate. Water security is, in this regard, illustrative of what Horkheimer 
and Adorno referred to as a “corrosive rationality” that binds existence with repetition. In 
their reading, reason becomes locked in instrumental terms, in the service of domination 
and control, rather than in progress or emancipation. In modern terms, an idea of 
inevitability sets in because that which is sets the boundaries of possible experience. 
These boundaries work to reflect and replicate the essence of the existing order – 
characterized as cyclical motion, fate, domination of the world, and the renunciation of 
hope.14 Reason and logic, the foundations of the enlightened spirit, become reduced to 
instruments of purposes, used to determine the prospects for either survival or doom. The 
rigid dualistic formulation expels actual thought from its methods of logic.15  
The consequences are extensive. Western social science, based upon the division of fact 
and value is meant to describe reality without making any judgments. But because this 
division rests upon an instrumental conception of rationality, the knowledge derived from 
it is used to control and exploit rather than for freedom or emancipation.16 Rationality in 
this regard is blindly applied with little capacity to think about its ends or its relationship 
to the specific character of the objects studied, or for that matter, the subjects observing 
the phenomena. Rationality replaces critique with affirmation, and as a result, truth 
                                                 
14
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Ed. Gunzelin Schmidd Noerr, Trans. 
Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 20. 
15
 Horkheimer and Adorno, 23. 
16
 Columba Peoples, “Theodor Adorno,” Critical Theorists and International Relations, Eds. Jenny Edkins 
and Nick Vaughan-Williams, (London: Routledge, 2009): 13.  
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evaporates.17 Social institutions and processes appear as self-directing and autonomous 
rather than as something actually directed by humans.  
The starting point of this dissertation then is an acknowledgment that conceptions of 
security are conditioned by larger understandings of being and reality, and that water 
security in particular is emblematic of traditional allegiances within the subject of 
international relations that are resistant to change. It takes this critical observation and 
extends it to examine the possibilities for emancipation in water security. At its core, it is 
designed to answer the question: What are the relationships between water and security?   
It approaches this question with two central objectives: First, by combining analytical 
reasoning and normative theorizing it seeks to excavate the complex relationships 
individuals and political communities have with scarce water sources; relationships that 
defy simple classification as competitive and protectionist. An individual’s connection 
with water, a unique and essential resource, is characterized by a wide and shifting 
confluence of personal and social needs and identities. Thus, the dissertation aims to 
reveal and examine how various security discourses are prevalent in the ways people 
manage their relationships with water, and more broadly, with each other. It does so by 
focusing on the prospects for change in international relations, and by detailing the ways 
in which myths (e.g. “great debates,” “water wars”) work to condition that which is 
possible in security. 
Second, it aims to further the contemporary debates on the nature and characteristics of 
critical security theory by providing a sketch of water security as emancipation. To date, 
                                                 
17
 Horkheimer and Adorno, xviii. 
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the concept of emancipation has been left theoretically and empirically adrift in critical 
security accounts, rendering its usefulness suspect and leaving it open to sustained 
critique.18 This dissertation provides one of the first useful examples of the way in which 
the concept of security as emancipation can be analytically and normatively valuable in 
relation to an absolutely essential resource, highlighting the concept of emancipation’s 
new potential in a real-world application. It provides a vision of emancipation in water 
security by focusing on three interrelated criteria: inclusion, communication, and 
cosmopolitanism. 
The central argument of the dissertation is that security as emancipation is desirable and 
possible in human relations over water. The basis of this argument is founded on the 
reality that,  
Water is an essential resource required for sustaining life and livelihoods: safe 
water is required for drinking, hygiene and providing food; and adequate water to 
produce energy and support economic activities such as industry and 
transportation. Water in the natural environment ensures the provision of a 
multitude of ecosystem services to meet basic human needs and support economic 
and cultural activities. For too long water has been an issue that is at once 
everywhere and nowhere…19 
                                                 
18
 Hayward Alker.“Emancipation in the ‘Critical Security Studies’ Project.” Critical Security Studies and 
World Politics. Ed. Ken Booth (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 189-205; Mark Neocleous. 
Critique of Security, (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2008); João R Nunes. Rethinking Emancipation 
in Critical Security Studies, PhD thesis University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 2010. Online. 17 February 
2013 http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/handle/2160/7179?show=full; João R Nunes. "Reclaiming the 
Political: Emancipation and critique in security studies," Security Dialogue, 43.4 (2012): 345-361. 
19
 World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP). “The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 4: Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk.” (Paris: UNESCO, 2012): 23. 
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This pivotal insight, from the 2012 World Water Development Report (WWDR), 
compels us to consider water as a critical natural resource upon which all social and 
economic activities and ecosystem functions depend. The subject of security, traditionally 
understood, is unable to fully account for the range of uses, meanings, and functions of 
water, frequently placing it within a dominant narrative of state security, and avoiding the 
implications of water insecurity upon individuals. Traditional security paradigms that 
focus upon always-over-the-horizon, existential, threats to the state, are fundamentally 
ill-equipped to solve the myriad problems of water insecurity in the twenty-first century. 
The 2012 WWDR concludes, “Greater recognition is needed of the fact that water is not 
solely a local, national or regional issue that can be governed at any of those levels alone. 
On the contrary, global interdependencies are woven through water…”20 The echoes of 
this are to be found in the insights of critical security studies. As Ken Booth reminds us, 
“In the first truly global age the answers to the questions about security must begin by 
being global.”21 
1.3 Scope of Analysis  
This dissertation offers a critical perspective on water security. It seeks to interrogate and 
uncover traditional allegiances held by security practitioners and scholars and understand 
how and why these allegiances contribute to problematic understandings of 
vulnerabilities related to water security. It begins with the critical observation that 
ontology lies at the beginning of inquiry. As such, it devotes considerable space to 
investigating the way in which understandings of being and reality work to condition 
                                                 
20
 WWAP, 23.  
21
 Ken Booth, Theory of World Security (CambridgeL Cambridge University Press, 2007): 90. 
11 
 
dominant attitudes towards water and security. That said, there are necessary limitations 
to the following analysis that must be acknowledged. There is neither space nor would it 
be appropriate here to provide an in-depth examination into the very ontology of 
humanity and its material relation to water. Such an undertaking is beyond what is 
attempted, though the dissertation does focus on aspects of those ontological and 
epistemological issues. Overall, the aims here are more modest. This dissertation is 
primarily meant to offset particular understandings of water security that privilege 
conflict over cooperation, state sovereignty over human and ecological needs, and 
instrumental rationality at the expense of reflexive understanding. It argues that water is a 
profoundly connective and supportive substance that disrupts the conventional 
boundaries of human life through its physical and social properties. Extending this 
reasoning and focus allows for the potential reimagining of security in equally profound 
ways. The chapters that follow accept this premise, but focus more attention on the 
conventional ways water is principally conceived: as something over which people fight, 
and as something over which people negotiate its distribution in fair and unfair ways. 
This is a deliberate decision meant to limit the scope of analysis to a manageable form. It 
would be unwise to open the dissertation up to such a wide expanse of possible inquiry – 
into the very ontology of humanity and its relation with water. A much narrower focus on 
particular strains of security studies is offered instead. This more managed focus 
produces pointed adjustments to discourses of security, while showing appreciation for 
larger questions that must necessarily be here left unanswered.  
1.4 Methodology 
 A section on methodology is warranted. Despite some notable exceptions, there has been 
a distinct lack of critical approaches that disrupt the political, economic, and security 
12 
 
frameworks that have given rise to environmental problems and vulnerabilities.22 The 
dissertation seeks to help fill this gap by exploring how the concept of security is mutable 
and how water security itself can be situated as a progressive concept of hope. To put it 
simply, an analyst’s theoretical and epistemological position selects the choice of 
methods deemed appropriate. With few exceptions, environmental conflict scholars rely 
upon a positivist epistemology that takes its cues from the natural sciences.23 This means 
that most environmental security work relies upon quantitative approaches. On the 
subject of water security, some of the most well-known and cited studies attempt to make 
causal connections between water and conflict by cross-referencing large statistical data 
sets on freshwater availability with incidents of intrastate and interstate armed conflicts.24 
But, as Rita Floyd points out,  
The predictive value of this type of analysis is unclear for at least two reasons. First, 
environmental change endlessly creates a new context for social behaviour and 
therefore the future is always unlike the past. Second, the density of connection in the 
human world suggest to many analysts that outcomes will tend to be more 
comparable to the non-linear models of quantum physics than the linear models of 
                                                 
22
 A small number of these exceptions include, Jon Barnett. The Meaning of Security. (London: Zed 
Books, 2001); Robin Eckersley. Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992); Simon Dalby. Environmental Security. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 2002); Matt McDonald. Security, the environment, and emancipation: contestation over 
environmental change. (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
23
 Rita Floyd. “Analyst, theory and security: a new framework for understanding environmental security 
studies.” Environmental Security, Approaches and Issues Eds. Rita Floyd and Richard A. Matthew (New 
York: Routledge, 2013): 24.  
24
 Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1999); Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.” Water Policy 
1.2. (1998): 251-262. 
13 
 
Newtonian physics. These reasons also explain why study results often are not easy to 
replicate with new data. 25 
Positivism assumes a social world that is observable and replicable through falsifiable 
studies. In contrast, critical methodologies rely upon a reflectivist position: the world is 
given through our methods of studying it. In this way, the social world cannot (and 
should not) be studied the same way as the natural world. Social and political life is too 
messy. While exhibiting methodological pluralism, all critical inquiries start from a 
position of self-doubt or a tendency towards self-undermining.26 They are inherently 
skeptical that the researcher is a value-free vessel for unattached observation. This creates 
a necessary openness to research and a reluctance to design programmatic research 
designs, for fear of closing off innovation, discovery, or most importantly, emancipation. 
Instead of the positivist belief in the separation of the object and the subject studying it, 
the critical tradition highlights the idea of the theorist as practitioner. One of the aims of 
inquiry is to develop praxis, borne of a commitment to not only identify issues of 
concern, but to contribute to their undoing. Matt McDonald, drawing upon Andrew 
Linklater, suggests that a critical theoretical approach “requires engaging with normative, 
sociological and praxeological questions that combine a focus on the composition of the 
ideal, the context of political action, and the feasible means of action or possibilities for 
                                                 
25
 Floyd, Analyst, theory and security: a new framework for understanding environmental security 
studies,” 24-25. 
26
 Mark B. Salter. “Introduction.” Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction Eds. 
Mark B. Salter, and Can E. Mutlu. (New York: Routledge, 2013): 2. 
14 
 
realizing the ideal. The praxeological dimension is advanced through the method of 
immanent critique.”27 
In approaching the central questions of water security the dissertation thus employs the 
method of immanent critique. This is defined as a method of critique used to locate the 
emancipatory potential embedded in existing social and political orders.28 Essentially, it 
uses a critique of concepts to obtain a critique of the real experience which is already 
sedimented in those concepts.29 Immanent critique rejects the notion that present 
situations reflect a timeless pattern and focuses instead on ‘subjugated’ voices to produce 
alternative understandings of security. The theorist acknowledges how a particular time 
and historical context is necessary to explain the origins, development, institutions, and 
the possibilities for change. By weaving a conceptual net that suspends the object 
‘momentarily’ it can reveal the processes at work, including the ways in which it is 
potentially becoming.30 It is put to use here to identify conceptions and practices of water 
security that transcend traditional understandings of security. This is important in chapter 
two specifically, where analyses of traditional discourses, literature, ideologies, and 
practices, are used to show the historical and conceptual inconsistencies that create such 
problematic understandings of security and environmental change. Immanent critique 
exposes the internal contradictions of seemingly intractable water conflict in politically 
                                                 
27
 McDonald, The Environment, Security, and Emancipation, 90. 
28
 Christopher S. Browning, and Matt McDonald. “The Future of Critical Security Studies: Ethics and the 
Possibility of Security.” European Journal of International Relations First published on 27 October 2011: 
14. 
29
 Simon Jarvis. Adorno: A Critical Introduction. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998): 6 
30
 Andrew Biro. Critical Ecologies: The Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises. 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011): 123 
15 
 
volatile regions. These contradictions are the fault lines where alternative visions of 
security can be identified, empowered and amplified.  
Chapters five and six reflect the praxeological focus of immanent critique by constructing 
a sketch of emancipatory water security built on the pillars of inclusion, communication, 
and cosmopolitanism, and then searching for those identifying features in contemporary 
water security practices. This form of analysis arises from the idea that even the bleakest 
situations have within them the possibilities of a better life. We are not doomed to repeat 
the failures of the past. Or, as Max Horkheimer argues, “Man can change reality, and the 
necessary conditions for such change already exist.”31 Chapter six presents a case that 
hydrosolidarity is one of the overlooked discourses of contemporary water politics. It 
argues that hydrosolidarity, in various institutionalized forms, can provoke radically new 
understandings of water security as emancipation. It does so by pointing out the tensions, 
inconsistencies, and, contradictions of traditional water security. All told, the dissertation 
relies upon a practice-orientated theory, capable of proposing scenarios and critical 
methods for citizen deliberation, all in the service of building what Richard Wyn Jones 
refers to as “concrete utopias.”32    
1.5 Definitions  
It is useful here to clarify many of the terms and concepts that will be used throughout the 
dissertation.  
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1.5.1 Traditional Security 
“Traditional” security is perhaps most succinctly summed up by Stephen Walt as “the 
study of the threat, use, and control of military force.”33 It refers to a wide span of 
approaches to security that employ an instrumental logic derived from a rationalist 
epistemology. It is exemplified in the broad range of studies that holds assumptions of 
actor rationality, self-interest, and value-maximization. 
1.5.2 Critical Security 
“Critical” security refers to a wide range of approaches that take as starting points a self-
reflective awareness to produce research that critiques the status quo, rather than simply 
trying to explain and understand it. It is heavily indebted to the tradition of critical theory, 
most actively associated with the Frankfurt School of the 1930s. Nancy Fraser observes 
that no one has improved upon Marx’s definition of critical theory as “the self-
clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age.”34 While the ideas of critical security 
have percolated for decades, it was not until 1997 that Keith Krause and Michael C. 
Williams issued their now-famous call to reconsider the concepts and methodologies 
traditionally employed in security studies.35 They argued that rethinking security required 
“making the definition of the political a question, rather than an assumption.” Thus 
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critical security is premised on the political nature of security – how understandings and 
practices of security affect social relations and the political order itself.36  
1.5.3 Traditional vs. Critical Security 
Reflecting an essentialized security foundation, both traditional and critical approaches 
begin from the idea of security as the absence of threat. But from there the approaches 
diverge almost immediately. Their perceptions of security are contingently based; that is, 
they are not logically necessary. From similar starting points, traditional approaches 
focus on protection through the use of power, while critical theorists focus on shared 
vulnerabilities and the emancipation of the individual through “the extension of dialogic 
possibilities in the contemporary world order.”37  In each case, security becomes security, 
or security is understood as security, but through two distinctly different political 
readings of the term. In traditional approaches this means that security conforms to the 
“real side of politics,” that is, as policy action in an unchanging international sphere, 
where states are the only significant actor and their relations are naturalized mainly 
because they are structurally pre-determined.38 It is different from critical approaches that 
argue that traditional views on security, the state, and the international system are 
historically conditioned, socially constructed, value-laden, and remiss at questioning the 
naturalness of the prevailing order. Instead critical theory problematizes the 
contemporary world order and the power relations that characterize it on the grounds that 
they both solidify and perpetuate exploitative social relations. According to this point of 
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view, there is nothing organic to, or necessary within, human relations to suggest that the 
existing system of exploitative social relations is a fixed and necessary historical creation. 
Rather it represents but one particular socio-historical interpretation of reality.39 To sum 
up, as Timothy Sinclair maintains, traditional theory “assumes the functional coherence 
of existing phenomena, critical theory seeks out the sources of contradiction and conflict 
in these entities and evaluates their potential to change into different patterns.”40 
1.5.4 Emancipation 
Emancipation is a complicated and thorny concept - one that has received relatively 
minor attention despite being a central component of critical security. Its pursuit is the 
central intent of scholars who adhere to the Frankfurt School model of critical theory and 
it provides the necessary impetus for the construction of alternative, progressive, security 
discourses and practices. Indeed, while critical theory itself encompasses hugely diverse 
approaches, the linkage among all critical theory is “the emancipatory intent.”41 This 
dissertation relies upon the definition put forth by Ken Booth, perhaps the most 
prominent theorist of the “Welsh School” of security studies. He conceives of 
emancipation as “the philosophy, theory, and politics, of inventing humanity.”42 This 
deliberately obscure definition holds within it the possibility of progress, but it is a view 
of progress that is both dynamic and reversible. This dissertation relies significantly on 
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the Welsh School, principally its commitment to critiquing state-centrism in security 
studies and its normative appeals for emancipation as a guide in theory and practice. An 
emancipatory vision of security is holistic, non-statist, and de-emphasizes the use or 
threat of force. The practical fulfillment of security as emancipation requires the freeing 
of individuals from arbitrary structures preventing them from living as they would 
otherwise wish.43 It entails overturning structures of oppression or exclusion. Its principal 
characteristics are that it is radically cosmopolitan; predicated on the rights and needs of 
the most vulnerable; and that the means envisaged to achieve or preserve ‘security’ will 
not deprive others of it.44 Given that individuals’ experiences of security and insecurity 
are heavily tied to their access to water resources, it is logical to situate the critical 
concept of emancipation as a rejoinder to traditional, dominant security discourses.  
1.5.5 Emancipatory Water Security 
The vision of water security put forth in this dissertation relies upon an integrative 
understanding of the problem and possibilities that water security offers, and is derivative 
of the insights of critical security. It argues for an emancipatory security of water that is 
dependent upon an inclusive morality, a communicative rationality, and cosmopolitan 
ethics. Water security becomes then much more than adequate access to quality water 
supplies, though this is certainly a prerequisite. It entails a political understanding of 
water security that unshackles the barriers to inclusion, communication, and refrains from 
barring others from also exercising their rights. Thus, emancipatory water security is 
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defined herein as, the process of securing vulnerable populations from the structural 
violence caused by the political, social, and natural impediments to adequate water 
supplies needed for a good life, while simultaneously ensuring the means by which water 
security is achieved does not also deprive others of it nor degrade affected ecosystems. 
This definition is designed as a targeted and practical application of Ken Booth’s 
deliberately obtuse vision of emancipation as “the philosophy, theory, and politics of 
inventing humanity.” It de-privileges the dominant actors of traditional security, and 
places the overriding focus of security on individuals and communities (and the natural 
environment upon which they rely) who suffer the most from inadequate water supplies. 
It is thus able to provide an actionable theory of water security, providing both 
intellectual coherence and practical guidance for designing future institutional and 
governance architecture that alleviate suffering. By reframing water security along 
individual lines, it can provide agency-possessing actors and those who challenge them 
with a reference point: are the policies currently in practice and are the policies 
envisioned for the future able to alleviate human suffering and ecological degradation 
caused by water insecurity?45 To answer these pivotal questions, emancipatory water 
security, as defined, relies upon the development of three central criteria that can help 
alleviate human suffering and which are also reflective of the overall spirit of 
emancipation in critical security studies. They are inclusion, communication, and 
cosmopolitanism. All three criteria are explored at length in chapter five, which seeks to 
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balance Booth’s emancipatory approach with a pragmatic application, all the while 
avoiding schematic, instrumental blueprints. 
1.5.6 Water Stress, Water Scarcity, Water Security 
Given the frequency with which the terms are employed in the dissertation it is useful to 
elaborate upon what is meant by water stress, water scarcity, and water security. The 
relationship between them is one that is often assumed to be interchangeable, though in 
reality, they remain distinct. The prolific Swedish hydrologist, Malin Falkenmark, has 
most succinctly defined water stress. Her Falkenmark Water Stress Indicator labels a 
country or a region as water stressed if its annual water supplies dip below 1,700 cubic 
metres (m3) per person per year.  Water scarcity occurs when water supplies fall below 
1,000 m3 per person per year.46 That said, given the range of agricultural and industrial 
practices and expectations throughout the world, it is not especially useful to assign a 
specific value to water scarcity or stress. Water scarcity is best understood simply as 
“imbalances between availability and demand.” When demand outstrips supply, water 
scarcity occurs. Contributing factors include “the degradation of groundwater and surface 
water quality, intersectoral competition, and interregional and international conflict.” 
Altogether, water scarcity is most often an issue of poverty.47 Water stress represents the 
effects of water scarcity or shortage including growing conflict between users and 
competition for water, declining standards of reliability and service, harvest failures and 
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food insecurity.48 Water security, is perhaps the most difficult to pinpoint. Cook and 
Bakker write, “Framings of water security are by no means consistent and tend to vary 
with context and disciplinary perspectives on water use.”49 There are both broad and 
narrow approaches to defining the concept. The most commonly used broad-based 
definition comes from the Global Water Partnership. In 2000, at the Second World Water 
Forum, it defined water security as a central goal “…where every person has access to 
enough safe water at affordable cost to lead a clean, healthy and productive life, while 
ensuring the environment is protected and enhanced.”50 This implies a central 
preoccupation with watershed management (for “life”), and demands adequate water 
quantities and quality for human and ecosystem needs. More narrow formulations often 
focus on the differentiated sectoral needs. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) defines water security in direct connection with food security, arguing it is the 
ability to provide adequate and reliable water supplies to meet agricultural demands.51 
The British non-governmental organization (NGO), WaterAid, conducted a literature 
review of the field, and found that most definitions of water security relate to food 
security, essentially asking - do we have enough water to grow the food we need?52  
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1.6 Chapter Outline  
This dissertation is divided into two broad sections. The first – chapters two, three, and 
four – undertake a sustained critique of the traditional concepts inherent in accounts of 
international relations, international security, and environmental security. These chapters, 
while each standing alone, work together to lay the groundwork for the second section of 
the thesis – chapters five and six – which builds a framework for emancipatory water 
security. It builds this framework in chapter five, and then identifies hydrosolidarity in 
chapter six as an emancipatory potential embedded in contemporary water security. A 
more thorough outline of each chapter is useful to situate the reader moving forward. 
Chapter two, “Historical Paradigms in International Security” characterizes theoretical 
complacency as prevalent in the study and construction of what is generally labeled 
“traditional” approaches to security. It does so by questioning the myth of tradition that 
permeates traditional security studies. It argues that “historical geographies”, such as the 
“The Great Debates” misrepresent the diversity of experiences related to security and are 
too easily employed to justify contemporary policies. It furthers this line of thinking by 
revisiting the Kuhn/Popper debate on the nature and resilience of particular paradigms. 
The central line of argument is that the disciplines of international relations/international 
security have clung to contradictory and obscure myths of tradition, to damaging effect. 
In other words, scholars of international relations have, “little practice in imagining what 
it considers ‘impossible things.’” 53 It argues though that water security may be 
demonstrative of a Kuhnian paradigm shift, showing what was thought to be permanent is 
in fact alterable.  
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Chapter three, “Water Wars and Environmental Security,” reviews the literature on 
environmental and water security. It begins by delineating the onset and subsequent four 
phases of environmental security literature, emphasizing the deepening moves apparent 
in the latest, fourth stage of environmental security. It does so with a critical awareness 
also apparent in chapter two, that delineating vast bodies of literature into uniform phases 
comes with its own set of problems. It then discusses the history of the concept of water 
wars and their use as a “hegemonic concept” and examines the discursive use of water 
wars as a legitimating force for traditional security studies. Much of the traditional water 
security literature follows the same trajectory as the broader environmental security 
literature. It evokes a picture of water as a dwindling natural resource that has the 
potential to act as a threat multiplier in an age of climate insecurity and domestic 
upheaval in a warming world. In response, a normative and theoretical critique is offered 
that disputes the usage of the water wars discourse and lays the groundwork for the 
theory building of emancipatory water security in chapter five. 
Chapter four, “Water Securitization in the Anthropocene” argues that the securitization 
framework of the Copenhagen School is useful for analyzing when water becomes 
designated as a threat using security language. Despite its analytical use however, the 
Copenhagen School puts forth a flawed reading of security, one that is largely inspired by 
the work of the twentieth century German Jurist Carl Schmitt. This reading is 
increasingly incoherent, in an ecological age when the distinction between exception and 
the rule is blurred. Chapter four provides an extended case study of the securitization of 
the Nile River Basin region, and the ways in which securitization is used to justify a 
security logic predicated on the threat of water wars and conflict. In the end, it argues for 
a deeper understanding of security, away from the securitization thesis and its Schmittian 
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definition of “security as extremity.” It does do so by arguing that the use/misuse of 
“securitization” as an employable theoretical construct replicates problematic 
understandings of security and fails to bring us closer to understanding its diverse nature, 
especially as it relates to water.  
Chapter five, “Towards an Emancipatory Security of Water: Inclusion, Communication, 
and Cosmopolitanism,” marks the beginning of the second section of the dissertation. It 
explores the idea that water can act as a progressive site for the articulation of 
emancipatory policies based upon cosmopolitan ethics. It asks the question, “What does 
an emancipatory security of water look like?” The chapter answers by constructing an 
“emancipatory security of water” that has three defining features: inclusion, 
communication, and cosmopolitanism. These three features are identified as central 
because they represent an ethically viable approach to water conflict and degradation in 
the twenty-first century. Without some combination of all three features it is difficult to 
envision the future looking anything other than a worsening reflection of the present. The 
idea in this chapter is not to provide a rigid policy blueprint for scholars and practitioners, 
but a process-oriented vision that is mutable and open to adaption, provided the principles 
remain. 
Chapter six, “Hydrosolidarity: the Ethics of Water Security,” isolates Swedish 
hydrologist Malin Falkenmark’s concept of hydrosolidarity as a promising alternative to 
traditional water security discourses. It provides a historical overview of the concept of 
hydrosolidarity, originally used as the ethical component to the dominant water 
management paradigm, Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). It then 
examines the promise and perils of IWRM, arguing that despite some promise, the 
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scientific and technical rationality at its heart is being overemphasized at the expense of 
normative judgments. The chapter’s final section analyzes the potential of Global Water 
Solidarity, a United Nations Development Programme-led initiative, to act as an 
immanent representation of emancipatory water security.  
 
1.7 Anticipated Contributions  
This thesis presents an overview, assessment, and reconsideration of water security. 
Stemming from dissatisfaction with the continued intransigence of conventional 
approaches to water security, it seeks to recast water security using emancipation as its 
ordering principle. The commitment to emancipation as an ordering concept for future 
water security practices is not without potential problems, as the following chapters will 
show. However, it does provide some measure of theoretical sophistication and should 
help push forward actionable designs for future security policies that take human 
suffering and structural violence seriously.  
This thesis is primarily theoretical. Its validity will rest on the internal consistency of its 
core propositions and the existing literature upon which many of its arguments are based. 
Empirical illustrations are offered, particularly in chapters four and six. These are done in 
the service of crafting a legitimate critique of existing approaches and in building a 
critical security of water. Arising from a critical theoretical stance, there are justified 
hesitations to construct schematic blueprints that should be adhered to by water officials 
and communities. That said, this thesis is committed to a form of praxis, of actively 
thinking about and acting in the world. By contributing a detailed emancipatory 
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framework this thesis can offer valued insight into how to think about, and respond to 
ongoing human and ecological suffering related to water.  
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2 CHAPTER TWO: Historical Paradigms in International 
Security 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Susan Strange, writing almost two decades ago, argued, “social scientists, in politics and 
economics especially, cling to obsolete concepts and inappropriate theories.”54 This 
observation guides the next chapter, which produces an immanent critique of the 
historical and conceptual trajectory of the broad program of International Security 
Studies (ISS). It argues that Kuhnian paradigm shifts are indeed possible; international 
security is constantly vulnerable to change and to the usurpation of dominant ontologies. 
Moreover, it maintains the concept of water security is at the forefront of a contemporary 
paradigm shift – away from Westphalian notions of state-centrism and exclusionary 
binaries of inside/outside, friend/enemy – towards critical ontologies of emancipation. 
The overall critique lays out the inconsistencies of traditional accounts of the field of 
international relations and security and argues for a better appreciation of the concept of 
change in ISS. The intention is to acknowledge the space for alternative theorizing in the 
field, which bring forth multiple visions of security. Such a maneuver is crucial for later 
attempts in the manuscript to outline an emancipatory security of water. It begins first by 
isolating and disrupting the “myth of tradition” that continues to order international 
relations and international security studies as a whole. It then re-examines the Kuhn-
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Popper debate in the philosophy of science to highlight the impact that shared beliefs of 
an academic community have in conditioning orthodoxy, rather than critically examining 
or altering the foundations of their knowledge. All told, most approaches to security fail 
to adequately account for the possibility of change on an ontological and epistemological 
level. The result then is the continued prevalence of analyses that replicate conventional, 
approaches to security that cannot envision alternative transformations that may further 
emancipatory change. This commitment to reproduction brings us no closer to solving the 
complex problems of water scarcity and degradation for individuals and communities. 
Later chapters in this dissertation will examine the extent of alternative possibilities in 
water security and detail emancipatory opportunities that provide models of hope and 
progress.  
2.2 The Story of Security Studies 
The story of security studies mirrors the discipline of international relations (IR) in its 
attachment to a set of foundational myths. As a subset of IR it may come as little surprise 
that international security studies (ISS) largely depends on a linear history of itself to 
organize and order its arrival and evolution as an academic field of study. The historical 
trajectory of IR is often taught to students as a series of “great debates,” between idealism 
and realism, traditionalism and behaviouralism, the inter-paradigm debate, and the 
positivist-post-positivist debate. The disagreements historically arising within the 
discipline have been used as the principal signposts through which students can most 
easily absorb the complexities associated with its thematic evolution. It makes for a good 
story, and thus a generally effective pedagogic device. The creation of the great debates 
mythology has been used to impart a sense of tradition in IR. James Der Derian has 
pointed out that “the power of a tradition lies in its ability to condense and simplify this 
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complexity into uniform, teachable expressions…”55 The danger is that the prevailing 
reliance on tradition allows for a naturalizing history of international relations that makes 
it difficult, even heretical to “think the unthought.”56 
In much the same way, ISS has developed its own attachments to historical myth making, 
fashioning a narrative that is an enabling gateway for students to begin to understand its 
agendas of study. A typical account of ISS begins by acknowledging its relatively recent 
addition as a sub-discipline of political science in general, IR in particular. Perfunctory 
historical accounts hold the discipline as emerging with the onset of nuclear-age 
international politics. Accordingly, ISS arose from a new need by governments and 
militaries to plan strategically during peacetime – fusing military power and political 
purpose.57 The end of World War Two, with the division of the world into two competing 
super power systems, and the eventual nuclear stalemate between the U.S. and USSR, 
created a new, diffuse, influence for non-military strategic planners. According to most 
historical overviews it was at the end of World War Two where the field of study 
recognized as ISS first emerged. The new possibility of influence in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s experienced by civilian experts in social science and physicists was the result 
of a new acceptance of a wider understanding of “security”, beyond simply war and 
defence. Security studies (at this point, probably more aptly referred to as “strategic 
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studies”) entered a “golden age” of influence from 1955-1965.58 During this time, it 
concentrated almost exclusively on great power politics and nuclear deterrence. The 
inclusion of civilians into strategic planning during the war paved the way for this 
“golden age” of security studies. The war made clear that the potential for destruction 
was now too important to be left to the generals. Individuals not previously 
commissioned to be included in the corridors of military power and strategy were able to 
exert a new and unique influence upon warfighting and the pursuit of strategic advantage. 
The nature of the Cold War, and the intensity of the conflict absent of direct military 
confrontation, was conducive to the inclusion of both military and non-military aspects of 
the generalized subject.59 
 Increasingly events in the Third World began to disrupt and reorient strategic studies 
analyses. The oil crisis in the early 1970s and the defeat of American forces in Vietnam 
generated new doubt about the utility of force and the ability of third world cartels to 
weaken the Western economy. The 1980s saw a rise of new studies in security that 
questioned the traditional approaches and sought to widen the scope of threats under 
review and to deepen the meaning of security. The end of the Cold War produced an 
invigorated debate between and amongst traditionalists, and those who sought to widen 
and deepen the traditional ISS framework. The inclusion of new topics such as the 
environment, terrorism, poverty, AIDS, and immigration in security studies was 
vigorously debated, and was responsible for disrupting traditional security studies’ 
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epistemological and methodological coherence. Today, the story of security studies is one 
of multiple approaches and meanings. And, depending on whom you ask, the expansion 
of security studies into new and diverse approaches has further enriched the 
understanding of threat, or has produced an incoherent and ineffective field of study, 
removed from the reality of contemporary international affairs.60 
A similar approach orders the intellectual history of international relations. As the story 
goes, IR, first coined over two hundred years ago by Jeremy Bentham, began as an 
academic discipline with the endowment of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at the University 
of Wales, Aberystwyth, in 1919 in a noble attempt to differentiate the study of war and 
peace from other disciplines like history and economics, with which it was usually 
lumped. It was believed that rigorous inquiry into the relations between states was 
necessary to assuage the human impulse to war. The level of devastation wrought by the 
First World War compelled academics and policy makers to commit to correct the errors, 
miscalculations, and distrust created by historical international interaction. The pursuit of 
scholarly inquiry for this central aim was intended to be an important contribution to state 
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relations. The idealist impulse in the first years of IR as a formal academic discipline was 
thus a strong component in its institutionalization.  
However, the onset of World War Two produced a significant disruption in the broad 
idealist project. E.H. Carr, in his opus, Twenty Years’ Crisis, published in 1939, produced 
a seemingly devastating critique of idealism arguing that it was unable “to provide any 
absolute and disinterested standard for the conduct of international affairs.”61 Instead of 
idealist attachments to unknowable and unreachable utopias, what Carr and others 
envisioned was much further attention to ‘what is’ before turning to ‘what ought to be.’ 
While Carr himself eschewed crude commitments to empiricism (‘the facts of history 
never come to us as pure…they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder’62) 
his book was “the first to grapple with a range of international matters in the spirit of 
science…of detached enquiry stripped of the liberal rationalist teleology that 
subconsciously infused virtually all works on the subject of the period.”63 This turn in IR 
arrived at a specific time and in a specific context – as a response to the perceived failure 
of liberal internationalist approaches that relied heavily on an absolutist morality that 
believed reality could be transformed by an act of will.64 The emergence of The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis in 1939, at the onset of another catastrophic world war, seems to suggest 
that it was stimulated by the failure of both policy and analysis. The book was a 
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remarkable achievement in that it bridged together diplomacy, security, war, and policy 
prescription. Authors as diverse as Kal Holsti, James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgreff, 
Michael Banks, J. Ann Tickner, James Der Derian, and Chris Brown have all, at one 
point or another, worked to consolidate a view that the theory of realism defeated 
utopianism/idealism/liberal internationalism.65  
The arrival of the Cold War and the beginning of the second great debate saw IR scholars 
move away from traditional interpretivist methods and embrace the move made by most 
North American social scientists towards the methods proposed by rational choice theory. 
Rational choice theory examines the behaviour of actors (whether they be individuals, 
states, companies, etc) under the assumption that these actors are rational, self-interested, 
and value maximizing.66 The third discipline-defining debate occurred between 
neoliberals and neorealists and is often referred to as “the inter-paradigm debate.”67 
Finally, the fourth debate, first arriving in the mid-late 1980s, occurred between 
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positivists and post-positivists. It dealt with themes like meta-scientific units, the concern 
with underlying premises and assumptions, and saw a drift to methodological pluralism.68  
There are genuine problems in producing unified intellectual histories of IR and ISS. It 
replicates the dominant normative position of a few theoretical approaches, legitimating 
their presence and value, while simultaneously ignoring and devaluing the plurality of 
voices that have offered cogent alternative interpretations. Beyond that, it presupposes a 
coherence and continuity within a specific theoretical paradigm that avoids critically 
investigating the differences across time and space. Despite what many writers in IR/ISS 
would have us believe it is not at all self-evident that Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Carr 
occupy a genuine historical pattern of thought. Arising across many centuries, and in 
vastly different contexts, it is more appropriate to speak of the “intellectual history” of 
IR/ISS through nebulous connections between authors and not through a uniformity of 
thought. The traditional approach is misleading and generally legitimates and validates 
the interests of the presenting authors instead of performing a true uncovering of the past. 
Brian Schmidt expertly argues this line of reasoning in his critique of the historiography 
of academic IR. He argues that there have been two pervasive intellectual errors in most 
historical studies of IR. The first is the confusion between an analytical and historical 
tradition. The second is the mistaken premise that events in world politics have had a 
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determinative and causal effect upon the development of the discipline.69 Schmidt looks 
to K.J. Holsti’s important survey of IR, The Dividing Discipline, first published in 1986, 
as an expert example of the power that the myth of tradition holds upon many IR 
theorists. While acknowledging that international theory was in disarray during the fourth 
debate in the mid-1980s, enabling new conceptions and images of the world to emerge”70, 
Holsti frames this “disarray” as a “breakdown” of a dominant realist paradigm that 
extended back to Hobbes, Rousseau and Bentham and forward to modern authors like 
Carr, Martin Wight, and Hans Morgenthau.  In so doing, Schmidt argues that Holsti 
produces a generally false sense of coherence and continuity. 
The disrupted, incongruent history of ideas that marks the development of IR and ISS has 
been generally overlooked for the sake of clean and demarcated lines of progression and 
development. The ubiquity of the linear narrative results in the historicity of the 
genealogical relationship being taken as given, with rarely any demonstration of the 
accuracy of its connections. One can then see that the use and reliance on grand 
narratives obfuscates what are principally analytical traditions rather than historical ones. 
As Schmidt writes, “the primary concern of many of the disciplinary histories of 
international relations is really to say something authoritative and critical about the field’s 
current or desired character.”71 To participate in the idealization of the past is to utilize 
one of the many disciplinary tools that help maintain the fatalist logic that seemingly 
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dominates both IR and ISS.72 Narratives that stretch IR back to Ancient Greece, or to the 
beginning of the Cold War nuclear rivalry between the US and USSR ‘naturalize 
categories of identity’. It tells us about the expected character of the discipline, 
privileging particular ontologies of power and individualism.73 Isolating Thucydides as 
the father of IR claims the preeminent position for realism, only to be reinforced by the 
historical inclusion of such theoretical “heavyweights” as Machiavelli and Hobbes into 
the historical narrative.74 All of this ignores the myriad ways that an author as seemingly 
canonical as Thucydides can be interpreted. Richard Ned Lebow’s The Tragic Vision of 
Politics (2003) and A Cultural History of International Relations (2005) have recast 
Thucydides through the lens of tragedy and honour.75 For him, the Ancient Greek world 
can be generally reduced to the role that honour played. This is a much more optimistic 
(though still weary of the ‘tragic’ nature of the human condition) interpretation of 
Thucydides that would likely appear unfamiliar to most students of conventionally-taught 
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IR.76 In this reading of Thucydides, humans are able to adapt and learn from art, history, 
and experience. Indeed, it is not difficult to find examples from the ancient world that 
privilege other sets of principles, separate from realism and power politics. In the second 
century BC, the Greek historian Polybius chronicled Rome’s rise to power in forty books 
that came to be known as The Histories. Book VI on the Roman Constitution argues that 
Rome was not simply dependent on power for its hegemonic position, but also derived 
authority from the strengths of its political structure and mixed constitution.77 This 
parallels modern liberal theory, specifically the general character of the democratic peace 
thesis in its emphasis on internal political structure playing an important role in foreign 
and military policy. It also frees us from the misguided assumption that the ancient world 
only exhibits the ‘timeless’ character of realism. Overall though, it is wrong to paint 
complex ancient writers like Polybius with contemporary brushes; their ideas are often 
multifaceted, exhibiting characteristics that are both present and absent modern theories 
of IR/ISS. But, Polybius’s ancient moral judgments,  
Are deeply expressive of a concern for the maintenance of ethical behaviour in a 
difficult and complex world…Polybius’s desire for the ‘improvement of his 
audience was not limited to the creation of more pragmatically efficient decisions 
makers – although of course he had much to say in that direction. Rather, 
Polybius also hoped that those who studied his Histories would emerge with a 
firm determination to live their lives nobly – according to the κ α λ •ν . 
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We might also ask “why Thucydides?” or “why Polybius?” The traditional approaches to 
international relations derive their authority from proving the enduring connections 
across space, time, and context. But by consulting ancient western authors and 
interspersing interpretations of their general themes, traditional IR writers create a 
thematic vacuum that subsumes alternative readings and explanations of international 
relations and security. Readers of the Melian Dialogue can easily be led to assume that 
international relations has always been and must always be primarily concerned with the 
relations between great powers in the international system. This trajectory from Ancient 
Greece to modern times then becomes a linear historical narrative that understands 
international relations primarily in terms of successive struggles between great powers 
and the rise and fall of powerful states.78 If, as Kenneth Waltz points out, “a general 
theory of international politics is necessarily based on great powers,”79 then traditional 
international relations and security studies must necessarily be Eurocentric, because, well 
that is where we find all the “great powers.” The regrettable downside is that traditional 
IR and ISS become characterized by historical geographies that reproduce a set of 
Eurocentric categories and assumptions; this, instead of a more appropriately nuanced 
understanding of the mutual constitution of European and non-European worlds, and their 
joint role in producing history.80 The question then might rightfully be asked why non-
Western historical social practices are predominantly underrepresented? Why Thucydides 
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and not Sun Tzu? Why the Melian Dialogue and not the Analects of Confucius? The 
seventeenth century Japanese guide A Book of Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi might 
teach us as much as Carl von Clausewitz or Antoine-Henry Jomini about military 
strategy. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani wrote his Islamic treatise on the 
international law of nations, Kitab al-Siyar al-Kabir (or Shaybani’s Siyar), hundreds of 
years before Grotius and other European thinkers, yet is conspicuously left out of most 
traditional studies of IR.81 What this points to is the perpetuation of a historical tradition 
in IR/ISS that fails to adequately interrogate the limits of its theoretical boundaries in any 
sustained way. This is because in traditionalist approaches to IR and ISS, the disciplinary 
boundaries are made possible, and reinforced by, discursive practices that animate a 
select few canonical texts as the lightning rods for acceptable analogy and the limits of 
appropriate criticism. The result of this is the stagnant and unreflective privileging of 
ontologies that fail to fully manage the complexities related to perceptions of security.  
Of course it would be foolish to diminish the profundity or significance of what may be 
conveyed by ancient and modern canonical authors. Writers like Thucydides, Hobbes, 
Machiavelli, and others selected to be the bearers of a timeless wisdom have much to 
teach us. Despite that they may only be true progenitors of a specific “reality” of their 
own time and context (male, European), their thoughts on life, community, peace, and 
war, can help better inform our own modern conceptions and policies related to security. 
But we would be well served to appreciate that the particular meaning of the historical 
text cannot help but be shaped by our contributions to the readings. Our own discourses, 
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interests, histories, goals, and idiosyncrasies influence what we choose to decipher. This 
understanding stands in direct contrast to traditional approaches to security, which follow 
the logic that Raymond Aron explicated in 1969: “strategic thought draws its inspiration 
each century, or rather at each moment of history, from the problems which events 
themselves pose.”82 The traditional problem-solving approach to security, as explained by 
Aron, relies upon an implicit assumption that facts, both historical and contemporary, 
speak for themselves. They are to be uncovered by observers and put to use in describing 
new emerging phenomena or problems. The security analyst can then through 
observation and reasoning secure a conceptual grasp and locate it within a particular 
philosophical tradition, or identify it as an important theoretical lacuna, to be filled 
primarily through empirical testing or logical reasoning. Essentially this approach 
collapses knowledge and belief into a single form.  
In response to this, some, such as David Welch, tell us that the task of the security 
theorists and practitioner is then, “to discipline the activity in such a way that we 
minimize our own contributions.”83 Welch believes that while we may never discover the 
essential truth of an author, we still are able to learn something. Another way of putting it 
is that while we may not find the essence, we can still view patterns. This is not a terribly 
convincing argument. Patterns are generally put to use to simplify and generalize a 
complex range of knowledge. Their usage eschews the more troubling and daunting 
incoherence and indeterminacy that can be found existing at any given time and space. 
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Our continued search for transhistorical truths in traditional IR and ISS can generally 
only amount to a particular contemporary understanding of a particular event, author, or 
grand work. It is not possible to fully understand the essence of a particular author or 
event in the past. This is because escaping the web of interconnections between the realm 
of the political and the identity of the individual is a rather impossible task. Rather we are 
better served if we succumb to the understanding that our identities create the lenses 
through which we view international relations and security.84 As sociologists have shown, 
these identities are not derivative of a fixed human nature, but rather the product of social 
construction – a mixture of our own genetic makeup and the social structures in which we 
exist.  
Attempting to mitigate the effects of the self in analyzing and ordering the study of 
security is a losing battle, one that can have damaging consequences for both the object 
and subject of security. Writing in the 1950s, historian Herbert Butterfield deplored the 
use of history in providing a “heroic narrative”, in which the past was made to speak for 
the present.85 For him, uncovering histories that yield lessons for the present was the 
result of the contemporary makeup of the historian’s mind. Thus history for Butterfield 
was an ongoing process, with interpretation ever evolving. He writes, “The best any of us 
can do at a given moment only represents the present state of knowledge in respect of the 
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subject with which we are dealing.”86 This is because the past consists solely of isolated 
facts that can only be ordered by those interpreting them from the present. Michael 
Oakeshott explained this lucidly when writing, “the past in history varies with the 
present, rests upon the present, is the present.”87 In other words, the past cannot exist 
independently of the present. And the present is never separate from the subject. Thus, 
the use of analyses for formulating and justifying present policies related to security is a 
dangerous exercise because it relies upon a construction of truth. And this construction is 
not an infallible tower; it is dependent on the facts, values, and experiences of its 
builders, the authors. The truth claims posited can never be demonstrably shown; they 
can only be inferred from available evidence.  
Brian Schmidt has argued that with regard to international relations, “instead of a history 
that traces the actual lineage of scholars who self-consciously and institutionally 
understood themselves as participating in the academic discourse of international 
relations, we are presented with an idealized version of the past in the form of a tradition 
stretching from Ancient Athens to the present.”88 What it leads to is the reification of 
structural analyses that are unreflective, uncritical and hardly close to showing a 
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historical truth.89 The “epic renderings” of the field’s history may be rhetorically effective 
but it obscures its disciplinary function, bringing us no closer to its past and present 
characters.90 An artificially constructed tradition helps create the conditions for action 
that are fixed on power and order, limiting the possibility for emancipatory change. 
Instead of enabling true security for the individual, traditional uses of history in ISS work 
mainly to falsely objectify the security dilemma, whereby one actor’s security must lead 
to another’s insecurity. There are alternative approaches to the way we might use the 
“ancients,” the “fathers,” or the “traditional” study of security without simply reducing it 
all to caricatures of ancient realism proving a timeless quality for privileged disciplinary 
theories. This is not to diminish the depth of thought that such authors present but is 
rather to convey that totalizing histories of IR and ISS can mislead students and 
practitioners into theoretical complacency and impose practical limitations on 
implementing security practices. It seems that to participate in this tradition is to enter 
“into a debate the terms of which have been largely set beforehand.”91  
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2.3 Science, Change, and Critique in International Security: 
Ducks and Rabbits  
The outset of this chapter has sought to characterize theoretical complacency as prevalent 
in the study and construction of what are generally labeled “traditional” approaches to 
security. This complacency manifests itself in an uncritical acceptance of a monological 
approach in international relations and international security studies. The previous section 
used immanent critique – a historically specific, self-reflexive critique of society - to 
justify the blurring of disciplinary boundaries of security. The intention has been to pave 
the way for a critical theory of water security with emancipatory intent. For critical water 
security to offer progressive alternatives that alleviate suffering – to remain optimistic – it 
must first allow for the possibility of change. These possibilities derive from disruption of 
the conceptual principles and standards of an object (international security) on its own 
terms. As the thesis unfolds it will become clear how the implications and consequences 
of traditional approaches to security are broadly negative for water security.  
It is here that the concept of change becomes important. While one must be wary not to 
mischaracterize traditional approaches to security through the use of straw-man 
caricatures, there remains an allegiance within academia and policy-making circles to a 
mythologized culture of “strategy”, dependent upon social constructions of the past for 
legitimation. The “one-eyed science”92 this generates prioritizes and privileges one 
particular branch of scholarship using history and science as validation. What is needed, 
as Rosenau argued over two decades ago, is for us to “jailbreak” our intellectual 
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equipment and look for new ways to interpret the world.93 In such spirit, what is 
attempted here is an approach to water security that relies on communicative rather than 
instrumental logic; one that pursues a more inclusive discussion and a more critical 
engagement with important and venerable traditions in international security, rather than 
a valorization of an evolutionary history that rationalizes traditional approaches and 
obscures the very real possibilities for emancipatory change.94 
It is clear that the historical dominance of traditional forms of security analysis belies the 
abundant diversity of approaches to understanding security. Despite the fact that in the 
last three decades, IR/ISS have experienced a significant deepening and widening in 
approaches, it is apparent that the traditional paradigm maintains a particular resilience. 
Traditional ISS (as a more-or-less uniform approach) is dependent upon a particular 
reading of human affairs that privileges a rational accumulation of knowledge, put to use 
to solve contemporary problems.95 In so doing it maintains a particularly strong grip on 
the principles of acceptable scholarship. Because the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions implicit in traditional security studies create the conditions by which the 
world is ordered, it constitutes its own set of shared understandings that render critical 
analysis as inconsequential, illegitimate, or downright dangerous.96 Or, to use Holsti’s 
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terms, “today, traditional concepts act as ontological blinders rather than as aids to 
understanding.”97 
2.4 Kuhn, Popper, and “Paradigm Shifts” 
One of the more familiar charges against critical security studies is that it maintains a 
naïve attachment to the potential for change. It is necessary then, if we are to create a 
theoretically and methodologically strong critical research project, to develop a good 
understanding why it is so hard to unseat commonly held assumptions. Thus it is 
worthwhile to focus some brief attention on the Kuhnian-Popper debate on the resilience 
and revolution of scientific paradigms. This is undertaken to better understand the base 
structure of scholarship and policy that maintains an allegiance to traditional approaches. 
Multiple authors in IR have highlighted the importance of the concept of change. Holsti 
points out that, despite change being crucial for distinguishing different IR theories, it 
remains undertheorized. He writes, “In International Relations we do not have even the 
beginning of a consensus on what constitutes change or transformation in political life.”98     
A longer examination of Kuhn’s sociology of science is provided because he is so useful 
for critical theorists interested in the evolution of academic disciplines. But a brief look at 
the Kuhn-Popper debate also allows us to upset the traditional narrative of their 
disagreement, which generally divides Kuhn and Popper along reflectivist-realist axes. 
The truth though is more complex, demonstrating both convergences and divergences 
between the authors and their ideas.  The principal aim of this discussion is to continue 
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unseating the logic of static paradigms in IR, so that we may move forward in upcoming 
chapters to develop visions of a radically emancipatory and open future for water 
security. It is a final precursor to the last section of this chapter, which describes the 
historical and contemporary literature one might broadly categorize as traditional water 
security, showing both the problems and potential for a project of emancipatory water 
security in relation to the traditional record.  
Thomas Kuhn’s enunciation of scientific paradigms provides useful insight to 
understanding the resilience of traditional approaches to security. This, despite the fact 
that Kuhn himself was skeptical about the transferability of his concepts of paradigms 
from natural sciences to social sciences. Kuhn believed that social sciences were often 
dominated by “overt disagreements” about “the nature of legitimate scientific problems 
and methods” 99 This was contrasted with the natural sciences, where the fundamentals 
failed to evoke the same level of controversy. According to Kuhn, social scientists are 
misconstruing his ideas if they take from him “the view they can improve the status of 
their field by first legislating agreement of fundamentals and then turning to puzzle 
solving.”100 While it is true that the discipline of international security has not reached a 
similar stage of development comparable with the natural sciences, Kuhn - and the lively 
debate he spawned on the nature of discovery and the role of thought communities – can 
provide us with analogies to the roots of scientific controversies.101 Kuhn was able to 
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level a significant critique of positivist science through his development of the notions of 
scientific revolutions and paradigms. Kuhn’s classic work, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, first published in 1962, is considered one of the most important modern 
books dealing with the process of intellectual discovery.  In it he argued against the 
classic model of positivism (what he termed “normal science”), which describes (and 
prescribes) knowledge production as a cumulative process of discovery that gradually 
brought researchers to the truth. The positivist approach to science develops theories and 
conclusions by testing and measuring observable phenomena. It seeks the continual 
extension of scientific knowledge through increasingly precise conclusions. However, for 
Kuhn, “normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory…”102 Instead, 
positivism is considered successful when it finds none. Kuhn believed that science should 
not accurately be seen as a cumulative process, but one that undergoes a series of stages. 
This schematic description of scientific development and evolution can be summarized 
by the following scheme:  
Pre-science – normal science – crisis – revolution – new normal science – new 
crisis103 
Normal science first exists in pre-paradigm form, which transitions into a definable 
paradigm following the acceptance by the scientific community of a disciplinary matrix 
of conceptual frames, experimental procedures, and acceptable solutions. Normal science 
proceeds to “puzzle-solve” within a so-called paradigm until the emergence of periods of 
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crises, caused by alternative candidates.104 These periods of crises represent the 
‘extraordinary’ final stage that can occur within normal science - the paradigm shift - that 
arises to radically alter basic assumptions about the previously accepted paradigm.  
The study of shifts in scientific paradigms is important because it sheds light on the 
impact the shared beliefs of an academic community can have on conditioning 
orthodoxy, rather than critically examining or altering the foundations of their 
knowledge. The epistemological commitments to normal science held by the community 
within a paradigm are reinforced by particular assumptions of how ‘reality’ is structured. 
While the aim of positivist experiments is explicitly one of discovery, and thus by 
extension, one of knowledge disruption, this is rarely the case. Kuhn writes “the scientific 
enterprise as a whole does from time to time prove useful, open up new territory, display 
order, and test long-accepted belief. Nevertheless, the individual engaged on a normal 
research problem is almost never doing any one of these things.”105 Instead, the 
assumptions, rules, and world-views, are reinforced by social incentives perpetuated by 
scientific authority, existing both in administrative and ideational capacities. The first 
accepted paradigm holds accepted ideas about the valid equipment, vocabulary, and 
skills, needed to produce legitimate scientific results. According to Kuhn, this 
“professionalization leads, on the one hand, to an immense restriction of the scientist’s 
vision and to a considerable resistance to paradigm change. The science has become 
increasingly rigid.”106  These impediments to scientific change contravene the positivist 
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commitment to objective knowledge creation. Instead of a gradual and smooth transition 
from one paradigm to another emerging from a set of superior scientific results, what is 
required is a ‘gestalt’ switch – a revolutionary re-ordering of individual conceptions of 
the world. Deliberation and interpretation, the hallmark characteristics of positivistic 
science, can only articulate a paradigm; they cannot alter it. Interpretations must be 
logically or gradually linked to the old experiences of the paradigm. Because of this, the 
technique of scientific interpretation is incapable of producing a new paradigm. Instead, 
what are required are the “flashes of intuition” that transform old experiences and 
transform them to a new bundle of experiences – and thus a new paradigm - separate 
from the one preceding it. When a paradigm shift occurs, the severity of the change that 
occurs within the researcher defies rational explanation. One might compare it to a 
religious conversion. Kuhn writes, “in so far as their only recourse to that world is 
through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are 
responding to a different world…what were ducks in the scientist’s world before the 
revolution are rabbits afterwards.107    
In 1965, Imre Lakatos, a colleague of the philosopher of science Karl Popper, organized a 
conference at the University of London aimed at the exchange of ideas between Popper 
and Kuhn and their respective supporters. The contents of this debate were published in 
1970 under the title Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Popper is best known for 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, a publication first translated into English in 1959, in 
which he developed the thesis of “falsifiability.” Falsifiability is a method used to judge 
the validity of a truth claim. For Popper, science should not attempt to “prove” a 
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knowledge claim is true but rather should constantly subject it to systematic attempts to 
falsify it. The deductive principle of falsifiability compels scientists to “test the 
consequences of their general knowledge claims in particular cases by issuing predictions 
that can be contradicted by the findings of empirical research.”108 Popper argued, contra 
Kuhn, that researchers are incentivized to produce positive findings, preferably paradigm-
altering ones – and this leads to a breakdown in scientific method. Knowledge, however 
accumulates through falsification. What is needed is the continuous replication of a study, 
testing whether new results confirm the original theories. If the original findings are 
falsified, that is if the evidence does not support the theory, then it is scrapped and a new 
theory with better explanatory power is developed in its place. The cumulative 
falsification of theories produces knowledge. If researchers do not pursue falsification 
then incorrect findings are often blindly accepted without the vigorous retesting 
necessary. 
The debate between Popper and Kuhn concerned three central differences in their 
philosophies. The existence and role of normal science; the role played by sociological 
and psychological factors in the development of scientific knowledge; and the manner in 
which scientific change occurred. Both philosophers agreed that something called 
“normal science” could be identified and that its allegiance to orthodoxy is troubling. 
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However Kuhn saw this allegiance as an inescapable and endemic characteristic, while 
Popper believed it to be the product of bad teaching and indoctrination.  
Their second disagreement concerned the extent that sociological and psychological 
factors played in the growth of scientific knowledge. Kuhn argued that social and 
psychological factors embedded in the minds of individuals who share a paradigm assist 
that growth. The logic of scientific discovery was not as important in the development of 
knowledge as was often assumed. Popper countered by attacking the spurious scientific 
nature of factors such as sociology and psychology. For him, relying on unfalsifiable 
phenomenon such as history, sociology, or psychology to account for paradigm shifts 
could easily be misused to legitimate uncritical, totalitarian truth claims?  
In the last major difference, Kuhn argued that a revolutionary gestalt switch was more 
often the cause of paradigm shifts, and that this turnover could not be evaluated 
rationally, because paradigms are necessarily incommensurable. Popper did agree that the 
smooth transition from one scientific paradigm to another was rare, but that did not mean 
that the new theories produced could not be evaluated equally and critically. He argued 
that not only did commensurability exist between old and new paradigms, but that 
dialogue, debate, and rational comparisons were all required to offset scientific 
dogmatism.109 
Kuhn and Popper’s discussion on the sociology of knowledge can be useful here in two 
significant and interrelated ways. First, it provides a lucid and penetrating interrogation of 
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knowledge paradigms, particularly the nature of their persistence, and the pitfalls that 
arise with an allegiance to this persistence. A theme up to this point of the chapter has 
been that continued allegiances to the notion of uniform paradigms within international 
security studies stifle the possibility of an emancipatory agenda. Second, the debate 
between Kuhn and Popper also neatly demonstrates the tendency (discussed earlier in the 
chapter) to create uncritical mythical narratives that simplify complex arguments and 
debates, often reducing them to caricatures used to satisfy particular knowledge claims. It 
is useful to examine both benefits more closely. 
Regarding the first use, Kuhn and Popper present differing approaches to understanding 
paradigms. Both though are able to convey how the creation of paradigm mentalities 
within international security studies obscures the multitude of voices that actually exist. 
Kuhn believed that paradigms are formed when a tightly bound and highly invested 
research community adopts the same world-views and methods, usually after a major 
scientific discovery. It seems obvious that distinct research communities within ISS 
continually reinforce separation along paradigmatic lines. The reduction of true 
multiplicity to seemingly incommensurable “paradigms” (e.g. traditional vs. critical 
security studies) impedes the acceptance of more nuanced studies that might derive 
insights unencumbered by theoretical singularity.  
The reification of singular paradigms allows researchers to order their research via a strict 
coded narrative. Parameters are established that create expectations of acceptable 
theoretical insight. These parameters operate to create communities of identity, often 
exclusionary and hostile to alternative approaches. The presence of these communities 
may be convenient and reassuring, but it can hardly bode well for theoretical pluralism. 
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For instance, operating within the so-called realist paradigm allows researchers to 
automatically operate with useful assumptions such as the existence of states operating as 
unitary actors in an anarchic international structure, (neatly separated from domestic 
politics), and forever struggling for power. Indeed, it has been claimed that realism is the 
only theory within IR that could be recognized as a theory by philosophers of science.110 
According to this view, “theories” put forth by other schools in IR are often only 
interpretations. Kenneth Waltz has said, “Interpretations and explanations are plentiful; 
theories are scarce.”111 This type of thinking is typical of the Kuhnian-inspired realist 
paradigm. As Thomas Walker has eloquently pointed out, according to this logic, “any 
criticism of a theory becomes pertinent only when it is packaged with a new research 
program that can subsume its standing rival.”112 The result is that singular paradigms are 
continually reinforced and reproduced - reduced to waiting for revolutionary gestalt 
switches - all at the expense of critically examining how different viewpoints might be 
better compared or combined. 
The Kuhn-Popper discussion can also illuminate our understanding here in another way. 
Kuhn should not simply be seen by critical theorists as the preeminent legitimating 
scientific philosopher, arguing passionately for interpretive science that is at once radical, 
open, and democratic. He may have indeed re-affirmed that science is better seen as a 
historically situated social practice, but he also did so without jeopardizing rational 
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choice in science. His postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific 
Revolution directly confronts the charges against him of relativism, subjectivism, and 
normativity by highlighting how he used methods of historical description to 
reconceptualize, not refute, rational choice theory.113 Likewise, Popper is too often 
crudely characterized (both by critics and defenders) as a conservative defender of a rigid 
positivism. Popper exhibited a more nuanced view of science and epistemology, 
accepting non-foundational claims against objectivity, while also safeguarding 
rationalism. He wrote in 1932,  
Science does not rest on a bedrock. Its towering edifice, an amazingly bold set of 
theories, rises over a swamp. The foundations are piers going down into the 
swamp from above. They do not reach a natural base, but…one resolves to be 
satisfied with their firmness, hoping they will carry the structure…The objectivity 
of science can be bought only at the cost of relativity.114 
There is not enough space to adequately excavate the Kuhn-Popper debate and the 
insights it provides into the resilience of academic paradigms and the dangers of 
historical myth making. But what is important is to further develop the notion that their 
ideas are at once convergent, divergent, critical, and traditional. Kuhn and Popper, while 
often placed at philosophically opposite ends of the spectrum, display similar attachments 
to modified conventionalism and anti-foundationalism. While critical theorists often 
reserve Kuhn as the legitimating force in philosophical science, Popper’s political 
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philosophy was able to preserve the emancipatory potential that arose from the late 
enlightenment. While grand, progressive narratives, such as the ones produced by Kuhn 
were often the targets of criticism from Popper, he retained hopes for progress and 
freedom, and eschewed any finality through empirical evidence.115 And in contrast to 
predominant Kuhnian charges, Popper did not propose simply a cold rationality that 
pledged allegiance to logical analysis. What Popper’s falsifiability sought was a critical 
attitude, which he felt was crucial to rational discourse.116 This critical attitude must be 
adopted to emphasize multiple theories and methods (though falsifiability must remain 
the cornerstone). The pluralism, criticism, embrace of anomalies, and the desire to see 
even the most corroborated theories challenged, comes across as closer to critical theory 
than a call for detached rationalism. That Kuhn and Popper retain distinct separation as 
preeminent philosophers of the science of reflectivism and rationalism speaks to the hold 
that community identities have on theoretical disciplines, ISS being no exception.  
The impact all this has for this study is to reaffirm the commitment to carefully 
interrogating established practices in order to reveal and uncover the dangers that a 
dominant theoretical framework, like realism, may pose to establishing a radical and 
emancipatory form of water security. Kuhn and Popper both offer significant insight for 
this study. Kuhn brings us closer to understanding the seeming incommensurability of 
paradigms and the hostility to change that arise amongst their practitioners. He teaches us 
that scientific rationality is often a cloak used to disguise the important role that human 
filters may play in the way facts and events are understood. Popper allows us to open up 
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paradigms for vigorous theoretical debate. This encourages a cross-pollination of ideas, 
theories, and methods, absent of scientific dogmatism. What can emerge from such a 
view is a humble theoretical inquiry that speaks less of absolutes, and more of relative 
pluralities. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Beginning with the foundation – with a conceptual analysis – will be a recurring theme of 
this study. Without the continual disruption of the disciplinary norms of international 
security the substantive problems of research and policy will remain unsolved and likely 
to persist. As David Baldwin has pointed out “conceptual clarification logically precedes 
the search for the necessary conditions of security, because the identification of such 
conditions presupposes a concept of security.”117 However, a conceptual analysis, while 
important, cannot on its own bring us closer to an emancipatory security of water. Later 
chapters will further develop the empirical and theoretical observations necessary for a 
clearer picture of the potential emancipatory alternatives that water security 
demonstrates. 
One of the arguments put forth here is that international water security can demonstrate a 
potential Kuhnian paradigm shift. While alternatives to dominant paradigms are always 
present, and confrontation is inevitable, IR/ISS have clung to myths of tradition that are 
monolithic and reductive. Duncan Bell eloquently summarizes the problems of the “great 
debate” narrative: 
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…The ‘debates’ are illusory anachronisms, based on an inaccurate interpretation 
of the scope, coherence and interests of the field. In the traditional historiography 
of IR, they serve as post hoc legitimating devices for the construction of a 
narrative about the progressive evolution of theoretical inquiry: first the supine 
idealists were defeated by the practical realists, then the sloppy historians were 
vanquished by the rigorous behaviourists and the discipline evolved into the hard-
headed social scientific enterprise that exerts such power today. Or so the story 
goes.118 
The effects of this ‘story’ are real. The dominance of these traditions grounds 
conventional understanding of rationality, knowledge, and ‘human nature.’ But, as both 
Kuhn and Popper are able to show, the always-present ontological struggles demonstrate 
that potentiality and change are at once immanent and possible. The task of the following 
chapters is to show shifts in the traditional paradigm of security, using the issue of water 
as the guiding signpost by which we might arrive at a more inclusive, communicative, 
and cosmopolitan world.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE:  Water Wars and Environmental 
Security 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter two outlined the ways in which international relations as a discipline is wrought 
with allegiances to traditional and totalizing discourses of security. It used immanent 
critique to isolate the multiple contradictions of the subject of international relations and 
argued that forms water security may be emblematic of paradigmatic change in the 
discipline. This chapter expands on this critique by offering a literature review of 
environmental security, and a tracing of the academic and popular fascination with the 
“water wars” narrative. It argues that there is compelling evidence to support a nuanced 
view of water as a driver of both conflict and cooperation. Despite this, water remains a 
securitized resource, and water wars remain a hegemonic concept, used as a perpetuating 
myth to service a broader vision of security as exclusion and enmity. These ideas, which 
begin in this chapter as a literature review, are given further attention in the following 
chapter, which examines ongoing securitizations of water in the Nile Basin during the 
Anthropocene, a geologic epoch of human dominance and an age of constant 
exception.119  
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It is impossible to overstate the importance of water. Beyond the biological and 
ecological functions, it occupies a place of spiritual importance across religions.  
Religious texts from all over the world isolate water as the pre-eminent physical and 
symbolic matter by which all life can be accounted. As the Koran says, “by means of 
water, we give life to everything.”  The Sanskrit text Mahabharata (XII.83-4) describes 
water’s central position: “The creator first produced water for the maintenance of life 
among human beings. The Water enriches life and its absence destroys all creatures and 
plant-life.”120 In Western thought, the four elements – fire, water, air and earth – have 
played an intrinsic part in the development of philosophy since before Socrates, and in 
the creation of Christian traditions. Further, water is used as potent symbol of distinct 
qualities and powers in Christianity – as channels of purification, purgation, and 
penalty.121 There can be no doubt that water is one of the central pillars upon which 
human society is founded – both literally and symbolically. Taken together with the 
centrality of water as the conduit of life-giving materials, we arrive at the conclusive 
statement that water holds within it the entirety of existence. To say as much may appear 
hyperbolic, but to acknowledge water’s supreme importance allows one to properly 
account for the vast array of approaches that investigate its multiple purposes and 
identities.  
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One such approach is to locate issues of water within discussions of security. Doing so 
has particular consequences that will be explored in this chapter and the next. The 
potential inclusion of environmental issues in security studies has caused significant 
debate within the discipline over the past three decades. The end stages of the Cold War 
seemingly allowed for the opening up of security mindsets to engage with national 
security threats stemming from elsewhere than the military buildup of Soviet forces. That 
said, the broadening of included threats to be studied largely remained within a static 
purview of state security. To this day there continues to exist significant support and 
hesitation to place the broad category of the environment within the realm of security 
studies. There are various fears that doing so may obfuscate the logical clarity and policy 
relevance of a rigidly defined discipline, or that it may lead to erroneously and 
dangerously placing the environment along a military-security axis that causes more 
harm than good. These hesitations are disparate in reasoning but they are representative 
of a particular understanding of what security means and how it is used.  
If the security analyst focuses on water as a driver of violent conflict – as a “threat 
multiplier” – then the concept of security is left relatively unchanged. The central 
dependent variable remains violent conflict and the implications lead to securitization. 
However, if the analyst works from a broader understanding of ecological security, then 
environmental stress is most important in terms of its human and ecological impacts. The 
implications are significant; they compel a reordering of the “modus operandi” in water 
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policies, and it becomes possible to include sustainable water management as a security 
imperative.122  
This fundamental point is reinforced here in this thesis. If our understanding of security 
starts from a place of contingency then it becomes impossible, indeed imperative, to 
pursue an emancipatory vision that promotes ethical and effective policies of water 
management.  
The next section proceeds with an appreciation of the contingent nature of security by 
undertaking a brief genealogy of environmental security, suggesting that environmental 
security can be radically altered depending on the context. The chapter concludes with an 
investigation into the hegemonic concept of water wars.  
3.2 The Four Phases of Environmental Security 
 
It would prove to be an impossible task to adequately account for the story of 
environmental security here in these few pages. It is more useful to briefly sketch the 
general historical trajectory of understanding environmental security. It is also readily 
acknowledged that historical “trajectories” are necessarily partial and can never truly 
account for the wide range of approaches and analyses that have been produced that deal 
with the subject. The literature review is a heuristic tool used to critically examine the 
three broad stages of environmental security research that have existed to this point.123  
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3.2.1 The First Generation of Environmental Security 
The first generation, arising in the final years of the Cold War, can be characterized by 
Richard Ullman’s criticism of the narrowness of national security. In his article 
“Redefining Security”, Ullman argued that “defining national security merely (or even 
primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality…First, it causes 
states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more 
harmful dangers…And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of international 
relations that in the long run can only reduce global security.”124 Other influential articles 
included Jessica Tuchman Mathews’ “Redefining Security,”125 Norman Myers’ 
“Environment and Security,”126 Gwyn Prins’ “Politics and the Environment,”127 and Ian 
Rowlands’ “The Security Challenges of Global Environmental Change.”128 This ‘stage’ 
made the case for placing the environment within the national (i.e. U.S.) security 
discourse, arguing that wars over scarce resources and social breakdowns caused by 
environmental decay were imminent. The most popular and influential of these narratives 
was Robert Kaplan’s “Coming Anarchy” thesis, which was explicated in a number of 
popular publications. It echoed the dangers posed by the confluence of environmental 
collapse and the anarchic international system.129  
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Policymakers followed up these warnings about the dangers posed by environmental 
scarcity by academics during the end of the Cold War. The 1987 Brundtland Commission 
formally named the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
published its final report, “Our Common Future” in 1987. The report explicitly defined 
“sustainable development”, providing its base as an important and frequently used 
concept in subsequent environmental analyses. Mikhail Gorbachev took a lead role in 
isolating the environmental as a matter of high politics. His famous speech to the 43rd 
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1988 named environmental protection as too 
important to place within a rigid ideological interpretation, a repetition of previous 
proposals produced by think tanks such as the Worldwatch Institute.130 The first phase of 
environmental security held the nation-state as its ultimate referent object, and was 
primarily concerned with the protection of the state from the dangers of a newly-broad set 
of threats emerging at the end of the Cold War. 
3.2.2 The Second Generation of Environmental Security 
The second phase of environmental research arose in the early 1990s principally from 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, and his “Toronto Group.”131 They sought to provide an empirical 
research agenda that deviated from the first generation of environmental scholars, which 
was criticized for too often engaging in polemics at the expense of falsifiable findings. 
The two questions Homer-Dixon sought to answer were: 1) does environmental scarcity 
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contribute to violence in developing countries? And 2) if so, how?132 He concluded that 
environmental scarcity did indeed lead to violent conflict. This conflict tended to be 
persistent, diffuse, and sub-national. Finally, conflict over resource scarcity would likely 
increase sharply in the following decades.133 A Swiss group of researchers led by Günther 
Bächler also produced studies on environmental conflict. These empirical investigations 
argued that environmental conflicts had a high potential of occurrence, though they might 
come in different forms (ethnopolitical, demographically-caused migration, international 
water-related, and global conflicts) and were dependent upon multiple factors 
(discrimination against actors in vulnerable areas who have a high level of capital 
dependence on the natural environment.)134  The Swiss studies differentiated from 
Homer-Dixon and his Canadian researchers by focusing not simply on scarcity, 
environmental stress, and conflict, but also on the conflict resolution outcomes.135 
Eventually these arguments began to be adopted into the national security agenda, and 
were echoed by the writings of prominent journalists and academics that emphasized the 
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seemingly stark possibilities that resource scarcity and environmental stress would 
threaten the sovereignty of the state.136  
3.2.3 The Third Generation of Environmental Security 
The third generation of environmental security research emerged in the mid-to-late 1990s 
partly in response to the explicitly causal links between resource scarcity and conflict 
highlighted in the earlier phases. Scholars such as Gleditsch137, Levy138, Wolf139, 
Dimitrov, and Dalby all sought to broaden the scope of independent variables beyond 
simply resource scarcity, and to include a bigger-picture approach that took stock of a 
number of sociological, psychological, and political factors. They also left open the 
dependent variables – violent conflict or cooperation. Research projects were pursued 
primarily in Europe and North America. These included The Global Environmental 
Change and Human Security (GEHS) project; the Swiss project on Research Partnerships 
for Mitigating Syndromes of Conflict Change; The Scientific Advisory Council on 
Global Environmental Issues of the German Government; and The Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database created by Aaron Wolf at Oregon State University. The 
policy community also began to more vigorously examine the role of the environment in 
conflict situations. In 1999, a NATO (Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 
                                                 
136
 Robert Kaplan. “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly, 273:2 (1994): 44-76; Starr. “Water Wars”; 
Peter H. Gleick. “Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security.” International 
Security 18.1 (1993), 79-112. 
137
 Nils Petter Gleditsch. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of 
Peace Research 35.3 (1998): 381-400. 
138
 Marc A. Levy. “Is the Environment a National Security Threat?”  International Security 20.2. (1995): 
35-62. 
139
 Aaron T. Wolf. “Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways.” Water Policy 1.2. (1998): 
251-262. 
68 
 
(CCMS)) project jointly undertaken by the US Department of Defence and the German 
Ministry of the Environment concentrated on the issue of environmental security within 
NATO countries.140 Since then, NATO’s Science for Peace and Security division has 
continued to sponsor selected projects examining “other threats to security”, including 
natural disasters, manmade pollution and ecoterrorism, protecting fragile ecosystems, 
water resources management, and energy-related research and development.141   
In addition, individual scholars such as Aaron Wolf, Geoffrey Dabelko, and Radoslav 
Dimitrov examined the tendency to associate environmental stress with inter-state and 
intra-state conflict.  Wolf wrote in 1998 that, “The patterns described…suggest that the 
more valuable lesson of international water is, as a resource whose characteristics tend to 
induce cooperation and incite violence only in the exception.”142 Jon Barnett argued that 
in previous examinations the environment becomes little more than another avenue of 
distrust and violence between state actors, driven by the imperatives of the anarchic 
global system.143 He wrote “in short, in describing a world of ‘coming anarchy’, the 
environment–conflict literature prepares for the reification of this possible world. In this 
respect the environment–conflict thesis is notable both for the way it justifies the defence 
of northern interests, and for the way it obscures northern complicity in the generation of 
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the very environmental problems scripted as threats.”144 Writing in 2002, Radoslav 
Dimitrov looked at how the construction of security can impact the way in which water is 
managed. Dimitrov begins with the qualifying statement that, “the way we think affects 
what we do, and ideas condition behaviour,” and he argued for a deeper interrogation of 
how the multiple meanings of environmental security impacts our management of 
water.145 For Dimitrov, the “failure to recognize the multiplicity of competing notions of 
security, precludes proper analysis of the dissimilar goals of water management that each 
discourse precipitates.”146 This was an important insight because it allowed for an 
appreciation of the power the concept of water security holds in creating the policy 
outcomes that are so important for alleviating suffering and conflict. Thus, for Dimitrov, 
it is possible “to analyze the changes in ‘water security’ policies and institutions that can 
be expected from embracing a certain conception of environmental security and from 
positioning ‘water’ within it.”147 In contrast to this manuscript’s relatively hopeful 
outlook, Dimitrov concluded on a skeptical note. For him, the different forms of water 
security emanating from different understandings of the security problematique are often 
contradictory and incompatible. ”The mere possibility that different dimensions of 
security are mutually incompatible and that pursuing them simultaneously is impossible 
bodes ill for human society.” This conclusion belies some important theoretical 
developments in the fields of environmental security over the last decade since the 
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publication of the article, and an increasing knowledge of the global geophysical 
connections that bind human actions together in the Anthropocene, the geologic era of 
human dominance.    
However, Dimitrov’s social-discursive model of security showed how the operational 
concepts of water are conditioned by the practices that they themselves guide. In contrast 
to the prevailing two phases of environmental security scholars, Barnett, Dabelko, Wolf, 
and Dimitrov focused extensively on re-situating the environment-conflict nexus. Wolf 
studied the links between water stress and conflict and concluded that the hype 
surrounding “water wars” is unfounded; that there is a prevailing “myth” of ever-future, 
over-the-horizon conflict over dwindling resources, which is simply not borne 
empirically.148 Rather the opposite is true: water has the potential to bridge divides 
amongst disparate riparian owners, across regions, and borders.  
The third phase of environmental research represented a significant progression in terms 
of opening the literature to a diversity of approaches and methods. Prof. Simon Dalby et 
al write that “what emerged in this debate…was a recognition that environmental change 
and resource scarcity and degradation was less likely to lead to international war than had 
been supposed in the first phase.”149 The literature in the third debate as it relates to water 
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exhibited a remarkable diversity, at least in comparison to earlier stages. The three 
editions of the World Water Development Report, released by UNESCO in 2003 (“Water 
for People, Water for Life”), 2006 (“Water: A Shared Responsibility”), and 2009 (“Water 
in a Changing World), displayed a novel appreciation of the potential for cooperative 
resource and conflict management that hitherto had been marginalized in policy circles to 
accounts of transboundary dangers and potential water conflict.  
The third phase was a shift from the first two phases of literature that emphasized 
environmental scarcity and degradation as a likely cause of national insecurity in the 
waning years of the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath. In the late 1990s and into 
the first decade of the twenty first century, the subject opened to allow for a diversity of 
approaches that included analyses from geography.150 Notions of environmental security 
were no longer restricted to state collapse or national conflict over scarce resources. Of 
course, while discussions of national security remained important, there began to emerge 
a new appreciation of the social effects of environmental change and the policy dilemmas 
that emerge in their wake. In terms of water security these new changes in thinking 
allowed for broader discussions away from more traditional preoccupations, such as how 
to avert water wars and ensure water scarcity would not lead to violent conflict. Instead a 
plurality of studies emerged that focused on the wide range of causes of insecurity and 
violence as well as the wide effects of water scarcity. More broadly, during the third 
phase there were attempts to broaden the notions of environmental security, away from 
the simplistic potential for conflict over dwindling resources. While overall, there 
remained an analytical commitment to the nation-state as the ultimate referent of study, 
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some studies argued for taking a human security approach to the environment, arguing 
for greater attention to the effects of water security on individuals, and the need for 
“environmental diplomacy.”151 This was clearly connected to the growing popularity of 
the human security concept during the late 1990s.  
3.2.4 A Fourth Phase of Environmental Security? 
Influential water conflict studies such as The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database have been instrumental in producing new ways of thinking about water security 
in particular and have helped some to argue we are currently witnessing the beginnings of 
a fourth phase of environmental security literature. Spring, Brauch, and Dalby argue that 
this new phase should encompass much more than previous stages, and seek to include 
human, environmental, and gender-related security, as well as peace research. They write,  
This phase, we argue, needs to build on the first three phases of environmental 
security research…It requires distancing security analysis from some of 
traditional assumptions in international relations thinking and focusing more 
explicitly on the specific contexts where people, especially socially vulnerable 
groups and their social networks, are insecure.152 
The call by Spring, Brauch, and Dalby for a widening and deepening of the referent 
object of security in the fourth phase of the environmental security literature is a theme 
that echoes throughout this dissertation. While their reliance on securitization as a 
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normative concept to be pursued may be questioned, the authors nonetheless have 
isolated some key components that can better inform contemporary environmental 
security analyses. They believe that new environmental security studies should include 
societal, human, and gender-related accounts. As well, new sectoral approaches that 
incorporate water, food, health, and livelihood security are seen to be more helpful to the 
deep range of environmental concerns within a unified framework of study. To pursue 
each sector without an appreciation of the interconnections that define them would leave 
environmental security studies insufficiently nuanced and help condition responses 
unable to cope with the scope and scale of global environmental change. The fourth 
phase aims to widen its understanding of security beyond a narrow focus on the nation-
state and include global, regional, societal, community, family, and human levels of 
organization. What is sought, essentially, is an appreciation of the environment as a 
holistic and inclusive factor in human affairs. In sum, if a fourth generation fully emerges 
it will be normatively and analytically strengthened if it offers more inclusive, and 
expansive understandings of the relationship between the environment, security, and 
individuals. This means contributing deeper knowledge of the deep and complex 
interconnections associated with the emerging “Anthropocene,” where conceptual 
separation between humans and the environment is incoherent and ineffective. It is hoped 
that the continued evolution of scholarship will produce multiple visions of 
environmental security that can help provide us with the “shared contexts of our 
insecurities.”153   
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3.3 Water Wars 
If we are to utilize the organizing benefits of isolating four phases of environmental 
security literature, (given this thesis’ critical analysis of mythmaking in IR, this may in 
fact be troublesome), we should understand that water security itself has existed as a 
corollary subset within each phase. For instance, Dimitrov’s social-discursive model 
discussed earlier showed how the different ways in which security is understood has a 
direct impact on the ways in which water is framed and how policies are developed in 
response. To date there has been a dominant (though not exhaustive) conceptual 
allegiance to traditional forms of security, which focuses on states, national security, and 
violent conflict. The dominant construction has been to view water either as a potential 
cause of future wars, or at the very least, a “threat multiplier” by adding stress to already 
vulnerable and volatile situations. This is most ably shown in the “water wars” narrative. 
A wide and still-growing literature on “water wars” has sought to examine the causal 
relationship between environmental stress and armed conflict. This has been an extension 
of earlier analyses that first sought to examine how resource limits influence political 
decision-making. The first issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, published in 1957, 
contained an article by Sprout and Sprout that examined the various ways in which the 
environment influenced political behaviour. Sprout and Sprout presented a rather 
compelling argument that “environmental factors become related to the attitudes and 
decisions which comprise a state’s foreign policy only by being perceived and taken into 
account in the policy-forming process…In policy-making, as we have stressed before, 
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what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is.154 
Thus, while they qualify the content effects that the environment may have on the 
decision-making process, there is no doubt that environment itself helps compel the 
decisions in the first place. Sprout and Sprout’s behaviouralist analysis is certainly a 
product of its intellectual era, but their conclusions can be seen as the precursor to much 
of the environmental security literature produced since the end of the Cold War. When 
they conclude “the ecological viewpoint and frame of reference…provide a fruitful 
approach to the analysis of foreign policy and the estimation of state capabilities,” it is 
not a far stretch to see the intellectual connections with modern environmental security as 
it is most often understood.155 In this sense, ecological processes, combined with 
behavioural and other approaches to decision-making, help students and analysts better 
comprehend the perception of capability and necessity in state decisions.  
The tracing of contemporary environmental security through four broad phases, and back 
to authors such as Wittfogel and Sprout and Sprout is useful in confirming the intellectual 
hegemony that state-centrism has enjoyed when it comes to analyzing environmental 
processes.  The literature on water corresponds in a relatively similar fashion to broader 
analyses of environmental security. The most pressing concern within water security 
literature and the broader public discourse have been how shared water might lead 
directly to wars between states. This seems to have begun in the mid 1980s, when a range 
of new publications began to emerge. These works initiated a still-running debate 
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whether a causal link can be drawn between water scarcity and water wars. It is an 
overstatement to point to one particular source as inspiring the debate, but the publication 
in 1984 of Naff and Mason’s edited volume Water in the Middle East: Conflict or 
Cooperation? was highly influential in creating the narrative for the next decade on 
water’s potential for sparking interstate war. Their case studies of the Jordan, Litani, 
Euphrates, Shatt al-Arab, Orontes, and Nile rivers found that international conflict over 
water was frequent in the Middle East. They state in their introduction:  
Water in the Middle East is also a conflict-laden determinant of both the domestic 
and external policies of the region’s principal actors. As water shortages occur 
and full utilization is reached these policies tend to be framed more and more in 
zero-sum terms, adding to the probability of discord. 156 
For them the Jordan River system was historically the most prominent flashpoint for 
conflict. It had seen more severe international conflict over water than any other river 
system in the Middle East. Along with the Jordan though, the Euphrates and the Nile 
were also seen as open to conflict. They felt that the fundamental reasons for such 
conflict were two-fold: 1) the already-present high levels of international tension and 
hostility in the region; 2) the progressively deteriorating water situation. Because of these 
two reasons, there was little “slack” in the system and water resources had become 
increasingly zero-sum and important strategically.157 The conclusions they reach, that 
water has “been seen as the primary strategic factor behind the political and military 
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maneuvering in the Middle East,” led the intellectual charge throughout the 1980s – the 
decade designated by the UN as the “Water Decade.”  
Following Naff and Mason a plethora of new investigations began to repeat, if not 
confirm, the link between resource scarcity and violent conflict. Some of the most 
influential water wars literature include John K. Cooley’s 1984 Foreign Policy article158, 
Joyce Starr’s 1991 article in Foreign Policy159, Starr and Stoll’s 1988 book160, Bulloch 
and Darwish’s 1993 book on looming water wars in the Middle East161, Biswas’ 1994 
book on Middle Eastern water politics162, Remans 1995 article “Water and War,”163 and 
article and a book from Soffer164, and Amery’s 2003 article in Geographical Journal on 
wars over water in the Middle East context.165 It is worth noting that each source listed 
here writes extensively of war over water in the context of the Middle East. In particular, 
wars involving Israel and its neighbours are returned to again and again as representative 
of the causal link between water and war.  In Westings’ 1986 edited volume, various 
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authors point to water as the causal factor in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Israel’s 1982 
invasion of Lebanon.166 Indeed, the idea that control over dwindling water resources was 
the primary motivator for Israeli military actions between 1967-1982 was developed 
during the 1980s both in academic literature and the popular press.167 Others have also 
added their voices to the crises associated with water scarcity, though they often take a 
broader definition of what is meant by “war,” than some of the more extreme warnings. 
Authors as diverse as Marc De Villiers168, Vandana Shiva169, Diane Raines Ward170, and 
Peter Annin171 all have authored books provocatively titled after ‘water wars.’ 
The causal link between water and war was generally left unchallenged for much of this 
phase of water security literature. Instead of questioning the basic assumptions propelling 
their analyses, authors continued to sound ominous warnings about the perilous state of 
water resources and their potential for igniting armed interstate war. The end of the Cold 
War and the broadening of security threats helped sustain the narrative, which advanced 
only in the sophistication of their empirical studies. Falkenmark’s 1989 article on 
dwindling water resources in Africa is emblematic of the trend to fix empirical limits 
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illustrating different stages of water scarcity and their associated dangers. Her influential 
water stress index sought to answer just how many people a flow unit of water could 
sustain. This Malthusian analysis supposed that as populations increase and their 
standards of living improve, the available amount of renewable water inevitably 
decreases.  The index she produced concluded that a country is said to be “water 
stressed” if it experiences less than ca 1,700 cubic metres (m3) per capita/year; when the 
figure is less than ca 1,000 m3 per capita/year, a country experiences “water scarcity”; 
and when a country experiences per capita availability below 500 m3 per capita/year, it is 
past “the water poverty line” or “beyond the water barrier.”172 While Falkenmark is more 
concerned with the dwindling water availability for vulnerable populations and the 
effects on socioeconomic development than in the prospect of water wars, her indices 
have been frequently used to gauge the likelihood of conflict in areas experiencing acute 
water shortages. Sandra Postel’s seminal 1992 work, Last Oasis published by the 
Worldwatch Institute173, and Tom Gardner-Outlaw and Robert Engelman’s 1997 report 
for Population Action International174 both explicitly rely on the water stress index, as do 
other works. As Leif Ohlsson writes, “this kind of index is foundational to the common 
alarms of risks for water wars. Since the available amount of renewable water is fixed, 
the conclusion is almost inevitable: As populations grow and per capita demands grow 
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even faster, states will be forced into a logic of fighting for more water.”175 And indeed 
these types of conclusions seem to have been the norm when examining the first 
generation of water security literature, just as this was the norm in the broader 
environmental security literature.  
The Malthusian approaches to water security adopted by many authors necessarily draw 
an upsetting picture of resource scarcity leading to war. Many authors propounding water 
wars theses derived their logic from Thomas Malthus’ Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798), which stated that resource scarcity resulting from demographic 
increases inevitably lead to famine or conflict. One of the most widely cited examinations 
of resource scarcity and international conflict, Arthur Westing’s 1986 volume Global 
Resource and International Conflict, already briefly discussed, propagates the Malthusian 
view of resource scarcity and war. He writes, “Demands on the land, fresh waters, and 
other natural resources of the earth are growing rapidly owing to the rapid increases in 
human aspirations…This dilemma suggests that natural resources have the potential for 
playing an even more important role as a cause of war in the future than they have in the 
past.176” Joyce Starr best articulated the classic Malthusian case for water wars in 1991. 
More nuanced (what Martin Kipping calls Neo-Malthusian) analyses still link water 
scarcity with conflict but as an indirect cause via its socio-economic consequences like 
decreasing agricultural productivity or overall economic decline. The work of Thomas 
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Homer-Dixon can be regarded as Neo-Malthusian.177 Nils Petter Gleditsch described the 
basic causal chain for Malthusian analyses as: 
Population growth/high resource consumption per capita deteriorated 
environmental conditions increasing resource scarcity harsher resource 
competition greater risk of violence178 
There may be disagreement over the number of causal mechanisms and their basic order, 
but these analyses remain beholden to an instrumental logic that restricts the potential for 
alternatives to war and conflict. The ultimate attachment to Malthusian concerns lays the 
groundwork for predictions about conflict, though rarely have these predictions been 
derived from convincing empirical data demonstrating the causal factor of the 
environment in past wars and interstate conflicts.  It is safe to conclude that water 
security literature in the 1980s and early 1990s, following the first two generations of the 
broader environmental security literature, was strongly pessimistic.  
Literature critical of these approaches to environmental security began to emerge in 
response. These criticisms principally arose with skepticism about the integration of the 
environment with security, displaying a naivety about the scale of environmental 
destruction and its effects. The general trend in critique was that the widening of security 
to include the environment would dilute the cohesion of studies on security and was more 
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the result of environmentalist rhetoric than of demonstrable links. Daniel Deudney 
echoed many other traditional security analysts when he argued that expanding national 
security to include the environment was inappropriate and misleading. In his 1991 article, 
“The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” he writes 
that combining national security and environmental risks would create “a conceptual 
muddle, rather than a paradigm or world-view shift – a de-definition rather than a re-
definition of security. If we begin to speak about all the forces and events that threaten 
life, property, and well being (on a large scale) as threats to our national security, we 
shall soon drain the term of any meaning.179 However, while Deudney initially appears to 
fall into a traditional security regression of isolating the state as the referent object of 
security, he does in fact adopt a more nuanced approach. He believes that linking the 
environment within national security would deprive the potential for thinking 
alternatively about the creative and interdependent responses necessary for positive 
solutions to a global problem. He writes,  
If in fact resolution of the global environmental problem, and particularly the 
global climate change problem, requires great, even unprecedented, types of 
international cooperation, then nationalist sentiment and identification is a barrier 
to overcome. Thus thinking of national security as an environmental problem 
risks undercutting both the globalist and common fate understanding of the 
situation and the sense of world community that may be necessary to solve the 
problem.180 
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Along with Daniel Deudney, Marc Levy also produced one of the earliest critical 
reactions to linking the environment with security concerns. In his 1995 article, “Is the 
Environment a National Security Issue?” he writes “the political threat from 
environmental degradation (involving environmental refugees, resource wars, and so on) 
is at once both the weakest substantive threat to U.S. security and the strongest 
intellectual challenge to the field of security challenges.”181 Levy thinks that instead of 
attempting to stretch environmental concerns into the realm of high politics, it would be 
better for environmentalists to gain support for their cause by engaging with 
environmental degradation on the level of low politics. Levy’s article has not fared well 
with age. His contention that the links between environmental and security values are 
simply rhetorical acts by environmentalists, and that the optimal response to the dangers 
of environmental degradation would be a combination of “prevention, adaptation, and 
‘letting nature take its course,’” exhibits a striking naivety. While he does carve some 
space for climate change to be included in security discourse, he does so only because of 
its potential economic effects and the potential loss of American lives.182 Considering that 
in 2007 the UN Security Council, under the leadership of the United Kingdom, affirmed 
that climate change is one of the most significant threats to humankind, Levy’s separation 
of the environment from traditional security seems wholly lost from the reality of the past 
twenty years.183  
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With that, the security literature emerging in critical response to the Malthusian warnings 
of environmental security was astute in casting a critical eye to the more dire warnings 
concerning threats of state collapse and international war and conflict. Deudney’s 
Cornucopian approach, which emphasized human inventiveness, the economic 
diversification of states away from resource dependency, and falling commodity prices, 
presented a compelling counter to the Malthusian analyses of environmental security like 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, Joyce Starr, and Richard Ullman.184 The problem with such 
accounts was that they failed to critically analyze a number of disparate variables that 
influence the way security is thought of in the first place. That the first two generations 
(and many of their critics) largely ignored contextual analysis of specific political, 
economic, cultural, and gender issues left open only the continued reification of state-
centric security, generally built upon realist assumptions and a rigid adherence to 
empiricist methodology. Nils Petter Gleditsch’s comprehensive literature review, written 
in 1998, reflected on the broad literature produced to that point, indicating nine common 
problems. The isolated problems that Gleditsch focused on relate to an overall absence of 
solid evidence and a lack of systemic research on the effect of resource or environmental 
factors on armed conflict.185 Despite Gleditsch producing a significant and useful 
summation of environmental security to that point, he failed to engage the parameters by 
which we view security itself. His critique never broached the subject of security, for 
whom, by whom? His final call – for a Correlates of War project for the environment – is 
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a strikingly uncritical approach to viewing the environment and security. However, as the 
literature progressed into a new, third, phase, the conditions by which security and the 
environment were viewed expanded, indicating a departure from the first two stages, 
which tried to empirically demonstrate the connections (or lack thereof) between the 
environment and conflict.  
The third phase, discussed briefly already, includes a number of different approaches to 
environmental security. According to Dalby, Brauch, and Spring, it included analyses of 
global change that are more closely linked to larger concerns of human security.186 Water 
security analyses arising in the late 1990s reflect this trend, and they began to incorporate 
broader frames of reference, specifically focusing on cooperative management of water 
resources.  In particular, the work of Aaron Wolf, Director of the Program in Water 
Conflict Management and Transformation and the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database, has been a catalyst for shifting the analytical focus away from Malthusian 
concerns of over-the-horizon conflict. His extensive work, investigating the reality of 
historic water conflict, shows empirically that only a handful of minor skirmishes 
occurred over water in the twentieth century, and that no war over water has ever 
occurred in history. Instead, cooperation over shared waterways is closer to the norm. His 
conclusions are that along shared waterways, cooperative interests consistently outweigh 
conflict. In the end, war over water is “neither strategically rational, hydrographically 
effective, nor economically viable.”187 Wolf’s findings, while unique in their 
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completeness and methodological vigor, have been confirmed in other analyses, 
including works by Jerome Delli Priscoli,188 Undula Alam,189 Wolf, Yoffe, and 
Giordano,190 Yoffe, Wolf, and Giordano,191 and Yoffe et al.192 The findings stand in direct 
contrast to the first generations of environmental security and water security. The water 
wars rationale, almost always focusing on the region of the Middle East, argues that 
given water’s critical importance to a country’s survival, if there is scarcity amidst a 
wider conflict and if enemy states rely upon shared water resources, each country will 
seek to ensure that it retains adequate access, even resorting to armed conflict. In other 
respects, the desire to maintain control over dwindling water resources may well compel 
states to act aggressively in maintenance of that strategic upper hand. It seems logical and 
highly plausible to many that each country’s water supply is so important that it would be 
willing to wage war to safeguard its supply.193  
The Malthusian logic that permeates such analyses is clear. When demand outstrips 
supply, states will go to war with their competitors to ensure sufficient access to a vital 
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resource such as water. One should understand water wars as international wars that are 
fought for reasons related to access to water. This separates water wars from mere water-
related conflicts within countries and the use/denial of water as a weapon of war.  
The water wars narrative has been invoked numerous times, though it was proclaimed 
most often in academic, policy, and journalistic circles in the 1980s and 1990s.194 During 
this time, many studies on water and specifically the region of the Middle East based 
their evidence on future predictions of impending water wars, due to occur because of 
urbanization, industrialization, population growth, consumerist economic development, 
and increased agricultural irrigation.195 The “hydraulic imperative” theory of water being 
the motivating factor for Middle Eastern conflict was proclaimed often and repeated in 
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both academic and popular presses. Authors as diverse as Thomas Homer-Dixon196, 
Sandra Postel197, and Peter Gleick198 have all (to varying degrees) proclaimed the 
likelihood of future conflicts being fought over water. Though Homer-Dixon and Gleick 
did in fact argue for a tempered outlook on the prospect of future water wars, they still 
managed to situate water resources as a site of future contestation, especially in 
vulnerable areas. Gleick wrote that 
Tensions appear likely in parts of southern and central Asia, central Europe, and the 
Middle East…in certain regions of the world…water is a scarce resource that has 
become increasingly important for economic and agricultural development. In these 
regions, water is evolving into an issue of “high politics,” and the probability of 
water-related violence is increasing.199  
Citing Falkenmark, he argued that if water provides a source of economic or political 
strength then (much like other resources like oil and other minerals) ensuring access to it 
provides a justification for going to war, and supply systems can become a goal of 
military conquest.200 Gleick was careful to not explicitly predict ‘water wars’ between 
state actors. However, his analyses consistently signaled out water as a source to be 
fought over at various levels, including local, subnational, and international levels. 
Writing in 2005, Gleick argued that, “Where water is scarce, competition for limited 
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supplies can lead communities, economic groups and even nations to see access to water 
as a matter of political concern. Conflict can easily arise because political borders rarely 
coincide with watershed boundaries.”201 Gleick’s prolific scholarly output and 
authoritative knowledge of transboundary water issues marks him as one of the foremost 
experts on the subject of water and conflict. Yet often he falls back upon what are by now 
the familiar clichés of impending water conflict.  Even when qualified by less alarmist 
rhetoric, this furthers perceptions that water primarily exists as an international security 
issue as a “threat multiplier,” because it either exacerbates simmering tensions between 
homogenous states or because it will be used as a weapon of war.   
The problem, as Aaron Wolf has pointed out, is a lack of evidence. Libiszewski and Wolf 
have both produced extensive studies that conclude water scarcity has never been a cause 
of any Arab-Israeli war.202 A critical review of the water wars literature reveals that many 
of the studies are actually more acutely tied to “political tensions or stability rather than 
about warfare, or about water as a tool, target, or victim of armed conflict – all important 
issues, just not the same as “water wars.”203   
It would be an overstatement to say whether there is one conclusive answer to the 
“debate” over the likelihood of water wars. Yet it is possible to conclude that there is 
indeed a burgeoning literature that examines water from an altogether different 
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perspective from past interpretations. “Water peace” literature has grown in recent years, 
and encompasses a major academic sub-field of water security. In what has grown to 
become a landmark study, Wolf’s 1998 article, “Conflict and Cooperation Along 
International Waterways”, found that there have been hardly any water wars in all of 
human history. In findings derived from Oregon State University’s Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), Wolf explained that a systematic study of the 
interstate interactions over water reveals a history more replete with cooperation than 
conflict. Wolf, and his team of researchers, using a comprehensive dataset that identified 
412 crises for the period 1912-1994, found only four disputes where water was partially a 
cause. They broadened the scope to include a total of seven “incidents” where water may 
have been an independent variable influencing armed aggression, only to find that in 
three of these incidents no shots were fired. Wolf concluded that “As near as we can find, 
there has never been a single war over water.”204 Instead of the interstate violence that 
has been consistently forecasted, the study, building upon earlier evidence compiled by 
Wolf205 and Hamner and Wolf206, found that cooperation along shared waterways is 
historically far more common. This has again been confirmed in subsequent findings by 
Wolf and others.207 Instead of wars over water, which are not “strategically rational, 
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hydrographically effective, or economically viable,” states have endeavored to find 
common ground when it comes to shared waterways. Wolf’s team identified 3,600 
treaties that have been signed over different aspects of international water (400 in the 
twentieth century alone.)  This stands in stark contrast to the water wars literature that 
was commonplace in the early 1990s. 
The data produced by TFDD has had a major impact on how water can be seen 
alternative to the prevailing discourses that place water scarcity in the context of war and 
violent conflict. Indeed, Phillips et al. write that: “It is rare that findings within social 
science produce instant paradigm shifts. However, with the surprising results from The 
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database disclosing that there have hardly been any 
‘water wars’ in human history, the tables were turned almost overnight.”208  
New emphasis on the potential for water to bridge political and psychological divides has 
recently emerged in the wake of the quantitative studies produced by Wolf and others. 
Many studies produced in the last decade have emphasized the cooperative side of water 
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politics.209 A few authors point to “discourses of cooperation”210 and “rising spirals of 
benevolent relations”211 instead of once-familiar discourses of conflict or spirals of 
insecurity. They contend that conflict over water – whether violent or not – is a rarity at 
the shared basin level. This new emphasis on the counter-hypothesis – that water scarcity 
can lead people to cooperate – is representative of a larger trend within environmental 
security studies. As chapter one of this dissertation showed, it is not without significance 
that the UN has declared 2013 the International Year of Water Cooperation.  
The speculative theorizing often at the root of early forms of environmental security has 
become less commonplace – at least when it comes to predicting future water wars. 
Instead, a teleological approach to the environment and cooperation has assumed a much 
more prominent place in academic studies. This approach has emphasized the discourse 
of cooperation and challenged sovereignty and the privileging of independent national 
development priorities.212 This has contributed to the emergent fourth phase of 
environmental security literature, discussed earlier in this chapter, which links together 
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human, environmental, and gender security and peace research.213 Some, such as Spring, 
Brauch, and Dalby are hopeful that this new phase in the literature will be more 
comprehensive, and better integrate physical and human sciences in ways that “neither 
focus on states on the one hand, or environmental causes as a simple variable on the 
other.” This new type of ecological thinking should focus on adaptability, resilience, and 
interconnection: “understanding security in contrast to earlier formulations assuming 
central control and violence as the essence of security.”214  
Many of these authors are careful to temper any undue enthusiasm for water to act as a 
magical panacea, curing international conflict. The intent is rather to present a fuller 
picture of the complex interactions that surround shared management of water resources. 
It is clear that water contains the potential to destabilize international relations, but it 
seems far more appropriate to speak of the consequences related to its unequal access, 
rather than competition over water resources.215 The authors writing on water as part of 
the new phases of environmental literature are more reluctant to produce extensive 
conclusions about either the inevitability of conflict or the likelihood of cooperation. It is 
clear that expanding the scope of analysis beyond conflict and war and including 
cooperation and negotiation has allowed for a wider range of approaches to water 
security. These new approaches often incorporate different facets of the relationship 
between water, conflict, and cooperation. Recent studies have highlighted the role of 
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water regimes in facilitating hydrosolidarity216, the potential for spillover effects of water 
cooperation217, the role of the poor and the implications for water management 
institutions in future water related conflict218, and the coexistence of conflict and 
cooperation in transboundary water interaction.219 This is only a small sampling to 
demonstrate the diversity of the latest stage of water security literature. As was discussed 
at some length in the previous chapter, the reduction of a whole scope of environmental 
security studies to singular paradigms is a misleading discursive tactic that obscures a 
consistently complex literature. Nevertheless there is some value in producing some 
synthesis of the literature because it can shed some light on the new approaches that have 
arisen in response to previous empirical findings and theoretical advancements. It is clear 
that there exists a highly complex and diverse literature investigating the myriad political 
and environmental issues associated with the management of water. The debate over 
whether water wars will occur seems to have muted in recent years (at least in academic 
circles), with a larger focus on how states cooperate over shared water resources. And 
while it is accepted that states often cooperate in the field of water resource management, 
we should heed various warnings that there still remains rapidly increasing demands for 
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strategic access to water by certain co-riparian states, which is caution against 
complacency.220   
What the debate over water wars shows is that in academic circles there currently exists a 
high degree of skepticism over the potential of water to act as a primary causal variable 
driving states to war. Yet there still remains a popular discursive reliance on the familiar 
perceptions of future water conflict. Most academic studies dismiss the notion that wars 
over water will dot the geopolitical landscape of the twenty-first century. Yet, we are 
often reminded by journalists and policymakers to expect increasing conflict in response 
to rising demand and dwindling resources. The nexus between water and impending 
conflict, drawn from Malthusian assumptions, is repeated and reiterated in the popular 
media. A Google search of “Water Wars” typically returns over 213,000,000 hits.  
Further, the message being constructed and conveyed in many analyses and statements by 
international experts is that the world is on the verge of a major water quantity and 
quality crisis. Arising from these truly dire warnings are a number of predictions from 
influential individuals that the world could experience future conflicts over water. As 
mentioned earlier, the last three UN Secretary Generals have all warned of water wars. 
The most provocative, and widely cited warning comes from Ismail Serageldin, former 
Vice President of the World Bank, who stated in 1995 that, “if the wars of the Twentieth 
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Century were fought over oil, the wars of this century will be fought over water.”221 
Phillip Stucki writes:  
The new perspectives on the nexus between water scarcity and potential conflicts 
(also called ‘water peace’ literature) were very successful in academic circles, and 
can be said to currently represent an epistemic consensus. However, not much has 
changed outside of the scientific debate. In March 2001, UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan still warned of future water wars. In the media, the fear of water wars 
is still expressed regularly, and little can be found concerning the cooperative 
potentials in dealing with water scarcity.222  
That the popular discourse is still flooded with warnings about water wars, despite the 
shift in academic circles towards a more holistic, integrative, approach towards water and 
security, points to the resiliency of hegemonic concepts.  It seems safe to conclude that 
following the findings of the TFDD and subsequent analyses trumpeting water as a path 
to peace, the academic “debate” is no longer entirely relevant.  However, articles still 
appear regularly in reputable news organizations proclaiming the need to develop 
coherent responses to water and resource scarcity, lest it push states or groups to violent 
conflict, or worse, war.223 Thus, given this apparent disconnect between solid academic 
consensus against the likelihood of water wars and popular retention of the water war 
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narrative it is useful to briefly make mention of the coercive power that the concept 
maintains.  
Julie Trottier first applied (without explicitly defining) the idea of hegemonic concepts to 
water wars in a 2003 article commissioned by UNESCO. Trottier explained that the best 
way to understand the continued application of discursive concepts such as “water wars” 
(and conversely “water peace”) is to return to Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. Hegemony 
might be understood as a consensual form of power. Thus, power in a hegemonic form 
marginalizes coercive forms of power that are applied to historically specific social 
classes. This opens up the role for new social bases of power, principally civil society. 
Gramsci believed that a fuller notion of the state was required to fully comprehend its 
administrative, executive, and coercive apparatuses. This enlarged definition of the state 
included the hegemonic structures of civil society, which helped establish limits of 
political action. Dominant social groupings arranged in the church, the educational 
system, the press, and other institutions, established these limits of acceptable political 
action in historical terms. Robert Cox explains that these social groups must be 
considered as part of the state, and should be used for the purpose of evaluating its broad 
political structure, extending into the powerful realm of ideas.224 Certainly Gramsci 
himself clarified how the modern “night-watchman state” blends civil society with 
political society through the diffusion of hegemonic persuasion. He wrote, “Certain 
elements that fall under the general notion of the state must be restored to the notion of 
civil society (in the sense, one might say, that state = political society + civil society, that 
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is, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion).”225 The implication here is that the 
state is able to function as an image of the non-state, by relying upon the expressions of 
civil society to peacefully coerce men and women to accept its laws.  
The intellectual stratum that carries forward hegemonic ideas often does so by picking up 
ideas that originate from prior eras and revolutions.226 Various members of national and 
international society carry these ideas, once held as self-evident, forward in new patterns 
of emulation. The diffusion of norms is one of the primary processes through which 
hegemony operates. For its purposes here, the concept of water as a causal variable 
affecting war and/or conflict seems to remain a “hegemonic concept” in that it retains 
vitality in popular discourse, despite being largely proven false or misleading. While 
academic consensus will always (and should always) remain elusive, there is little debate 
anymore on the validity of future water wars, at least conventionally understood. Instead, 
concerns are more likely to be voiced over the “water riots,”227 the use of water for 
facilitating cooperation, human water security (and water rights), and other forms of 
“new security thinking” in inter-state and intra-state water relations.228  
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3.4 Conclusion 
Much of the popular literature exploring water and security approaches the problem 
strategically; the debate centres on the nature of the looming threat of water scarcity and 
how states should best respond. This dissertation moves elsewhere, not strictly 
concerning itself with strategy but rather with how the securitization of water itself might 
engender policies that view water scarcity as a potential threat to states. It thus 
problematizes the prevailing statist ontology that underpins the majority of security 
studies.  It is a critique that extends beyond just empirical studies of water conflict or 
water war. It is important to explore not only the historical and contemporary political 
terrain of water security, but also the conceptual sites in which the production of the 
possibility of “security” occurs. This chapter presented a brief overview of the various 
stages of environmental security literature, including the shift in academic thinking 
towards water as an instrument compelling negotiation and cooperation, while dually 
containing the power to facilitate conflict. It ended with a brief look at the power of water 
wars as a hegemonic concept, existing independently within popular discourse due to a 
normative appeal for engagement with water scarcity through the lenses of traditional 
security. While this chapter has avoided producing an overtly critical appeal, it has 
sought to provide the foundation for a deeper line of critique that questions statist 
political ontology and the obstacles that are posed by its conceptions and representations 
of sovereignty, and identity – the holders of life seemingly pre-existent and requiring 
security.  
To re-state the implications of this analysis more clearly, all this means that the re-
articulation of security as a performative act laden with power can help us understand that 
water scarcity exists within a normalizing discourse allowing for extraordinary modes of 
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control and exclusion. To extend this control over a fundamental human right such as 
water - one that holds both ecological and spiritual importance - poses significant 
obstacles to peace and development.  The next chapter seeks to build upon this 
conceptual history and examine how ongoing water securitizations require the 
realignment of water security theory away from enmity, exclusion, and exception. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: Water Securitization in the Anthropocene 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter confronts the concept of water securitization in the Anthropocene. The 
Anthropocene is the contemporary geologic epoch, which is defined by humanity’s 
impacts on the earth’s systems.229 The chapter acknowledges that while the securitization 
approach has generated important and wide-ranging insights into the problems of water 
and environmental security, it never truly excavates the traditional, Schmittian-inspired, 
logic of security that define it in terms of exclusion and distrust. In analytical terms, 
securitization is useful in explaining how water becomes defined in terms of security. 
However, the concept rigidly adheres to a static, statist notion of security, which is 
particularly problematic in an age of global change caused by human actions.  
Given that the concept of securitization represents a zenith of constructivist security 
insight, it is important to question its adherence to an unchanging form of security. Thus, 
this chapter reviews the basics of the Copenhagen School approach before turning its 
attention to the case of the Nile River basin, one of the most successfully securitized 
water regions in the world. The Nile River basin is the site of historical and ongoing 
securitizations, despite periods of both conflict and cooperation. As it stands today, the 
region is consistently framed as the site of future water wars, which works to obscure the 
emancipatory potential latent in complex water relationships. It is argued that 
securitization is insufficient for understanding the multifaceted realities and possibilities 
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that water (and the wider environment) provides because it relies upon the singular 
security concept that privileges the preservation of the territory and sovereignty of the 
nation-state from militaristic threats, to the detriment of alternative readings of security 
that seek to create the conditions for the emancipation of individuals from structural 
oppressions. This argument represents an attempt to begin relocating security to the realm 
of individuals and their natural environments, which is beneficial for broadly 
comprehending the complex relationships between water, human, and non-human life, 
and which will be explored at greater length in the chapters to follow.  
 
4.2 Securitization: Speech acts and the construction of 
security  
By labeling something a security issue, it becomes one. This is the heart of securitization. 
Since its most thorough explication by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde in 1998, the 
concept of securitization has received significant attention within security studies. In the 
same way that constructivism has proven to be an attractive “middle-ground” for security 
scholars, securitization approaches are able to utilize insights from critical approaches 
like post-structuralism as well as from more traditional security areas, such as neo-
realism. Indeed, the connection between constructivism and the concept of securitization 
is fairly explicit; Buzan and Waever have said so themselves: “Our securitization 
approach is radically constructivist regarding security.”230  
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The following section lays out the “Copenhagen School” approach and argues that a 
critical security of water stands to benefit conceptually from its varied insights. In 
particular, it can help in understanding the process of broadening security, and the ways 
in which issues (if not the concept of security itself) become intersubjectively defined as 
security issues in speech and practice. However, as will be made clear, the Copenhagen 
School essentializes security as state-centric focusing almost exclusively on threats to and 
defence of the state. It thereby fails at the task of deepening security, which the 
emancipatory approach attempts. As a result, while securitization is a process that 
remains analytically important, its normative deficiencies are significant enough to 
warrant caution and reflection.  
The name “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney in a 1996 critical essay 
titled “Identity and Security: Buzan and The Copenhagen school.”231 To use the moniker 
is to refer to a broad program of study that is built around three main ideas: 1) 
securitization 2) sectors and 3) regional security complexes. In general, securitization is 
the most important of the three ideas, as it forms the meta-theoretical framework of the 
School.232 
The academics belonging to the Copenhagen school of security studies such as Barry 
Buzan and Ole Wæver have been credited with forming the concept of securitization. 
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While its ideas bounced around in numerous precursory publications233 The Copenhagen 
school of security studies is most coherently articulated in Security: A New Framework 
for Analysis, written by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde in 1998. In it, the 
authors spend significant time defining and marking securitization as an important form 
of rhetorical structure and practice. They begin with the constructivist insight that, 
“Security can never be based on the objective reference that something is in and of itself 
a security problem. That quality is always given to it in human communication.”234 
Securitization is defined as the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
a saliency that is judged to have substantial political effects.235 They write that to 
securitize an issue takes the politics of it beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. When an issue is 
securitized it is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”236  
The process of securitization, or bringing an issue into the security framework, requires a 
level of state mobilization that would otherwise not be called upon to address the issue. 
As such, the state plays a central role. It addresses the identified threats by eliminating 
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the chance that such threats would successfully overthrow the state and its apparatuses. It 
legitimizes the use of force and opens the way for the state to mobilize or take special 
power – e.g. using conscription, secrecy, and other means only legitimate when dealing 
with ‘security matters’.237  
Securitization scholars look to discourse to understand how certain issues become 
security issues. In essence, securitization is a speech act.238 By exploring the discursive 
nature of the object in relation to conflict through analyses of particularly employed 
rhetorical and semiotic structures, one may determine what allows intended audiences to 
tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed.239 It must be noted 
that, echoing trends in social science towards a “linguistic turn” this baseline assumption 
relies upon a performative understanding of discourse, instead of a representational view. 
By saying the words of security something is done. It is clear that a sentence like “Water 
is a major security problem in our country’ does not have the same effect as a sentence 
like, “An apple falls from the tree.” The former sentence has a performative force.240 
Uttering security is an act itself. Securitization does not point to an object that is real; 
rather it actually performs to make an object an existential threat.241 This is a clear, 
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constructivist reading of security, one that consciously avoids an objectivist account of 
security threats. For the Copenhagen school, security is dependent on its successful 
construction in discourse.242 
At its most fundamental, securitization is the process by which something becomes 
designated in security language. The designation of the threat determines how we think. 
And, as Simon Dalby has argued, how we think, “leads not only to how we act 
politically, but also to our understandings of who we are, what we value, and what we are 
prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identity.”243 For scholars of the 
Copenhagen school, the articulation of threat and security structures the social practices 
that follow.244 
According to the Copenhagen school, these issues/threats are not objective. Rather, 
“security is what states make of it.”245 The task is “not to assess some objective threats 
that ‘really’ endanger some object, rather it is to understand the process of constructing 
and designating a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively 
responded to as a threat.”246 What is most telling for securitization theorists is how some 
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things are (or are not) designated as a “threat.” And while it seems as though 
concentrating on the designation of threats creates an open view of security – allowing 
for a substantial widening of security – the Copenhagen school is in fact able to limit the 
widening of security. It is able to do so because it identifies the most common 
securitizing actors as “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and 
pressure groups.”247 Securitization is limited to the construction of the threat and thus the 
holders of security are those who are placed in a privileged position of construction: The 
securitizing actors are the ones with the power and capacity to declare a referent object as 
existentially threatened. The objects in question, determined by the securitizing actor, are 
unsurprisingly middle-range (state-based), or macro (structural), that affect the 
international system.248 The authors claim that security is socially constructed becomes 
reduced to the Schmittian logic of executive unilateralism, which focuses on the actions 
of leaders placing themselves and their actions above the law, as part of the exception 
necessary for emergency politics. The result of this is to reaffirm the status quo of 
security despite the Copenhagen school’s novel commitment to a non-objectivist view of 
security through “speech acts.” The logic here is built on the assumption that there are 
reasonable and knowable ideas of “normal” politics and security in the first place. Given 
the speed and rate of environmental change in the Anthropocene, the effects of a global 
“War on Terror” now well into its second decade, and the spread of political upheaval 
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across the globe, it may be more apt to view the modern age as one of constant 
exception.249  
It seems insufficient then to limit to security to such a reductionist framework, where 
non-state actors are given short shrift in terms of their material power to securitize (a 
reasonable claim), but more importantly, where states themselves are the moral arbiters 
of security based upon their abilities to enact emergency politics. From a normative 
position, the Copenhagen school contributes to the perpetuation of a security logic built 
upon a static, objectivist understanding of security as state-led and maintained. If, as earth 
systems approaches remind us, “nonlinearities are the rule not the exception…in the 
Anthropocene Era,” then it becomes illogical to rely upon the Schmittian logic at its 
heart.250 Schmitt’s seemingly prescient adage, “Sovereign is he who decides upon the 
exception,” may no longer apply.251  
4.3 The Securitization of Water 
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In the context of securitization the water wars hypothesis can offer a robust picture of the 
development, perpetuation, and the limitations of linking water and security. The 
remainder of this chapter offers a view of water securitization in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region and concludes by critiquing the Copenhagen School 
approach and paving the way for the emancipatory theory of water advanced in the next 
chapter. 
Water crosses national boundaries, its uses are diverse, measurements are unreliable, and 
it lacks definitive legal generalizations. Adding to the complexity is the tripartite process 
of increasing water demand, decreasing water supply, and deteriorating water quality. 
Collectively these problems have led to an increased desire to tie water with security. In 
effect, water is experiencing ongoing processes of securitization.  
The Copenhagen school is careful to point out that securitization works differently in 
different sectors (politics, religion, health, the environment) and across different scales.252  
However, there are three constant aspects of the securitizing speech act: a securitizing 
actor, a referent object to be securitized, and an audience that accepts (or rejects) the 
securitizing move.253 The outcome of securitization – whether successful or not – depends 
on the acceptance or rejection of the speech act by an audience. In the case of water, 
successful securitization has occurred primarily through various interpretations of the 
water wars hypothesis, perpetuated by political elites and reported by the media. The 
                                                 
252
 Roxanna Sjöstedt. “Health issues and securitization: HIV/AIDS as a US national security threat.”  
Securitization Theory. Ed. Thierry Balzacq. London: Routledge, 2010): 150–69; Buzan and Wæver, 2009.  
253
 Alexander Kelle. “Securitization of Public Health: Implications for Global Health Governance and the 
Biological Weapons Prohibition Regime.” Global Governance. 13 (2007): 218-219. 
110 
 
most prevalent understanding of the hypothesis is that states will do anything, even wage 
war, to secure access to, or preserve, dwindling water supplies. A “hydrological 
imperative” compels states that suffer from water shortages to act aggressively against 
neighbouring countries. A milder form of this thesis, put forth by academics like Thomas 
Homer-Dixon and Peter Gleick, posits that while water alone is unlikely to serve as a 
casus belli between nations it may strain existing tensions through multiplier effects, like 
increasing competition for arable land, displacing drought-affected rural populations, and 
creating environmental refugees.254  
Numerous high-level reports from state agencies and intergovernmental organizations 
have highlighted the security implications brought by environmental issues, and water in 
particular. In 2012, The US National Intelligence Council’s National Intelligence 
Estimate, which is a high-level intelligence product, released  “Global Water Security,” a 
detailed assessment of how water and sanitation might impact US security interests. It 
concluded that over the next decade, while water-related state-on-state conflict is 
unlikely, “water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national 
security interests.”255 Likewise, the United Nations frequently warns that countries 
experiencing acute water shortages are threats to the international system because of the 
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undue social stresses they create. Former UN Secretary Generals have in the past 
proclaimed the high potential for water violence. Boutros Boutros Ghali told the US 
Congress that, “the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics.”256 
Kofi Annan suggested that “fierce competition for freshwater may well become a source 
of conflict and war in the future.”257 Current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has also 
highlighted reports that environmental changes, including droughts “are likely to become 
a major driver of war and conflict.”258 These conclusions voiced by high-ranking public 
officials and state administrations contribute to the widespread belief - prevalent in public 
discourse - that water scarcity will lead to an increase of violent conflict, of “water wars.”  
Support for the water wars thesis is infrequent in academia, but government officials, 
business leaders, and the media often repeat its warnings. 259 Past heads of state like 
Anwar Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein of Jordan, and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
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have all warned about the likelihood of water wars.260 In March 2012, the UK Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change alerted a conference of high ranking politicians 
and diplomats that, “Countries have not tended to go to war over water, but I have a fear 
for the world that climate instability drives political instability…The pressure of that 
makes conflict more likely.”261 He continued, “Where the risk of conflict already burns 
brightly, it will focus the flame.”262 These interpretations offer similar conclusions: water 
could be an important variable in historical cases of conflict. As its strategic value rises 
with its scarcity, the world is likely to see an increase in water-related conflict. 
4.4 Water Securitization in the MENA Region: The Nile 
River Basin 
 
Unsurprisingly, the most resilient and successful examples of water securitization are 
found in the MENA region. The focus on water security in the MENA region is 
intrinsically tied up with the reality of demographic changes and economic development, 
together with continued political tension and absolute water stress. The Nile River Basin 
offers a fairly succinct example of the processes and effects of water securitization in the 
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region. It can also demonstrate how the concept of securitization faithfully recreates the 
story of security as being defined by enmity, competition, and perpetual threat of conflict.  
The Nile River Basin (See figure 1), covering 10 percent of the African continent, has 
always been an important artery for the lifeblood of the region. The Nile is the longest 
river in the world at 6850 km263, but its overall volume is incredibly small. Its annual 
discharge is only 6 percent of that of the Congo. It has two main tributaries: the White 
Nile, originating from Lake Victoria in east central Africa, and the Blue Nile, sourced 
from the highlands of Ethiopia. From their confluence, the river flows northwards into 
Egypt and out into the Mediterranean Sea. Because of the length of the river, regional 
climatic changes and developmental disparities are significant. The tributaries begin in 
humid conditions, in areas with annual rainfalls of 1200-1500 mm.264 However, the 
downstream portion of the river flows northward through the Sahara desert. Thus, for half 
of its journey, the Nile travels through countries that have effectively no rainfall and 
close to 80 million people in the downstream areas depend exclusively on the Nile for 
their water supply.265  
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 Figure 1: The Nile Basin
 
The world’s first civilizations grew out of the Nile River Basin over 4 millennia ago, and 
it continues today to drive the social, political and, economic identities of its inhabitants. 
Eleven countries share the basin with 200 million people inhabiting th
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and 370 million living in the countries that share it.267 This represents almost 40 percent 
of Africa’s population. Overall, the region is one of the poorest in the world, 
characterized by weak institutions, armed strife, and political instability. All of this is 
intensified by a population growth projected to be between 61-82 percent by 2030.268 The 
disparities among the social and environmental geographies contribute to the overall 
stress placed on this crucial waterway. The downstream riparians, because their societies 
have used the Nile for thousands of years, have “developed a sense of entitlement and 
have adopted the principle of ‘prior utilization’, which gives the right of use to the first 
user.”
269
 Two countries – Egypt and Sudan – comprise 98.7 percent of the basin’s 
irrigated lands.270 Adding to the complexity is the fact that the Nile Basin is home to 
some of the poorest countries in the world. Taking out Egypt and Kenya, the remaining 9 
basin countries are classified by the United Nations as “least developed.” Almost 100 
million residents live on less than a dollar a day. The humanitarian crises created by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, severe waterborne diseases and malaria, as well as violent interstate 
and intrastate conflict further compound this debilitating poverty.271 
The deep complexities of the Nile River Basin – power and geographic asymmetries, 
variability caused by climate change, competing water uses, pervasive poverty and 
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underdevelopment, institutional inefficiency and corruption, infrastructure deficiencies, 
and political and ethnic volatility – contribute to its persistent characterization as a likely 
site for future water wars. Authors like Bulloch and Darwish, Waterbury and 
Whittington, Klare, and Shiva, have all used the Nile Basin to further the narrative that 
water wars will break out over use of the Nile.272 UNESCO’s former Director-General 
Federico Mayor, directly referred to the Nile when he claimed that “More than petrol and 
land, it is over water that the most bitter conflicts of the near future may be fought.”273  
The whole Nile Basin is securitized, though it is most formally oriented around Egypt 
and Sudan, which together use 94 percent of the river’s water. Because of Egypt’s 
geographical deficiencies (it is 97 percent desert), it is forced to into an extreme reliance 
upon the waters of the Nile. Essentially, all of its domestic food, water, and power come 
from the Nile. Thanks to a generous allotment of water from the 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, Egypt has been able to maintain a hegemonic 
position in the region and thrive in the absence of anything close to native water 
abundance. However, the overall water picture remains difficult for Egypt. Its current 
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renewable water resources stand at 706 m3 per capita, leaving the country classified as 
“water poor”274  
Sudan, the largest country in Africa, is also highly dependent upon the Nile. Its average 
annual rainfall is 416 mm, but this number obscures the high variance in geographical 
climate. Its north is essentially bone-dry with an average annual rainfall of 25 mm, while 
the tropical rain forests of the south accumulate 1,600 mm per year. The erratic nature of 
rainfall means that Sudan is highly dependent upon the Nile. Total water withdrawal is 
estimated at 37 km3, with the country being allocated 18.5 km3/year from the 1959 Nile 
Waters Agreement. Of the 37 km3 withdrawn, 36 km3 is used by agriculture, which 
contributes 90 percent of the country’s non-oil export earnings.275 It is clear that the Nile 
River Basin is of existential importance to the peoples of Sudan and Egypt.   
It is rather remarkable that the creeping securitization of the Nile River Basin, especially 
in the context of Egypt and Sudan, has occurred in a period when relationships among 
Nile Basin countries have transitioned from “competition to cooperation.”276 The period 
immediately after the signing of the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement was defined by a new 
post-colonial reality. British colonialism in the region brought with it an attempt to exert 
hegemonic control over the basin, and ensure uninterrupted downstream flow. As the 
colonial period faded, riparian countries were mostly preoccupied with state-level 
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struggles for self-determination. The colonial legacy has loomed large over negotiations 
of the Nile ever since. Most countries in the basin did not win their independence until 
the 1960s, leaving them absent from the initial allocation discussions. This has led to 
some countries, like Ethiopia arguing for a new treaty to replace the Nile Waters 
Agreement, because it was never party to it. Indeed, “riparian cooperation in the Nile 
basin is essentially a post-colonial phenomenon, enormously influenced and somehow 
predetermined by the hydrological and hydro-political legacies of the colonial era.” The 
period between 1959 and 1999 was generally defined by competition and little 
cooperation over the Nile Basin. Mekonnen argues that, “hegemonic control and 
competition, which constituted the central preoccupation of the colonial powers,” was 
replicated by the newly independent riparians, which were distrustful of one another, 
lacked integrative activities, and demonstrated highly disparate interests.277  
The generally competitive nature of riparian relationships lasted until 1999 when a new 
cooperative venture, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), was launched.  Until then there had 
been no joint management, or coordinated planning and development of the Nile.278 
However, with the creation of the NBI, it was hoped that a new era would emerge. In 
some respects, it has led to a shift in the tone and the substance of state-to-state 
relationships along the Nile. Officially designed to, “achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development through the equitable utilization of and benefit from the common Nile Basin 
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water resources,”279 the NBI now comprises all eleven countries in the Nile Basin. 
Perhaps its most lasting impact will be encouraging the active inclusion and participation 
of Ethiopia, which until then had been long been resentful of its lack of involvement in 
decision-making and the small percentage of its water use, despite 85 percent of the 
Nile’s water originating there. All the key actors are engaged in the NBI, and the 
initiative is careful to facilitate both technical and political dimensions of the Basin’s 
management. Its central element, the Strategic Action Program (SAP), is made up of two 
complementary programs, the Shared Vision Program, and the Subsidiary Action 
Program. The SVP, supported by UNDP, was completed in 2009 and was comprised of 
eight basin-wide programs to build trust, confidence, and capacity building. The 
Subsidiary Action Program is more investment-oriented, encouraging projects that are 
trans-boundary and that contribute to poverty alleviation, reverse environmental 
degradation, and promote socio-economic growth in the riparian countries.280 It continues 
today.  
Since its inception in 1999 the NBI has always been viewed as a transitional mechanism, 
working as a capacity-builder towards a more comprehensive water management regime, 
one that would replace the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Until that time comes, the NBI 
has made substantial progress in promoting dialogue, cooperation, and opportunities for 
management. It has implemented eight major projects with a total value of $900 million, 
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and has 13 projects under preparation, with a projected value of $7-11 billion.281  All told, 
the NBI has been a hopeful sign that potential volatilities over shared water resources 
could be transformed through stakeholder involvement into a catalyst for cooperation.  
The Nile Basin Initiative demonstrates some innovative solutions that promote good 
stewardship and fair allocation, and there has been no outbreak of armed conflict between 
riparians. However, despite this, the NBI has not been successful in preventing the 
continued securitization of the Nile. In this respect it offers a helpful explication of the 
potential and limits of securitization theory in a water context. Despite the goodwill 
sought by the NBI, water relationships between its members continue to be strained and 
antagonistic. This antagonism is reflected by the processes of water securitization 
undertaken by important actors in the region. Indeed, the specific security rhetoric 
employed by the region’s leaders highlights the state’s existential survival, priority of 
action, and urgency, and often works to obscure some of the (albeit minor) progress 
towards cooperation in the water politics of the region. 282  
One of the principle catalysts sustaining the securitization of water in the Nile Basin 
region was the decision by a breakaway group of Nile Basin countries (Ethiopia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) to sign a new water distribution framework 
agreement to replace the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. The 2010 Entebbe Agreement 
prevents countries from using the Nile in ways that would harm downstream states, but 
does so in a way that removes Egypt’s absolute veto over upstream projects. It reflects 
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the relative economic and political stability experienced by upstream riparians, which is 
now being used to challenge the historical hydro-hegemony of Egypt and Sudan. 
Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi in a combative interview with Reuters, demonstrated 
this growing confidence, declaring that, ““I am not worried that the Egyptians will 
suddenly invade Ethiopia. Nobody who has tried that has lived to tell the story. I don’t 
think the Egyptians will be any different and I think they know that.”283 Unsurprisingly 
the Entebbe Agreement led to strong condemnations from Egypt, Sudan, and South 
Sudan. When Ethiopia signaled its intention to pursue the Entebbe Agreement, the 
Egyptian water minister, Mahmoud Abu-Zeid described it as an “act of war.”284 The 
Sudanese water minister, Kamal Ali Mohamed, said his country would stop co-operating 
with the NBI. "We are freezing activities regarding the NBI until these issues, these legal 
implications, are resolved."285 To date, the Entebbe Agreement has remained a divisive 
thorn in the side of the hegemonic downstream riparians. Adding to the new volatility of 
the Nile Basin, have been the regional upheavals emanating from the Arab Spring and the 
overthrow of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. This has seemingly weakened the Egyptian 
position in the region, and created significant challenges for the health of the NBI. While 
it still meets regularly, and it recently agreed on a new five-year plan, the prospects for a 
comprehensive agreement suitable for all countries in the Nile Basin seems far off.  
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The Nile Basin is one of the preeminent case studies of water securitization in the world. 
While no overt water wars have occurred, government officials, along with regional and 
international media, have contributed to a consistent perception of emergency. The 
rhetoric employed has frequently invoked security as the primary motivator and concern 
of the state actors in the region. The statement by the ancient historian Herodotus that 
“Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt,”286 is indicative of the popular perception that 
still exists in that country. It is not surprising then that the Egyptian government has often 
characterized upstream development of the Nile’s water as a substantial national security 
threat, and it has consistently threatened to go to war to protect its hegemonic control of 
the water.287 In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat proclaimed that, “water was the 
only matter that could take Egypt to war again.“288 In 1991, President Hosni Mubarak 
declared to both Ethiopia and Sudan he was ready to use force to protect Egypt’s access 
to the Nile’s water.289 The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi responded to these 
threats with assurances that, “there is no earthly force that can stop Ethiopia from 
benefiting from the Nile” and that, “We [Ethiopia] will use the Nile waters within our 
territory. We will not go to war unless they [Egypt] prevent us from using it.”290 Even 
relations amongst the dominant regional riparians, Egypt and Sudan have been volatile. 
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There are reports that in 1994, Egypt devised plans (later aborted) to deploy fighter jets to 
bomb Khartoum, where a dam was being built.291 These examples follow the basic logic 
of exceptionality contained in the Copenhagen school’s conception of security. Executive 
unilateralism proclaims the urgency of the situation and is often powerful enough to be 
reported and repeated and, in the case of the Nile region, it becomes accepted by the 
audience.  
Another potent factor contributing to securitization in the region is the recent decision by 
Ethiopia to construct the largest dam in Africa. “The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam,” 
(GERD) at a cost of 4.5 billion dollars (all supplied by the Ethiopian government), will 
primarily be used for hydropower, producing 15,000 GWh annually by mid-2017.292 It 
will also create the largest water-body in Ethiopia, twice the size of its largest natural 
lake, Lake Tana.293 The created reservoir will have a volume of 1.3 times the annual flow 
of the Blue Nile.294 The Ethiopian government has offered assurances the mega-project 
will benefit the wider region: it claims it will be able to produce clean and cheaper energy 
for export and it will be able to better manage water flow season-to-season, thereby 
reducing the threat of flooding, especially in Sudan.295  
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Unsurprisingly, the decision to construct the dam has been met with skepticism and fear, 
particularly by the traditionally dominant upstream hegemons and their allies. In a 
February 2013 meeting of the Arab Water Council, the Saudi Arabian Deputy Defence 
Minister, Prince Khalid Bin Sultan, argued that attempts by Nile basin countries to 
reallocate Nile water shares via the GERD were “a real threat” to Egyptian and Sudanese 
national security. He claimed that if the dam collapsed, “Khartoum would be drowned 
completely and the impact will even reach the Aswan Dam.” He speculated that the 
decision to build the dam so close to the Sudanese border (12 km away) “is for political 
plotting rather than economic gain.” Ratcheting up the rhetoric beyond the level of 
national security, the Prince accused the Ethiopian government of wanting to harm all 
Arab peoples: “There are fingers messing with water resources of Sudan and Egypt 
which are rooted in the mind and body of Ethiopia. They do not forsake an opportunity to 
harm Arabs without taking advantage of it." Concluding, he declared “The establishment 
of the dam means full Ethiopian control of every drop of water… The information is 
alarming and it is important that we do not underestimate the danger at the moment and 
its repercussions in the future.”296  
A few months prior to the Prince’s enflaming rhetoric, unverified reports emerged that 
Egypt and Sudan may have agreed to build an Egyptian airbase in Darfur, which would 
be used to strike Ethiopia and the GERD if diplomatic negotiations broke down over fair 
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use of the Nile.297 The report was officially denied by Cairo, and Nairobi sought to defuse 
tensions by refusing to comment. Adding fuel to the tensions, in June 2013, Egyptian 
politicians were caught on live TV discussing various strategies that would aggressively 
thwart Ethiopia’s continued development of the GERD. The strategies, aired across the 
region and reported in international news outlets, included backing Ethiopian rebels or 
using its intelligence services to destroy the dam (or at least giving the impression they 
were willing to).298 The continued expression of highly volatile rhetoric in the context of 
shifting regional power dynamics has led to the evolution of a highly securitized space. 
Egyptian officials have even recently used the technique of narrative counter-factual in 
the service of securitization. After Ethiopia announced its plans for the GERD, shortly 
after the Egyptian revolution in 2011, an unnamed international official proclaimed that 
“If Mubarak was still in power today, it would have been the beginning of a water war.” 
This was duly reported in the Financial Times, which, after describing the various 
cooperative mechanisms in place along the Nile River, ended its story on the heightened 
tensions in an all-too-familiar tone: “The Nile’s water wars may merely be on hold.”299  
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The threat of overt violence is indeed real. Thomas Homer-Dixon pointed to the Nile as 
one of the few cases in the world where the necessary conditions exist for water wars to 
break out. He wrote,  
In reality, wars over river water between upstream and downstream neighbors are 
likely only in a narrow set of circumstances: the downstream country must be 
highly dependent on the water for its national well-being; the up-stream country 
must be threatening to restrict substantially the river’s flow; there must be a 
history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most importantly, the 
downstream country must believe it is militarily stronger than the upstream 
country. 
 
The Nile is an obvious example that fulfills these conditions. And “sure enough,” from 
Anwar Sadat, to Boutros-Boutros Ghali, to Mubarak, to Zenawi, to Kamal Ali Mohamed, 
the placement of water at the centerpiece of national security has been a consistent theme.  
Securitization theory offers important insight into the security dynamics of the Nile 
Basin, and into the politics of water more generally. Remembering that the central 
concern for securitization theorists is to illustrate the performative power of speech acts, 
it is able to show how the complex web of historical relationships between state actors in 
the Nile region has come to be dominantly defined by specific security logic. The act of 
labeling control of the Nile and its acceptance by a significant audience (both internal and 
external to the region) has allowed for water to become defined as an existential threat to 
the state. The performative power of the speech acts, the speech act as event, has been 
enough to move the issue from the realm of ‘normal politics’ to a politics of 
extraordinary measures, in this case through threats and preparations for war. The 
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resonance of these securitized speech acts has coincided with shifts in the traditional 
power relations that have characterized the region since the original 1959 Nile Waters 
Agreement. Egypt has been weakened by the Arab Spring revolution. Sudan, under 
constant international pressure and the weight of economic sanctions, was unable to 
prevent the secession of its southern half into the newly formed country of South Sudan. 
In comparison, the countries of the Entebbe Agreement, in particular, Ethiopia, have 
experienced economic growth and relative stability. This has contributed to new 
initiatives that challenge the traditional downstream hydro-hegemony and basin-wide 
securitization.  
 
The case of water securitization along the Nile Basin provides a concrete example of the 
multi-layered ways in which water becomes designated and framed in a particular 
security language. It seems that the historical experience has been for the hydro-
hegemonic powers in the region (Egypt and Sudan) to consistently securitize the issue of 
the Nile in order to assert their dominance and preserve the favourable status quo. By 
directly framing any changes that would alter the dominant power imbalance in the 
region as an existential threat, they are able to justify aggressive, confrontational rhetoric 
and action as necessary reaction in the face of such “emergencies.” The result then is that 
the issue of water security in the Nile basin region becomes one marked by 
exceptionality, a particularly realist proposition, and one which seemingly avoids the 
reality that the securitization of the Nile has been ongoing for decades, and is therefore 
not really “exceptional” at all. Despite all the goodwill and hope that followed the 
creation of the cooperation-focused Nile Basin Initiative, relations between states over 
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water remain largely securitized, displaying a familiar pattern of threats, distrust, 
emergency planning, and fiery rhetoric. Is the response then to argue for 
“desecuritization” – a de-escalation of the issue, so that it may be tackled by normal 
political negotiations? Many authors believe so.300 Such moves may indeed prove 
analytically useful, but as the next section will argue, it is more likely to reaffirm a 
particularly negative reading of security: whereby security becomes something to be 
avoided. The politics of securitization that are embedded in this context constrain the 
possibility for transcendence. Because securitization remains largely ambivalent about 
the concept of security, limiting it to a static understanding of threats and defence, 
securitization is an instrument of a political ethic, and therefore capable of 
transformation.301 The question then is how might it be possible to envision and 
understand water security along multiple axes? 
4.5 Securitization and Desecuritization 
 
When a securitization is successful, it means the audience has accepted it. Successful 
securitization entails the suspension of the normal rules of the game, and the 
implementation of emergency measures. Connecting the issue of water with this concept 
of security is tempting because it can be an effective way to dramatize and mobilize 
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action against environmental problems. The idea might well be to place water scarcity 
and degradation on an appropriate level of importance, whereby it becomes an essential 
pursuit. But as Ole Wæver rightly points out, “the practices resulting from the slogan 
might lead to an inappropriate social construction of the environment as a threat/defense 
problem.”302 The danger is that these states of exception may become commonplace or 
even permanent. It is because of these associated dangers that the Copenhagen school so 
often argues that securitization must be avoided and claims to security must be limited. In 
its stead, they advocate for desecuritization. According to Wæver, desecuritization is a 
process whereby issues lose their “securityness” and where issues no longer present a 
threat to a particular actor.303 It is the fading away of one particular issue or actor. “At 
some point, certain ‘threats’ might no longer exercise our minds and imaginations 
sufficiently and are replaced with more powerful and stirring imageries.”304 In effect, a 
speaker suggests that a particular issue no longer constitutes a threat, or at least an 
existential threat. Desecuritization moves issues downward from the realm of security 
into the realm of public political discourse, and into normal modes of negotiation and 
settlement.305 Wæver points out, “In some democratic perspective, ‘desecuritization’ is 
probably the ideal, since it restores the possibility of exposing the issue to the normal 
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haggling and questioning of politicization…”306 In the context of the Nile Basin, the 
attempts to renegotiate antagonistic water relationships via the NBI could be viewed as 
attempts to desecuritize water.   
The hope is that desecuritization can appease critics from both critical and traditional 
security camps. On the one hand, it limits the scope of threats that should be tackled by 
the state and its security apparatuses, thus placating traditionalists who wish to protect the 
sanctity of their preferred vision of security as state security. On the other hand, 
desecuritization shares with critical theorists an aversion to the militarization of issues, 
and calls for problems to be dealt with through negotiation, compromise, and dialogue. 
However, the Copenhagen school’s “preference”307 for desecuritization struggles to offer 
a coherent alternative, nor a normatively superior position. Primarily this is because 
desecuritization is built upon the same exceptional and exclusionary logic that underpins 
securitization. It would be wrong then to assume that the Copenhagen school’s advocacy 
for desecuritization can alleviate the many obvious problems of water securitization, 
whether in the Nile Basin, or elsewhere.308  
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While the Copenhagen school’s desire to avoid militarizing issues is indeed compatible 
with an emancipatory approach, it does not absolve it from the acute criticism leveled by 
theorists like Ken Booth, who claim that that “the central themes of securitization and 
desecuritization are state-centric, discourse-dominated, and conservative.”309 The 
constructivist lens upon which the Copenhagen school relies does not adequately 
interrogate how we might unmake ideas and practices of security, and take stock of ones 
that create space for radically democratic and emancipatory approaches. In its desire to 
remain simply an analytical tool, deprived of any political motives, the Copenhagen 
school subordinates ethical/moral consequences in lieu of providing coherence to the 
processes of speech acts and the series of extraordinary practices that accompany them. 
Desecuritization, at least as envisioned by Wæver,310 signals an attachment to a view of 
security as resistance to a threatening other, which is reliant upon the same Schmittian 
configuration of security as its securitization opposite and remains prevalent in traditional 
security discourses. And as the CASE Collective has pointed out, the fact that 
desecuritization seeks to retrieve the “normality of politics” implies quite enormous 
assumptions about what can be thought of as the objective socio-political (presumably 
liberal-democracy) order within which an issue should reside.311 By seeking a return to 
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“normal politics,” the Copenhagen school retreats from actively interrogating the shifting 
and context-driven spheres of exception and rule. Thus, despite being considered 
revolutionary in its articulation of a constructivist logic of security threats – whereby 
security is what we make of it – the Copenhagen school still relies upon a fixed, 
traditional understanding of security. This (in part) fails to adequately match the 
complexity of the social dynamics of security.312  
This fixed vision of security inherent within the Copenhagen school approach has been 
the basis for some of the most thorough critiques of the securitization approach. Felix 
Ciută  points out that the meaning of security can vary contextually, and as a result the  points out that the meaning of security can vary contextually, and as a 
concept of securitization provides a contradictory answer to its own question of “what is 
security?” For Ciută , “securitization theory urges the analyst not to engage in the , “securitization theory urges the analyst not to engage in the 
evaluation of security issues qua security issues (whether ‘real’ or ‘unreal’), since this is 
decided by the actors who decide to securitize or not these issues.” But securitization by 
its very nature provides benchmarks that allow actors to determine whether policies are 
about security, because “security is what fills the criteria of securitization and nothing 
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else.”313 These actors carry with them specific beliefs about the nature of security, ones 
that delineate ethical boundaries of obligation and consideration. But these approaches 
that tout a necessary opposition to a threatening other are not inevitable, as later chapters 
will reveal.  
4.6 Schmitt, Security, and the Exception in the 
Anthropocene 
Where the Copenhagen School falls noticeably flat is in its failure to deeply probe the 
underlying construction of security itself. This obscures the inherent power dynamics that 
comprise the political choices made in deeming an issue appropriate for securitization or 
desecuritization. Beyond simply a novel way of theorizing the importance of how the 
discourse of security matters, it involves a political reading of security itself. These 
political choices according to the Copenhagen School revolve around a specific 
understanding of security, itself representative of a specific understanding of identity.314 
The German political philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt is instrumental to the political 
readings of politics and security put forth by the Copenhagen School. Michael C. 
Williams has addressed the Schmittian connection, describing the form of security put 
forth by the Copenhagen School as one dependent upon politics of exclusion and 
emergency. He writes that, “the identification of ‘security’ with a logic of existential 
threat and extreme necessity” mirrors “the intense condition of existential division, of 
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friendship and enmity, that constitutes Schmitt’s concept of the political.315 According to 
Schmitt’s philosophy of political realism, government action is grounded upon the 
constitution of the political through the passage to the limit. In other words, governments 
can derive order and authority through the specific techniques of securitization whereby 
the fear of violent death and destruction become paramount. This reading of security has 
dramatic implications. It identifies the distinction between friend and enemy, inside and 
outside, as the fundamental principle that allows political authority to integrate otherwise 
free individuals into a political community.316 The repercussions of this matter 
significantly because it attaches security practices to a rigid dichotomy of identity. This is 
useful for Buzan, Wæver, and others subscribing to the Copenhagen School, because it 
coincides with their desire to incorporate identity into security analyses – one of the more 
important post-Cold War developments in security studies.  But this dichotomy is 
problematic. The political identification used in securitization maintains a clear and 
distinct dialectic between inside and outside, between friend and enemy. As Huysmans 
writes,  
Securitization here sets a dialectic of self and other at work, in which the other 
transforms into an enemy defining the self and grounding the dialectic in 
expectations of violence. In other words, the community of friends comes into 
existence precisely as a reaction to the representation of an enemy. This 
rationality of government subjugates the dynamics of association and 
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disassociation among friends to the manufacturing and mediation of relations of 
enmity and distrust.317 
 
For Schmitt, the “political” is “the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every 
concrete antagonism becomes much more political the closer it approaches the most 
extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.”318 In essence, individuals only become 
politicized once they are positioned within a friend-enemy dichotomy, with the survival 
of the newly identified group at stake. The fundamental division provides the 
Copenhagen School with the basis for viewing securitization as the decision to mobilize 
political groupings over an issue with enough passion and intensity to act in exceptional, 
often violent ways. The generally negative view of security that Schmitt held is clearly 
visible in the Copenhagen School’s calls for desecuritization. They believe that security 
is a dangerous concept, to be invoked only with care and restraint. In effect they are 
arguing for a stable, tolerant, and negotiated settlement on issues, rather than emergency 
measures that curtail individual political liberties. This is a particularly salient issue with 
regards to the water sector because, as Buzan and Wæver are careful to point out, 
securitizing the environment can have problematic side effects.319  
But, as this dissertation shows, there is nothing inevitable about this particular reading of 
security and human political identity. Examples of alternative conceptions of identity and 
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security that emphasize inclusive, cooperative, and non-threatening relationships with 
others abound. Emancipatory water security is committed to certain aspects of 
desecuritization – negotiation, deliberation, communication, and an avoidance of threats 
and violence. Beyond that, the two approaches remain largely disconnected, because 
emancipation offers a more humble and critical approach to security that encourages the 
continual pursuit of a positive form of security, rather than fight for its avoidance, as 
desecuritization advocates. This will be further explicated in later discussions on the 
embedded potential within water security to offer the hope of resistance to, and 
emancipation from, limited understandings of security and identity traditionally seen as 
narrow, fixed, timeless and apolitical. Though the Copenhagen School is able to offer 
analytical guidance to the process of the designation as a security issue, it fails to 
excavate the deeply-held attachment to an objective understanding of the concept of 
security. Given its analytical focus and the lack of a critical investigation into the concept 
of security, the Copenhagen School has been criticized for being distinctly divided from 
emancipatory security, if not wholly incommensurable.320  
The connections between water and conflict have been made so consistently, forcefully, 
and authoritatively that an ongoing process of securitization is readily apparent. There is 
no clearer example than in the Nile Basin. And as the resilience of the water wars thesis 
in the region indicates, the prospects for desecuritization appear dim; water has 
consistently been tied to a vision of security as exception. But if we are to take the 
insights of earth system scientists seriously, then we need to better attach to security 
theories and practices the idea we are living in an age of constant flux. It is incoherent to 
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speak of our age absent exception. The scale of earthly human impacts is only now being 
appreciably understood, and it is becoming clear that the effects are profound, pervasive, 
and accelerating further change.  The Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen and his colleague 
Eugene Stoermer formally introduced the term “Anthropocene” in 2000, to describe the 
growing impact of human activities on earth and atmosphere, at all scales, including the 
global scale. They wrote, “it seems to us more than appropriate to emphasize the central 
role of mankind in geology and ecology by proposing to use the term ‘Anthropocene’ for 
the current geological epoch.321 The ramifications of this declaration are immense and are 
only now being appreciably introduced into security studies. Simon Dalby is one security 
theorist who has begun to think of what it means to think of security in the Anthropocene. 
He writes, 
The Anthropocene formulation makes it clear that humanity is now a major force 
shaping the biosphere. It challenges the Malthusian formulation because it shows 
the connections that cross boundaries while also showing that many of the poor 
and marginal are made so by the environmental processes of the global economy. 
Consequently security and modern identity must be fundamentally 
rethought…Putting people rather than states at the heart of the analysis is a 
HUGE task, but one that is necessary to challenge attempts on the part of the 
prosperous to maintain their privileges in the face of the needs of the poor.322 
 
Dalby retains some faith in the securitization framework; in fact, he speculates that we 
might be reaching the point where the environment should be securitized (in the short 
                                                 
321
 Paul J. Crutzen, and Eugene F. Stoermer. “The Anthropocene.” IGBP Newsletter 41. (2000): 17. 
322
 Simon Dalby. Security and Environmental Change. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009): 170. 
138 
 
run), if only to set societies on a more sustainable path. In the Anthropocene, the 
exception no longer holds. The binary logic that reduces water resources to 
“threat/defence” or “secure/insecure” significantly obscures alternative articulations of 
security, limiting the emancipatory potentials embedded within the complex social 
relations that surround the issue of water scarcity.  
It should be acknowledged that to focus on the content of security is helpful in many 
respects. It allows issues that often exist outside the scope of traditional security analyses 
to be brought under scrutiny. This can have tangible benefits in raising public awareness 
into the myriad experiences of security, beyond simply traditional threats of armed 
conflict. However, for all the benefits to be derived from securitization/desecuritization – 
presenting limits to the “excessive widening” of security, the successful fusion of 
neorealist and poststructuralist approaches to security, and its clear research program – 
there are numerous and important limitations that limit its usefulness in developing an 
emancipatory security of water. Using securitization to broaden our understandings of 
security is to privilege the characterizations of people and environmental degradation (to 
highlight only two examples) as threatening to traditional life. This does not get us closer 
to solving the dilemmas of our common age, only reinforcing a status quo vision that 
lacks a clear application for the most vulnerable of our common human society. 
The process of securitization, and our understanding of it relies upon a static, unchanging 
view of security – one that at its heart “finds something to do with defence and the 
state.”323 Because the securitization thesis consistently focuses on the designation of 
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threat, there is a tendency to avoid examining the construction of security itself, and 
therefore privileging the content of security, over its very meaning.324   
The securitization thesis tells us that the owners, or the agents, of “security” are almost 
solely political leaders who speak fearfully of security to their domestic audience. To 
raise an issue up to a level of existential importance requires a degree of mobilization 
only held by those with significant authority and power. Situating acts of securitization in 
the hands of leaders, bureaucracies, lobby groups, and pressure groups, can only help but 
maintain a view of security that privileges notions of statism, survival, threats, and 
defence as its guiding ontology. It leaves the audience passive in the construction of 
security – active only in its acceptance (or rejection) of a threat, but not of security itself. 
Furthermore, given the incredible discursive power available to those in positions of 
authority, they often resort to utilizing language that place people (e.g. upstream water-
seekers), organizations (e.g. stakeholders), or things (e.g. environment degradation) as 
“threats” to be dealt with using existing security practices. Thus, rather than focusing on 
those people who suffer the harshest consequences of securitizing moves (in this context 
access to adequate water supplies), it is individuals or groups who are often reduced to 
being designated as the threat itself.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the Copenhagen School approaches to security and their 
relationship to water security. It described the ongoing process of securitization in the 
MENA region, specifically in the volatile Nile Basin. Finally, it argued that these new 
theoretical approaches have been important in showing how the concept of security can 
be broadened in scope yet remains silent on the ethical-normative dimensions of the 
construction of security as a concept. This has significant implications, because as the 
CASE Collective reminds us, “How security is defined conditions what is considered as 
insecurity (risk, threat).”325  
The securitization framework developed by Buzan and Wæver is useful for illuminating 
the expressions of - and responses to - many varied issues, including water. It met one of 
the key criticisms of post-Cold War security scholars by limiting the excessive widening 
of security. And by its description of the intersubjective nature of the concept of security 
it was able to introduce important theoretical tools to illuminate incidences of 
securitization and desecuritization. Ultimately though, the Copenhagen School’s 
understanding of security is based upon a particular tradition of international relations 
and security that does not escape the logic of exclusion and an attachment to defining 
security as “panic politics.”326 It thus anchors itself to a particular interpretation of the 
meaning of security, seemingly to avoid rendering the security concept incoherent. As Jef 
Huysmans has written, “the rhetorical structure upon which the intelligibility of security 
depends is the fixed point – the threats, the units, the agents fluctuate but the signification 
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of security remains.”327 For the Copenhagen school, to speak security is to make security. 
This approach fails to push deeper and excavate the security logic that is embedded in the 
rhetorical structure – how and why the speaker and audience understand a language as 
security language. The underlying logic of security is not an object of research for the 
Copenhagen school.  
This has particular consequences for responses to ongoing water insecurity in the 
Anthropocene. It means the continuation of business-as-usual, offering little hope to 
break out of contemporary traps of vulnerability. Acknowledging the power of the water 
wars discourse, as the Copenhagen school does quite expertly, is only one aspect of the 
overall picture; acknowledgment only gets us so far. To deny its ethical-normative 
implications is to again cede the ontological vision of security as survival and exclusion. 
To do so, “retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of 
the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature.”328  A response to this, offered in the 
following chapters, is to re-orient the conception of water security towards one that is 
under continued dialogical critique, with an emphasis towards emancipatory goals. This 
means that water security might be seen in conceptual and practical terms as something 
shifting, context-dependent, and capable of producing emancipatory outcomes for those 
most vulnerable to the vagaries of the international system of states. In contrast to 
totalizing statist discourses, to provide a critical rendering of water security would be to, 
as James Der Derian writes, “…reinterpret – and possibly reconstruct through the 
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reinterpretation – a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centres, multiple 
meanings, and fluid identities.”329  
Upcoming chapters attempt to build a critical-water security approach that can offer 
continued, varied guidance toward a deeper understanding of the nature of the problem of 
water insecurity. Such an approach may also help move toward the greater emancipation 
of individuals and communities through a progressive security rather than avoiding it (as 
the Copenhagen school would have us do through desecuritization) and relying upon its 
strict definition as survival. The principal concern must be to examine who security is for, 
and what does it do? 
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5 CHAPTER FIVE: Toward an Emancipatory Security of 
Water: Inclusion, Communication, and Cosmopolitanism 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As the last chapter showed, an ongoing process of water securitization is occurring in 
many places around the world. There is a dominant view of water as a dwindling natural 
resource that has the potential to act as a threat multiplier in the Anthropocene, an age of 
constant climate insecurity and domestic upheaval in warming world. This view admits 
that while it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to find a major conflict precipitated over 
water resources, water is often an important variable in conflict and is emblematic of the 
increasing importance of environmental factors going forward in the twenty-first century. 
Against this background, the next two chapters sharply shift the trajectory of water 
security towards a critical engagement with its emancipatory characteristics. It explores 
the idea that water can act as a progressive site for the articulation of emancipatory 
policies based upon cosmopolitan ethics. While a great number of analyses and policies 
on water security utilize insights from traditional international security (either explicitly 
or implicitly), none have yet actively demonstrated how the twin concepts of 
emancipation and cosmopolitanism are immanent in global relations over water 
resources. The succeeding chapter - chapter six - will more fully elucidate the 
emancipatory interest in water security through a focus on the cosmopolitan ethics of 
hydrosolidarity present in contemporary water practices. The current chapter seeks to 
theoretically bind emancipation with water security. It does so by first providing the 
conceptual foundations for re-orienting security along a critical theory axis. It then 
examines emancipation as the unifying intent upon which all critical theories rely. There 
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exist many variations of critical theory that illustrate significant differences among 
authors. The commitment to emancipation is the single unifying factor between them. 
While the first generation of Frankfurt School theorists grew increasingly pessimistic 
about the possibilities for emancipatory social change, they also knew that enlightenment 
contains within it the perpetual possibility of change. The analysis here draws from this 
insight to pursue a vision of water security that does not seek to escape the concept of 
security altogether, but to critique it, so as to reveal the progressive spirit of emancipation 
immanent within discourse and practice. The chapter concludes by describing the varied 
set of understandings employed by different actors in the construction of security over 
water. This will act as a precursor to a longer discussion in the next chapter on the 
relationships individuals and communities have over shared water - relationships which 
empower security visions absent of the prevailing logic of exclusion and enmity. 
The benefits of linking the concept of emancipation with water have already been 
mentioned in earlier chapters. However, a more explicit attempt will be made here to 
point to the important junctures where relationships over water display emancipatory 
alternatives to traditional discourses of security. There are significant implications that 
arise from this. By identifying the junctures where water coalesces with marginalized 
individuals and communities to help articulate different interpretations of security, it 
becomes possible to decentre the analytical and prescriptive situation of the state, thereby 
suspending assumptions about traditional hierarchies of values and issues in international 
security.330 This, it is argued, has both analytical and normative value. In terms of 
                                                 
330
 Robert Boardman, “Environmental Discourse and International Relations Theory: Towards a Proto-
Theory of Ecosation.” Global Society 11.1 (1997): 42.  
145 
 
analytical benefit, the critical approach elaborates a wide range of relationships that 
individuals and communities exhibit over shared waterways. This creates better analyses 
of “water security” by making it clear that traditional approaches - with their focus on 
state and system level interactions – are not sufficient for explaining the existing and 
potential effects of freshwater scarcity on individuals and communities. Political 
responses and approaches to the issue of water scarcity would indeed be well served to 
take heed of the elaboration of critical water security found in this chapter. Given that 
many new and innovative approaches to water management depend upon holistic values 
and rely upon interdependent, cross-sectoral cooperation (Integrated Water Resources 
Management – IWRM - being only one, albeit controversial example), the non-statist and 
cosmopolitan ethics at the heart of critical security analyses seem exceedingly prescient 
and appropriate for study.  
As myriads of studies show, the global environmental situation in the early twenty-first 
century displays crises on a scale not yet experienced in human history.331 The 
interrelated nature of the epochal, structural, and decisional crises, require new and 
radical responses that push development of a world security. It is in such political 
arrangements, underscored by ethical attachments, that we are best able to achieve 
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‘security’ without depriving others of it.332  A water security developed to meet both 
human and environmental needs, through a form of cosmopolitan ethics, is one 
component of a global response to shared threats and vulnerabilities. It adds to a growing 
literature that seeks to identify alternatives to security characterized as statist, militaristic, 
and exclusionary, and to shift dominant discourses and practices of security in 
emancipatory directions. This chapter and the one that follows it contribute to these dual 
aims by demonstrating that progressive change in water management policy must 
consistently rely upon the opening up of dialogic space to include multiple actors 
engaging and contesting the dominant values that privilege business-as-usual. It is 
through this diffusion of power to marginalized individuals, so often left out of 
discussions of security, that it becomes possible to remove the arbitrary, oppressive, 
structural constraints that limit human potential and contribute to the processes of 
environmental degradation.  
The next section develops a three-pronged approach to emancipatory water security. 
Inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism are isolated as the primary building 
blocks for emancipatory water security. These three characteristics coalesce in various 
forms in historical and contemporary water relations and show that water security can be 
a positive force. Chapter six shows how hydrosolidarity has emerged in a variety of ways 
to offset neo-Malthusian concerns about water scarcity and violence. But to understand 
how and why these three characteristics produce emancipatory water security, it is 
necessary to spend more time dissecting their constituent parts. Taken together, chapters 
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five and six outline a framework for understanding how water can provide a unique and 
compelling avenue for the emergence of progressive security discourses and practices.  
5.2 Three Components of Emancipatory Water Security 
Claiming emancipation as the core aim of water security is a difficult and confusing task, 
but it is also one that can provide us with a more robust understanding of the politics of 
security. Clearly, as has been carefully demonstrated, to view emancipation as a utopian 
panacea for the ill effects related to environmental scarcity and security misses the point. 
The reliance on emancipation here is meant to present a vision of transformative action 
without necessarily producing a detailed moral/legal framework, which often overlooks 
the constant flow and change of individual and group identities and the resulting social 
norms. To present such a framework also runs the risk of imparting an external, idealized 
vision of the world divorced from contemporary political and social contexts.333 An 
emancipatory security of water therefore cannot present a schematic design for better 
water institutions or negotiations. What it can do is produce an understanding of the 
possibilities for progressive change, a vision of normatively better linkages between 
environmental scarcity and security that are inclusive, communicative, and cosmopolitan. 
In this sense it does marry theory with action.  
Matt McDonald has previously outlined the characteristics of generalized emancipatory 
security as:  concerned with overturning structures of oppression or exclusion; radically 
cosmopolitan; predicated on the rights and needs of the most vulnerable; and ensuring 
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that the means envisaged to achieve or preserve ‘security’ will not deprive others of it.334 
McDonald’s characteristics are all compatible with the vision outlined here. But what 
specifically does an emancipatory security of water look like? The rest of this chapter 
will answer this question. There are unique qualities to water security that precipitate a 
more refined vision of the ways in which emancipation can overcome the deficiencies of 
other traditional and critical approaches. In essence, an emancipatory water security 
consists of three interrelated central components: 1) It is inclusive. Traditional political 
analyses and approaches to water security often view it as a site of timeless, conflictual, 
and necessarily exclusionary relations, where individuals, groups, and most importantly, 
states, battle over control of the dwindling resource. Such attitudes were clarified in 
chapter three. Inclusion is meant to promote a model whereby excluded groups, such as 
women, subordinated classes, racial, national, and ethnic minorities are incorporated into 
discussions and decisions about water security. Of course a focus on inclusion does not 
deny the existence of difference; rather it embraces it. The recognition of difference is 
central to a permanent openness to dialogue, which connects us to the second component 
of emancipatory water security.335   2) It is communicative. Drawing heavily from the 
insights of Andrew Linklater, himself an intellectual devotee of Habermas, an 
emancipatory water security relies upon a discourse theory of morality, whereby 
individuals are granted the right to participate in decisions that may affect them 
adversely. The basis for this morality comes from an understanding of the individual 
subject as a social being who “gains self-understanding simultaneously with the 
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understanding of others through communicative practice.”336  A permanent openness to 
dialogue is necessary for the equitable management of shared water resources, especially 
as new and unexpected changes occur to available water sources (most notably from 
climate change) and the political structures which currently manage them. By eliminating 
the structural constraints that inhibit active participation in decision-making procedures, 
progress is made towards the critical pursuit of the constant enlargement of freedom.337 3) 
It is cosmopolitan. The necessary corollary to the first two components of emancipatory 
water security is the expansion of the moral community of stakeholders. A view is taken 
towards a post-sovereign understanding of political identity, whereby individual 
allegiances and understandings are not reducible to a homogenous localism, but exhibit 
cultural pluralism and heterogeneity. The focus on cosmopolitanism here as “interactive 
universalism” entails a reconfiguration of political and ethical boundaries away from 
established borders towards a more globally-oriented space where no clear lines can be 
drawn between inside and outside, domestic and foreign. There is a universal recognition 
of individuals to be consulted in the decisions which affect them. This allows for greater 
inclusion and dialogue among human beings to express shared water concerns and 
vulnerabilities. The normative requirement here is an epistemological shift towards an 
understanding of shared reality, whereby individuals treat one another as equals, rather 
than as competitors or threats. This undercuts the traditional focus on national self-
interest as the ordering dimension of environmental security. 
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It is necessary to expand upon each characteristic to advance the argument that 
emancipation best positions individuals to recover their voices as important stakeholders 
in water security and creates the conditions for more harmonious and ethical relations 
over water.  
5.3 Inclusion 
The issue of inclusion is a crucial component of any critical security, and it 
remains essential to an emancipatory water security. It is the building block for a process-
based approach to water security that is communicative and cosmopolitan.338 Inclusion 
allows for a radical opening of the normative space of security by blurring the 
distinctions between insider and outside, citizen and non-citizen, self and other. To reach 
this opening critical water security must approach inclusion by way of a constitutive-
relational theory of identity. Such a theory upsets the essentialized notions of identity that 
lead to a dualistic logic of self/other, which confirms and replicates difference rather than 
acceptance and understanding. A constitutive-relational theory of identity views self and 
group identities as constituted by the multiple and overlapping social relations that make 
up their experiences. Identity is relational rather than essential. By removing the false 
dichotomies from identity we can move to an understanding of inclusion that promotes a 
politics of recognition whereby all parties affected by water scarcity are provided with 
fairness and political opportunity.339 From this notion of inclusion stem the remaining 
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components of emancipatory security – communication based on dialogical rationality 
and cosmopolitanism. While the problems inherent in the self/other dichotomy have 
already been discussed in earlier sections of this dissertation, we can see here how 
impactful its collapse can be. In security terms it upsets prevailing security ethics that 
rely upon exclusion and enmity, upon which the Westphalian system of states relies.  
Acts of inclusion work in two central ways in the context of security. First, at the 
individual level, they break down essentialized views of identity, so often the cause of 
entrenched, intractable, and antagonistic differences.  Secondly, at an international level 
they blur the borders of inside/outside, that fundamental characteristic of the Westphalian 
view. Together, both ways work to ensure inclusion is a concept necessary to overcome 
the essential “otherness” emblematic of conventional approaches to water security. An 
emancipatory water security relies upon a constitutive-relational theory of identity. It 
highlights the constitutive nature of identities such as the self and the other. This can be 
used to challenge the disciplining narrative of separation that comprises so many security 
relations. The result is that individuals can and do see their own self-fulfillment in the 
inclusion of others’ wants and desires. As critical philosopher Jacques Rancière reminds 
us, the concept of emancipation does not mean a radical secession of marginalized groups 
to form a counter-hegemonic bloc, but rather the recognition of marginalized groups as 
members of a common world.  He writes, “Self-emancipation is not secession, but self-
affirmation as a joint-sharer in a common world, with the assumption, appearances to the 
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contrary notwithstanding, that one can play the same game as the adversary.”340 The 
implication here is that individuals can pursue their full possibilities - can pursue 
emancipation - by including others, even their adversaries.  
The notion of inclusion here derives from a constitutive-relational theory of identity. In 
this reading, identity is not so much the result of shared biological attributes from birth 
and shared social understandings but is derived from experience. In other words, identity 
is not something fixed by Mother Nature or a god, but is constituted by relationships with 
others. According to Charles Taylor, identity is partly shaped by recognition, its absence, 
or by the misrecognition, of others.341 The character and constitution of identity is 
determined by the interactions between individuals and groups, the “stylized repetition of 
acts,” as Judith Butler terms it.342 Such a theory dismantles the separation between self 
and other, seeing identities as socially situated and relationally constituted.343 In their 
interactions the self and other work to constitute each other’s reality, and thus determine 
its ontological status. This contrasts the essentialized notion of identity, which holds that 
individuals and groups demonstrate a unity of attributes.344 The idea of an essentialized 
identity is easily dismissed by the reality that all social groups include persons who defy 
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or reject many of the attributes deemed essential for membership within a group. As Iris 
Marion Young reminds us, “the attempt to define a common group identity tends to 
normalize the experience and perspective of some of the group members while 
marginalizing or silencing that of others.”345 In such a view there is a fundamental 
acknowledgment of social difference even within defined groups, which, though it can 
lead to more complexity and difficulty in reaching decisions, produces more equitable 
political processes.  
Acknowledging social differences creates an enlarged view of democratic discussion and 
decision-making. The social differences pointed to here rely upon a conception of 
identity that is constructed not on the basis of a substantial logic but through a relational 
understanding with other individuals. This view rejects the idea of difference as a 
manifestation of self-regarded interest. It entails a commitment to including voices in 
security discourse from a wide range of actors to encourage a better understanding of the 
multiple effects water scarcity has on communities and individuals. Including varied 
perspectives on water from diverse social segments creates security dialogues that see 
differences as socially situated and relationally constituted. This understanding can lead 
to normatively and consequentially better policies of water governance so necessary for 
emancipation and human possibility. The point is not necessarily to pursue formal 
equality for members of a group or society in decision-making. Rather, inclusive 
democracy means “explicitly acknowledging social differentiations and divisions and 
encouraging differently situated groups to give voice to their needs, interests, and 
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perspectives on the society in ways that meet conditionals of reasonableness and 
publicity.”346 
Understanding the constitutive-relational aspects of identity can exert significant impacts 
on the representations of inclusion and exclusion that lie at the heart of international 
relations. On an international level, acts of inclusion uproot the traditional inside/outside 
dichotomy cemented by the Westphalian system of states. The post-structuralist David 
Campbell, in his pioneering study of U.S. foreign policy, Writing Security, has most ably 
described the production and effects of security exclusions. In his book, Campbell 
examines the dangerous political consequences of relying on difference as a basis for 
exclusion. He writes that “the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription 
of boundaries that serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside,’ a ‘self’ from an 
‘other,’ a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign.’347  The constitutive-relational components that 
upset the notion of an essential and stable identity can carry over to categories such as 
“nation” or “state.” If identity no longer remains a fixed concept then this opens the door 
for the destabilization of the inside/outside boundaries that present untenable markers of 
exclusion in international security. Indeed it opens the door for emancipatory practices of 
inclusion. Such practices generally improve the quality of life and security of once-
marginalized individuals, specifically with regard to water access. This is not to deny the 
very real power that “imagined communities” hold on people. But when it comes to 
water, the idea is that the best way to secure it is to begin thinking and acting in ways that 
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propel a more ethically just community of communities, rather than exclusionary, binary 
terms like insider/outsider, friend/enemy, etc.   
A focus on identity can be used to open up the number of voices seen as legitimate actors 
in water security. By expanding the range of voices traditionally left outside of security 
discourse, differences and similarities in language, everyday practices, and social, 
political, and spiritual understanding can be observed and granted recognition. In this 
regard water politics become a space for critical interaction between individuals, with 
states no longer representing the necessary ethical arbiters of resource allocation. With 
the erosion of essentialized identities, the state no longer maintains its position as the 
only just guarantor of security. This does not result necessarily in the disintegration of 
statist water politics, but it does open up new conditions of possibility, whereby water 
security becomes characterized by the dialogical pursuit of emancipation. In fact, the 
state itself can maintain a dominant position in negotiating allocation and distribution yet 
still contend with a multiplicity of other actors pursuing alternative forms of security. An 
emancipatory water security sees discussions over water as enlivened sites of democratic 
practice when the focus shifts from a raw pursuit of state interest to the expansion of 
jurisdictions for participation by oppressed and marginalized individuals. It engenders a 
sense of recognition in the emancipatory vision.348 The inclusion of marginalized voices 
of individuals is one of the paramount drivers of an ethical and acceptable negotiation of 
shared water resources. All this is in conjunction with the central argument of enlivening 
sites of water security with open possibilities of communication, towards a future where 
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individuals are freed from arbitrary and oppressive forms of structural and physical 
violence.  
The pivotal question may be asked to what extent the inclusion of marginalized 
individuals into security discussions opens up space for normatively progressive 
approaches to managing water resources? In principle, pursuing inclusion is a necessary 
first step that allows, “differently situated individuals” to understand,  
They are nevertheless related in a world of interaction and internal effects that 
affects them all, but differently. If they aim to solve their collective problems, 
they must listen across their differences to understand how proposals and policies 
affect others differently situated. They learn what takes place in different social 
situations and how social processes appear to connect and conflict from different 
points of view…Such an enlarged view better enables them to arrive at wise and 
just solutions to collective problems to the extent they are committed to doing 
so.
349
  
Developing out of a consciousness that accepts deep fissures in representation, the 
emancipatory vision expressed here seeks to promote actions of water negotiation that 
take seriously the wishes and concerns of marginalized populations. It is premised on an 
observation that water scarcity and exposure to environmental harm are accessible points 
of solidarity between differently situated individuals. Such an observation must then 
translate into clear commitments to the pursuit of inclusion, premised upon a constitutive-
relational understanding of identity. However, inclusion itself will not ensure 
emancipatory visions of water security. Inclusion, in a critical theoretical understanding, 
must reflect a commitment to communication, which, if it is to be conceptually coherent, 
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is derived from a cosmopolitan ethical viewpoint. The institutional implications of all this 
are difficult to assuage, but there are indications that some movement towards 
institutionalized “hydrosolidarity” is achievable. The next chapter will formally discuss 
this potential. The remaining sections of this chapter will clarify the remaining two 
components of an emancipatory water security.  
5.4 Communication (Dialogical Rationality) 
The jump from inclusion to communication is not very great. Working to include all 
voices within a discussion over shared water entails a commitment to dialogue that can 
promote the greatest possible freedom for individuals. Such a commitment draws from a 
deeper epistemological understanding that the mind plays a central role in the 
construction of reality.350 A communicative rationality stands in opposition to the reliance 
on scientific techniques or objective analyses of fact to discover the laws of society and 
nature. Instead, what is sought through immanent critique is the space to collapse the 
objective self/other distinction and reveal how the contemporary “realities” of 
international security are mutable and subject to emancipatory change. It was Hegel, and 
later Marx, who fervently argued that the lines of progress are not drawn by autonomous 
accumulation of scientific knowledge, but reflect specific human interests and dominant 
power relations.351 In light of this, it is necessary to put forth ideas of communicative 
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rationality and discourse ethics that produce an enlarged mentality that can be a model for 
interaction with the other, a dialogue that is open to all and governed by principles of 
equality. Such thinking allows for reflexive actors to engage with a multiplicity of 
viewpoints, a variety of perspectives, and to acknowledge all the layers of meaning which 
constitute a situation.352 In this view, emancipation remains the goal, but process becomes 
the key. Processes that emphasize communication, dialogue, and conversation can 
produce the moral framework for the third pillar of emancipatory water security – 
cosmopolitanism – because they depend upon a universal principle of reciprocal 
recognition.   
Communication, with an emphasis on dialogue, must be used to overcome disputes and 
lessen the potential for conflict over shared water. In this regard it is of equal importance 
as the notions of inclusion and cosmopolitanism for an emancipatory water security. The 
concept of communication used here is derivative of two central, interrelated ideas of 
German philosopher Jürgen Habermas: his theory of communicative action, and his 
moral theory, referred to as “discourse ethics.”353 The two ideas combine to reinforce 
emancipatory water security because they point to the necessity of communication and 
dialogue and the right of all individuals to be understood. At the heart of this critique is 
the understanding that identities and the views of reason that sustain them, are 
intersubjective and subject to change.  
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5.4.1 Strategic vs. Communicative Action:  
Deciphering how exactly it is possible to construct non-coercive means of interaction 
between water stakeholders requires a turn to Habermas. The eminent German 
philosopher has spent a long lifetime developing a framework whereby actors are able to 
engage in radically democratic communication, free of domination and force. Such an 
ideal-type of interaction is crucial for the emancipatory interest forwarded here. 
Interactions between individuals and groups are, according to Habermas, derived from 
two central logics: A strategic logic and a communicative logic. The logic of social action 
sought in emancipatory security is one based on communication, which differs in 
important ways from strategic, rational-choice based logics that are beholden to 
“consequentialism.”354 These rational-choice approaches tend to view the interests and 
preferences of actors as fixed during the communicative process, and base their decisions 
for communication on the likely consequences to arise. In contrast, the logic of 
communicative action emphasizes how actors reason through a collective communicative 
process. In a strategic approach, the interests and preferences of actors are largely derived 
from their given identities. Communicative approaches highlight how these interests and 
preferences are intersubjectively created and thus open to dialogue and discursive 
challenges. In other words, if reason itself is intersubjectively created, as is argued, then 
the notion of community is also intersubjective. Actors relying on a communicative 
rationality are not seeking to satisfy their fixed preferences and interests. They are 
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challenging and justifying “the validity claims inherent in them.” As befits Habermas’ 
focus on reason, participants in a dialogue should be able to give a valid reason for their 
beliefs. If they cannot, they should be capable of taking points of disagreement into 
consideration and moving forward in the course of future interaction towards consensus 
and understanding.355 As the Habermasian IR scholar Thomas Risse explains, it becomes 
possible for participants engaged in communicative action to “change their views of the 
world or even their interests in light of the better argument.”356 This is a significant 
departure from rational-choice approaches because it emphasizes argumentation, 
deliberation, and reason, rather than strategic emphases on compellance or deterrence. 
While communicative action is as similarly goal-oriented as strategic action, the 
attainment of a set of preferred interests is not the objective.  
Such a viewpoint has significant implications that can open up space for persuasion and 
consensus to be obtained through the use of the better argument. If reason, identity, and 
community are intersubjectively created and sustained, then actors in communication can 
be convinced that their positions and arguments are wrong, in the face of better, contrary 
views. Because of the emphasis in communicative action on the tools of argumentation 
and persuasion, the significant problems of legitimacy and capacity that continue to 
plague water security perceptions and policies can be overcome. The tools provide the 
moral and cognitive space for the inclusion of a diversity of viewpoints into discourses of 
water security. Chapter six will show that in the field of water management, integrated 
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water resource management (IWRM), comes close to following the Habermasian 
communicative rationality by bringing together the multiple actors in a hydrological unit 
– such as a region, watershed, sub-watershed - to communicate and make decisions.357 
5.4.2 Communicative Rationality  
Beginning in the 1970s, Habermas undertook a social and linguistic turn in critical theory 
arguing that linguistic structures underpinned human actions and the desire for 
understanding. Whereas the first generation of Frankfurt School scholars became entirely 
circumspect of any emancipatory potential, Habermas took a more optimistic view that 
human societies could faithfully pursue the emancipatory interest. According to first 
generation critical theorists like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, modernity, born 
from the western Enlightenment, contained within it both the possibility for emancipation 
and an instrumental rationality that would forever prevent it. The next generation of 
Frankfurt school theorists, including Habermas, believed that this view lacks nuance and 
empirical validity. For him, modernity contains within it the possibility for consensus, 
itself a pre-requisite for what he believes is humanity’s emancipatory interest. In 
particular, this is Habermas’ central deviation from earlier generations of critical theory. 
He argues that language and communication have a liberating potential. In one of his 
most notable passages Habermas writes, “What raises us out of nature is the only thing 
we can know: language…Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of the 
universal and unconstrained consensus.”358  
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Essentially, Habermas’ ideas on communicative rationality help show how modern actors 
interact with the aim of mutual understanding. For him social interactions display the 
universalizing norms of discourse, pointing to shared emancipatory interests. These 
interests are expressed in the “ideal speech situation,” or “undistorted communication” 
when individuals engage with one another absent exogenous factors in efforts to identify 
the better argument. This type of communication comes by way of a vibrant dialogue 
within an inclusive public sphere, ensuring that actors are able to satisfy their own needs 
without inhibiting or damaging the abilities of other to do the same.  
The most important point to emphasize is that the rational structure of communication is 
principally focused on reaching common understanding - a “fusion of horizons 
(Horizontverschmelzung)” – according to German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer.359 
This emphasizes an intersubjective relationship, where interests and identities are 
formulated through interaction and dialogue. This directly opposes conventional security 
approaches that assume an inevitable clash of interests between subjects - where both, 
subjects and their interests are given.360 The focus on communication and understanding 
attempts to overcome the problems associated with asymmetries of power and authority 
in a dyadic relationship of discourse by focusing on how in a process of emancipation 
“there can be only participants.”361 This also provides a way out from the pessimism of 
the first generation of Frankfurt School critical theory, because it shows how 
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intersubjective relationships overcome instrumental tendencies of modernity, allowing 
for a rational integration of speakers into communicative, and emancipatory relationships. 
As Habermas himself explains, “Communication is not merely a matter of transmitting 
information…but of establishing (or maintaining) a relationship with another person.”362 
This relationship helps determine the context in which information between subjects is 
transferred and where particular meanings are created and understood.363 Social 
relationships are not predicated on a totalizing instrumentality, but upon a consensus 
between all those involved in the communicative process to pursue the ultimate goal of 
understanding. In such a way then, all knowledge is socialized. The ideal is a “social 
intercourse free of coercion, in which the self-realization of one party does not have to be 
bought with the mortification of the other.”364 
Acts of communication aim to produce understanding, which is a central component for 
emancipation. Liberation will not come simply through the expansion of technological 
rationality and the spread of productive forces; it emerges through a learning process 
accumulated through communicative action. Habermas writes that “liberation from 
hunger and misery does not necessarily converge with liberation from servitude and 
degradation, for there is no automatic developmental relation between the two 
dimensions…the self-formative process of spirit as well as our species essentially 
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depends on that relation between labor and interaction.”365 The central idea is that shared 
understanding is the main desire of participants in a dialogue. Thus, whenever truth 
claims are made, whether they are normative or empirical, the goal is mutual 
understanding: “The goal of coming to an understanding is to bring about an agreement 
that culminates in the intersubjective mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared 
knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another.”366 The larger critique evident here 
relates to the failure of conventional social science (including international security 
studies!) to fully acknowledge the learning potential that is culturally available.367 To 
summarize: communication and the inherent desire for understanding and consensus 
through validity claims368 demonstrates the emancipation potential immanent in 
individual and social behavior.  
5.4.3 Discourse Ethics 
One of the principal tasks of an emancipatory security of water is to introduce moral 
approaches to conventional forms of political action. Habermas’ ideas about 
communicative action are a good start for understanding how there is an ever-present 
unfulfilled potential for emancipation. The second component of communication that 
must be discussed briefly is the idea of discourse ethics, which is pivotal in forming a 
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coherent framework of emancipatory water security from the loose strands of a 
communicative social theory.  
It has been shown how communicative rationality - the desire for understanding and 
consensus – is important for the emancipatory intent. Discourse ethics explains the 
implications of communicative rationality. These implications are, generally speaking, 
the creation of models of universal moral reasoning that promote equal conversation 
between those who are affected by water security (that is to say everyone). The model 
relied upon here is derivative of Seyla Benhabib’s model of moral reasoning through 
conversation, “in which the capacity to reverse perspectives, that is, the willingness to 
reason from the others’ point of view, and the sensitivity to hear their voice is 
paramount.”369 The goal of conversation in this regard is not consensus but the 
“anticipated communication with others with whom I know I must finally come to some 
agreement”370 Such thinking requires a deep-rooted commitment to moral reasoning that 
is both inclusive and universal.  
The attention to morals is important because, as should be clear by now, none of 
the pressing problems related to water management can be fully separated from deeper 
moral questions. The deficiencies of contemporary water discourse, practices, and 
institutions are moral dilemmas. While it is of course logical to argue for more efficient 
technical arrangements and less bureaucratic institutional features that can alleviate water 
stress/scarcity, it should be remembered that it is often the fundamental nature of 
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technical arrangements and institutional features which are responsible for hindering the 
realization of unconstrained communication, of emancipatory security. In this respect, an 
emancipatory water security must focus on unsettling the preeminence of territorially-
defined national sovereignty as the organizing principle of water security towards a 
broader consensus on sustainable water stewardship. The focus must be on identifying 
the cleavages inherent within communicative relationships of water that can open space 
for reaching an understanding on shared, intersubjectively-arrived at ideas of 
emancipation. Such an endeavor can work by transforming attendant water security 
concerns of individuals so that they also recognize the larger meaning; an attention to the 
long-run, rather than short-term payoffs. Such thinking is beholden to an awareness of the 
ontological underpinnings of human interaction. Habermas writes:  
These problems can only be brought to a head by rethinking topics morally, by 
universalizing interests in a more or less discursive form… It helps to perceive the 
way one’s own interests are bound up with the interests of others. The moral or 
ethical point of view makes us quicker to perceive the more far-reaching and 
simultaneously less insistent and more fragile, ties that bind the fate of an 
individual to that of every other, making even the most alien person a member of 
one’s community.371 
The idea of discourse ethics sharpens the edge of emancipatory water security by 
connecting communicative rationality with a universalizing ethical appeal. Discourse 
ethics in this regard is helpful for delineating how conversations can create an “enlarged 
thinking” that is necessary to overcome traditional impasses of divergent security 
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interests. Such a conception is derived from Benhabib’s reformulation of what Habermas 
termed the “ideal speech situation.” Benhabib does not disagree with Habermas on the 
importance of ensuring that “the conflicting needs of all participants are given their due 
and can be taken into consideration from the viewpoint of the participants themselves.”372 
However, she is careful to highlight how Habermas’ ideal speech situations do not only 
recognize the rights of all beings capable of speech to participate in the moral 
conversation. They also must stipulate how within such moral conversations each 
participant is accorded the same symmetrical rights to various other speech acts, to 
initiate new topics, to ask for reflection about the presuppositions of the conversation, etc. 
She calls this the principle of egalitarian responsibility.373 This implies that a normative 
principle of universal moral respect ought be employed where individuals “treat each 
other as concrete human beings whose capacity to express this standpoint we ought to 
enhance by creating, whenever possible, social practices embodying the discursive 
ideal.”374  
Benhabib augments Habermas’ discourse ethics by reconstructing it towards a 
“historically self-conscious universalism” that is attendant to the social and individual 
contexts which are in play during conversation. The main point of departure, and one that 
is relevant to an emancipatory security of water, is that consensus itself does lead to truth 
or even moral outcomes. What is important “is not that everybody could or would agree 
to the same set of principles, but that these principles have been adopted as a result of a 
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procedure…It is not the result of the process of moral judgment which plays a role in its 
validity, and I would say, moral worth”375 What is important is the process. And this 
process must aim for reasonable understanding about deep moral principles via an open-
ended conversation. This reworking of Habermas is useful for promoting a vision of 
ethical relations that radically questions all procedures of justification including its own, 
and thus, can create the conditions for a conversation that accepts differing points of 
view. It is representative of the reflexive understanding of communicative rationality, 
which, while certainly not politically “neutral,” encourages a plurality of life choices, 
styles, and many different conceptions of the good.376 The maintenance of the meta-
norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity is the aim of a reflexive discourse, 
one that fully acknowledges the “embedded, contingent, and finite aspects of human 
beings.”377 Such an approach is pivotal for maintaining open forms of dialogue, premised 
upon recognition, inclusion, and universalism. This is the essence of the progressive 
mentality that can lead to emancipatory water security.  
If communicative rationality explains how understanding (through discourse) is 
immanent in social relationships, then discourse ethics explains how such understanding 
entails respect for one’s conversation partners. The argument of course still begs the 
question as to who can be considered as a “conversation partner?” Certainly it is no 
longer appropriate to limit the legitimacy of conversation to bounded communities of 
states. With the growing acceptance of cosmopolitan norms as a consequence of the 
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changes wrought by globalization, it becomes possible - perhaps likely - to envision the 
spread of democratic agreements and laws over shared and unshared waters. 
5.5 Cosmopolitanism 
To satisfy the demands of the global problems of water security, to help satisfy the 
emancipatory interest latent in every individual, a conception of cosmopolitan citizenship 
must be employed. Otherwise one risks replicating the same harm that conventional 
practices of global security have engendered to date. But on the other hand, by relying 
upon a normative framework of cosmopolitanism, it becomes possible to tie concepts of 
inclusion and communication together to form coherent schemata of emancipation and 
water security. And as the debates on ethics in global politics continue to swirl, a critical 
conception of cosmopolitanism can help tangibly alleviate suffering by facilitating the 
emergence of decision-making processes over water that are inclusive and dialogical.  
As the previous chapters demonstrate, it should come as no surprise that the blueprint for 
a critical security of water focuses on the holistic, integrated nature of water vulnerability 
on individuals and species around the world. In this regard, a cosmopolitanism ethical 
framework helps highlight the universal dependencies of water by both the human and 
non-human world.378 Of course this is not to say that vulnerabilities to water scarcity and 
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quality are uniform; quite the opposite. Almost 66 percent of Africa is arid or semi-arid 
and more than 300 of the 800 million people of Sub-Saharan Africa live in a water-scarce 
environment, defined as having less than 3000 m³ per capita.379 This is a stark contrast to 
the experiences of water-rich areas, such as Canada, where total renewable water 
resources are approximately 85,310 m³ per capita.380  
Cosmopolitanism is a contested term, with many variations. From a moral standpoint, 
cosmopolitanism begins with the idea that individual loyalties be tied to a universal 
human community, rather than strict allegiances only to local or national 
identifications.381 It both harkens back to ancient Greek philosophy and is representative 
of modern phenomena of globalization. From a cosmopolitan outlook, boundaries, 
including territorial state borders, require justification, which entails an endless and 
critical moral conversation.382 In terms of security thinking, cosmopolitanism holds that 
peace is best achieved through the establishment of a transnational order built on shared 
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moral, legal, and political understandings. It focuses on individuals as the primary unit of 
moral concern, above states, and other political or ethnic communities. By virtue of their 
humanity, individuals do share the same political community, in addition to all of the 
other communities with which they may also identify.  
When it comes to water, cosmopolitan ethics offers a conception of water security that 
focuses on the interconnectedness of the problem and the fact that vulnerabilities and 
opportunities are shared. It can do so while isolating shared universal interests such as the 
sustainability of threatened water resources. The last section of this chapter will briefly 
draw out the central characteristics of a critical cosmopolitanism that coincides with 
inclusivity and communicative rationality.  
There is no question that significant divergences exist across regions and peoples, over a 
range of historical, political, and sociological factors. But while there exist multiple 
affiliations individuals cling to, be they familial, religious, ethnic, or political, there are a 
bundle of needs, desires, and anxieties that define us as common members of the human 
species. When it comes to water, there are shared vulnerabilities and interests that present 
a significant rejoinder to the idea of the other as a threatening menace intent on denying 
the innate right of the self to pursue a secure existence. The self and the other have 
already been seen as highly-problematic, constructed categories of identity. 
Emancipatory processes of water security can draw upon the collapse of the self and the 
other and tell different stories of the necessarily interconnected relations of water. Such 
interconnections are manifested physically and normatively. Throughout the world there 
are 263 international river basins shared by 145 countries, representing 45.3 percent of 
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the Earth’s land surface.383 Since 1820, more than 400 international water agreements 
have been signed dealing with a range of issues related to water including its equitable 
use as a limited and consumable resource.384 It seems impossible to think of water in 
splendid isolation, as something to be controlled independently of the needs and wishes 
of other, cross-border riparian users. Yet, the state-centric, survivalist, ethics of 
traditional security approaches consistently revert back to a myopic singularity that extols 
the virtues of the bounded communities of nation-states. This type of thinking may well 
be useful in organizing parsimonious accounts of the world, but it has little bearing on the 
complex and urgent needs of the majority of people around the world.  By viewing 
security as the freeing of individuals from arbitrary constraints on their pursuit of a good 
life, one seeks out the possibilities for the immanent possible transformations of 
traditional ontologies of security. Central to these transformations is a re-orientation 
towards a reflexive ethics that identifies the rights and aspirations of individuals rather 
than relying solely on the idea of security as the pursuit of the national interest. In this 
regard cosmopolitanism provides a necessary ethical approach, one that is already 
embedded in current societal developments over water. As Chris Rumford writes,  
Cosmopolitanism requires us to recognize that we are all positioned 
simultaneously as outsiders and insiders, as individuals and group members, as 
Self and Other, as local and global. Cosmopolitanism is about relativizing our 
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place within the global frame, positioning ourselves in relation to multiple 
communities, crossing and re-crossing territorial and community borders’.”385 
Unsurprisingly there are many variations of cosmopolitanism, each offering a unique 
perspective on how to best consider the rights individuals share by virtue of being human. 
The first usage of the term probably comes from ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. 
The first utterance of a cosmopolitan viewpoint may have come from Diogenes the 
Cynic, who, when asked where he came from, replied, “I am a citizen of the world 
[kosmopolitês]”386 Moving forward, many Enlightenment thinkers in the eighteenth 
century referred to conditions and commitments of cosmopolitanism. Immanuel Kant is 
perhaps best known for his articulation of the principle of “Cosmopolitan Right,” the 
third article in his Definitive Articles outlined in Perpetual Peace. Others who thought of 
cosmopolitan either as a normative ideal, or an empirical development through the 
enlightenment and after include, Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Paine, John Stuart Mill and 
Karl Marx. Clearly it is an old and well-worn path.  
Contemporary forms of cosmopolitanism are diverse and can sometimes emphasize 
competing visions of ethics and political projects. Despite the many different avenues to 
take in getting to something called cosmopolitanism, all of them are derived from a 
central concern with the avoidance of unnecessary suffering and projecting visions of 
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institutions that allow for the realization of freedom.387  Some, like Martha Nussbaum, 
approach cosmopolitanism on moral grounds, refusing to place love of one’s country 
above love of mankind. Others, such as Jeremy Waldron emphasize how national 
communities, and communities based on ethnic primordialism fail to capture the 
complexities of human allegiances.388 Such allegiances may be difficult to pin down, but 
by focusing on the spread of more mundane cosmopolitan norms already existing 
throughout the world, on matters like currency, banking, aviation, and time zones, one 
gets the sense that “as lives lived in the world, the interaction of people and peoples on 
the face of the earth is not an anarchy.”389 Further still, one may divide contemporary 
cosmopolitans along a variety of conceptual fault lines, including duty-based,390 
utilitarian-consequentialist,391 rights-based,392 and contractarian.393 These approaches 
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emphasize different aspects of the cosmopolitan idea (moral, political, cultural), offering 
unique justifications and conditions to build a more coherent cosmopolitan vision.  
The vision of cosmopolitanism articulated here is one indebted to the spirit of critical 
theory already so thoroughly discussed. It is one that seeks to accept cosmopolitanism as 
a process, (instead of an end outcome or project) oriented towards the construction of 
new ways of thinking and acting.394 Such a vision can make room for different 
approaches to water management while still acknowledging the deep unity of purpose 
needed to ethically evaluate security practices. There are many authors who have already 
undertaken to expand the ideas of cosmopolitanism by drawing from the insights of 
critical theory.395  David Held, though not a critical theorist, has provided a definition of 
“layered cosmopolitanism” that is a useful as a starting point. He writes that 
cosmopolitanism is, 
An ethical approach to political life which champions self-determination and 
freedom from domination and arbitrary power. Its principles and standards, 
embedded in democratic public law, provide a framework for cultural diversity 
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and individual difference to flourish in a public life marked by deliberation and 
argument, bounded by legitimate rules and mechanisms of conflict resolution.396 
The central precepts of this definition are useful for an emancipatory security of water. It 
must, at the outset recognize that: 1) all people are morally equal; 2) that arbitrary forms 
of power/domination are to be avoided and; 3) the necessity of dialogue and inclusion 
over matters of public importance. The remaining section will build upon these three 
features of critical cosmopolitanism to build an applicable model suitable for better 
informing international security discourse and practice over water.  
5.5.1 All people are morally equal.  
The topic of morality in global security is generally avoided. It is often seen as a 
dangerous catalyst for projects of imperial intervention or for perpetuating a sense of 
liberal exceptionalism that is blind to non-western forms of justice (e.g. the “White 
Man’s Burden”).  When morality is spoken of in security discourse, it is often in terms of 
the “Just War” tradition, intent on finding moral justification for armed intervention and 
conflict.397 A critical cosmopolitanism is able to bring in deeper questions about morality 
into discussions of security by highlighting how ethical approaches must shift the unit of 
concern from states or other particular forms of human association to individuals. This 
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entails a commitment to equal moral concern for all human beings, by virtue of their 
humanness, rather than some other abstract quality.398 It provides the moral basis for 
shifting the referent object of security away from states to individuals. Such a basis 
entails a double move. On the one hand it deepens the object of security, down to the 
individual level. On the other hand, by moving to the level of the individual, one must 
also broaden the scope to include all humans.  
From a water security perspective, enshrining the rights of every individual may entail 
wading into the difficult and complex questions of whether water itself is a human right. 
The human right to water was recently affirmed by the United Nations General 
Assembly, which on 28 July, 2010, voted 122-0 (with 41 abstentions) in favour of 
declaring “the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that 
is essential for the full enjoyment of life and all human rights.”399  It seems intuitive to 
declare that water is a human right; it is one of (along with air) the most essential 
components to life itself. It would thus seem to fall directly under Article 3 of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, which affirms, “Every person has the right to life, liberty, 
and security of person.”400 The Human Rights Council of the UN adopted a resolution on 
30 September 2010, affirming that water is a human right, derived from the right to an 
adequate standard of living, already defined in numerous international human rights 
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treaties.401 On a national scale, many states are now revising their laws and constitutions 
to explicitly include the right to water. 402 
Despite this progressive legal shift to declare the universal human right to water and 
sanitation, the debate continues to rage whether it is appropriate in practical terms to 
speak of water as a human right. Most of the arguments against declaring the human right 
to water stem from a belief that it would distort the free markets’ abilities to accurately 
price water; that full market valuation and “cost recovery” is the best method to conserve 
and distribute water.403 For these proponents, water services and access are best improved 
not through the discourse of rights, but through economic development. The argument in 
favour of the human right to water claims water is much more than an economic good; it 
is a public trust and part of the global commons. Beyond that, it holds significant spiritual 
and cultural importance that cannot have an appropriate economic value attached to it. On 
a practical level, there are deep concerns that pricing water will prevent the poorest 
segments of the population from sufficient access.404 
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What the debate over the human right to water demonstrates is a competition over how to 
adequately define basic rights and what are the proper underlying meanings and values 
when it comes to water. Pradhan and Meinzen-Dick point out that,  
The concept of water rights…does not refer to a single and unitary right but to 
bundles of rights that vary across property regimes, legal orders, and cultures. 
Moreover, the bundles of rights are not static, but complex, dynamic, flexible, and 
subject to change because of ecological, livelihood, knowledge, and social and 
political uncertainties.405 
Pradhan and Menzie-Dick illustrate that the contestation over the right to water is multi-
faceted and complex. At the heart of the debate is not whether individuals should have 
access to a sufficient amount of water for their general health and well being, regardless 
of their ability to pay for it. This is a given that even the staunchest defender of the free 
market would agree. It is a debate on whether or not the language of rights is the best 
means by which this base amount is secured. In emancipatory terms, the debate is 
obscurant because it overlooks the broadly held consensus that water is essential for all 
humankind, let alone other life forms. A very wide range of international law and 
government and community practices already explicitly and implicitly support the human 
right to water for individual needs.  
The human right to water is an integral aspect of an emancipatory security of water 
because it focuses on the individual, as a distinct unit of concern, cutting into deeper and 
more primordial categories of being than contingent political, ethnic, gender, economic, 
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or religious affiliations that individuals themselves may hold. In this regard, the 
individual remains the central vessel through which ethics, rights and obligations must 
travel. Security becomes predicated on the successful fulfillment of the rights embedded 
in individuals, by virtue of their humanness. This distinguishes emancipatory security 
from other, more traditional interpretations of security that codify multiple objects for 
ethics in the quest for an elusive, abstract, and artificial “security.” This is most ably 
displayed in the tensions surrounding the two key pillars of the United Nations 
progressive rights architecture: the UN Charter, which enshrines the right of state 
sovereignty, and the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which focuses on the rights of 
individuals. Often these two visions are incommensurate with one another, with the 
security of the individual generally subsumed under the weight of statist security 
discourse. 
The focus on the individual for water security accentuates the significant threats people 
experience on a daily basis from lack of access to clean and sufficient supplies of water. 
It overrides the continued predominance of water wars discourse that mistakenly sees 
water as a strategic resource that will inevitably propel states and intra-state groups to 
conflict. Switching to the individual as the subject of water security means a radical break 
from traditional security concerns focused on the state. To pursue emancipation as the 
goal of security means to focus on the emancipation of individuals.  
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5.5.2 The avoidance of arbitrary forms of violence/domination (Water as 
a lever of peace) 
Water security is one of the defining global challenges of the twenty-first century. It 
impacts the lives of billions of people daily. Aaron Wolf writes succinctly that, “Water 
management is conflict management.”406 But incidences of violent confrontation between 
states or groups directly attributable to water scarcity are few and far between. In this 
regard it is more appropriate to depend upon a broader vision of cosmopolitanism that is 
less deeply connected to the original Kantian model, which was primarily premised on 
avoiding war. The wider global problems existing in today’s globalized world extend 
beyond war and conflict and include such diverse issues as economic inequality, poverty, 
disease, human rights abuses, and of course environmental degradation. Water intersects 
with many of these compelling notions of a broad understanding of security. 
Cosmopolitan theorizing can provide the ethical foundation upon which emancipatory 
water security flourishes. It can do so by producing a holistic awareness of the embedded 
connections that all individuals share with water sources in particular, and broader 
ecological processes in general. Beyond that, it is able to connect people across space and 
time over environmental resources. It is true that across most religions and cultures, there 
exists an emerging ethical consistency that places water and environmental stewardship 
as a pre-eminent concern. It is no stretch to place these types of emerging holistic beliefs 
in the context of a broader cosmopolitan outlook.  
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A critical cosmopolitan ethics can be the required shift that re-orients our conception of 
water security towards individual emancipation and ecological sustainability. It can help 
us consider how water management entails an ethical commitment that can assist 
scientific and technological knowledge. Placing a cosmopolitan water ethos at the heart 
of water security policy will help avoid the arbitrary domination of one group by another 
- whether by violent or non-violent coercion. This will largely be achieved by relying 
upon public domains of communication. Communication, the opening of discursive 
space, allows for the flourishing of emancipation and the avoidance of imposing arbitrary 
harm on vulnerable populations. This is something that will be turned to shortly.  
Placing moral preeminence on a global polis, rather than on bounded communities also 
helps move us away from modern societies’ “disconnect from nature’s web of life and 
from water’s most fundamental role as the basis of that life.” 407 It helps us realize that 
water is tied together with all aspects of life on Earth. Water’s functions go beyond that 
of other resources; it not only helps maintain the current (and unsustainable) luxuries of 
modern societies, it also drives the interconnected ecological process of the planet’s 
ecosphere. There is then a global responsibility to act to preserve these vital functions for 
the sustainment of life on the planet. Given the global nature of the vulnerabilities and 
opportunities for the alleviation of harm, it is no longer morally compelling to restrict our 
collective responsibility to state-centric solutions.408 As Sandra Postel writes,  
With freshwater life being extinguished at record rates, a more fundamental 
change is needed. An ethical society can no longer ignore the fact that water-
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management decisions have life or death consequences for other species. An 
ethically grounded water policy must begin with the premise that all people and 
all living things be given access to enough water to secure their survival before 
some get more than enough.409 
Avoiding violence and domination is crucial to achieving the emancipation of the 
individual, which is the procedural goal of critical water security advanced here. It is also 
one of the key pillars of a cosmopolitan position.410 Experiences of physical violence, as 
well as economic and social injustices, felt either through direct conflict or via structural 
inequalities are the realities for a great many people across the world. Yet we know that 
the connections between violence and water are tenuous. Water has been a far greater 
driver of cooperation than conflict. Water may factor into inter-state and intra-state 
conflicts, but the vast majority of interactions over water are mild and disputes are almost 
always resolved peacefully.411 Given this, it is more appropriate to shift attention to 
alleviating existing day-to-day tensions over water, namely by improving access to safe 
and clean water sources for individual human needs as well as for the sustainable 
management of precious water sources.412 Because these are global problems, global 
solutions are needed. A cosmopolitan ethics that emphasizes human interconnectedness is 
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best suited for dealing with the myriad shortcomings of contemporary water security 
policies. A critical security of water based upon such cosmopolitan understandings is able 
to “scale up” from the minute experiences of individual relationships with water to 
greater emotional identification with other persons, with the intent to limit the capacity to 
cause violent and non-violent harm.413  
While the potential for violent conflict between states remains remote, a significant 
degree of harm is inflicted upon already vulnerable populations. The damaging effects of 
chronic water shortages and compromised water resources are disproportionately felt in 
low-income countries. It is the poorest who live in the areas of highest risk: the urban 
slums, the rural hinterland and along the floodplains.414 Water-related diseases remain a 
major threat to human health and well being, responsible for the deaths of 3.575 million 
people each year.415  Every year 1.5 million children under the age of 5 die from 
diarrhoeal diseases, largely from contaminated drinking water. All told, the Millennium 
Development Goals, the major UN markers for social progress, state unsafe drinking 
water represents one of the major threats to the world’s poor.416 As the fourth World 
Water Development Report states, “In a global context, water contamination with 
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pathogenic substances is acknowledged as the most serious risk factor in relation to 
human health.”417 Degraded water quality - untreated wastewater and sewage, 
contamination from hazardous chemicals like arsenic and pesticides - is responsible for 
adversely affecting billions of people around the world. In some very real respects, water 
quality is growing into a much greater concern than water quantity. Pressures on the 
volume and the quality of water supplies combine to substantially alter the prospects for a 
full life for an incredibly high number of people around the world.  
The new types of threats posed by water scarcity and poor water quality are 
representative of the widening of security in a rapidly changing world. Water security 
encompasses a variety of risks including population displacement, human health, 
ecosystem degradation, climate change, disease, poverty, and inequality. While there 
have been no examples of overt warfare between states over water sources, significant 
harm has been inflicted upon vulnerable populations via system-wide drivers like 
population growth, urbanization, as well as industrial and agricultural production. All of 
this suggests that an ethics based on cosmopolitan responsibility must be principally 
concerned with ensuring vulnerable populations avoid arbitrary harm or domination 
through processes of self-transformation, based upon continuous dialogue. As Pogge 
writes, “the stringency of our most important negative duties does not vary with the 
presence or absence of compatriotism.”418 In fact, “all persons have a negative duty of 
very high stringency toward every human being not to collaborate in imposing an unjust 
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institutional order upon him or her.”419 It means that new kinds of political and economic 
‘violence’, rather than state-centric violent conflict, are the crucial context for a twenty-
first century connection between cosmopolitanism and water.  
5.5.3 The necessity of dialogue and inclusion over matters of public 
importance. 
The last component of cosmopolitanism used here emphasizes the necessity of dialogue 
and the inclusion of marginal voices in matters of water security. This key theme is 
adapted to address the continued shortcomings of traditional approaches to water security 
that have failed to incorporate the views and wishes of all water stakeholders in a truly 
deliberative fashion. Cosmopolitan ethics that integrate deliberation and dialogue are able 
to transform the realm of human interaction, with the aim of developing a holistic, 
universal, communication community.420 Those that are affected by decisions should have 
an equal opportunity to shape those decisions in the first place. Such commitments will 
foster greater a sense of solidarity amongst water users and create better conditions for 
sustainable environmental policies.  
Promoting a spirit of inclusion and non-coercive dialogue in communicative practices is a 
key component of a critical cosmopolitanism. Creating spaces for communication over 
matters of public importance is essential for unlocking what Bryan Turner has referred to 
as a “cosmopolitan epistemology of a shared reality.”421  By actively participating in a 
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deliberative political community, individuals and groups can construct themselves as 
active agents while also learning about the responsibility they hold to others. By actively 
learning with and about the experiences of other water users, one of the effects may be to 
release common understandings about shared vulnerabilities, which can be rectified 
through democratic decision-making and the construction of inclusive social institutions. 
Participation and deliberation can also allow for the transcendence of established 
territorial and moral borders, as political communities reinvent themselves around shared 
global ethics rather than around clearly demarcated lines of inside/outside. It pressures 
the distinctions between fellow-citizens and aliens, the moral duties so unnecessary in an 
age of increasing interdependence and shared vulnerabilities.422 The idea is to capture the 
immanent potentials for emancipation by configuring social relations around an inclusive, 
open communicative space. 
Deliberation and participation will not always lead to agreement and the cessation of 
conflict; that is not the point. Consensus is often the exception rather than the norm. What 
is at stake is ensuring that morally speaking, all stakeholders are given the opportunity to 
participate and articulate their views from a position of non-coercion. The ideal speech 
situation, according to Habermas, is one where each participant experiences equality and 
freedom, so that they can express their own attitudes, desires, and needs.  It is only when 
both equal participation and freedom of expression are guaranteed that it is possible for a 
morally legitimate decision to be reached. This ideal speech situation is one where equals 
engage with one another to uncover the strength of the better argument. Communication 
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has the dialectical aim of identifying strengths and weaknesses of “different positions and 
of ensuring that the stress on differences does not eliminate the quest for actual or 
potential points of convergence.”423 Without proper commitment to inclusive dialogue, 
there is faint hope that entrenched differences over water will be overcome. Actors - from 
states all the way down to individuals - will continue to rely upon unreflective strategies 
that fail to sustainably manage precious water resources and deny a great many 
individuals from experiencing full lives.  
Critical cosmopolitan ethics can help overcome the significant challenges posed by 
traditional thinking on water security. Using communicative rationality as the standpoint 
for negotiating equitable and sustainable water policies entails engaging the other in an 
effort to settle disagreements. Cosmopolitan interaction, premised upon integration and 
acceptance of all stakeholders of water security, beyond simply nation-states and 
powerful sub-groups, is one of the most significant foundations of an emancipatory 
security of water. Interaction, based upon a positive recognition of the other, is not meant 
to merely “accommodate” differing views, but is seen here as a fundamental component 
of global transformation. The twentieth century sociologist Herbert Blumer is important 
here. Blumer’s notion of symbolic interactionism helps us understand how inclusion and 
interaction can lead to the transformation of social understandings and practices. Blumer 
helped pioneer the central constructivist belief that the nature of an object consists of 
what it means to the person for whom it is an object. This counters traditional social 
science belief in the determining factors of psychological factors or social structures. 
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Instead, meaning plays a central role in human actions. Meanings are derived principally 
through social interaction, or “symbolic interactionism,” where common symbols and 
common understanding construct both an individual’s and a culture’s self-identity. 
According to Blumer, group members are trained through their interactions with one 
another. These interactions are crucial in forming interpretations of the self and the other. 
In other words, social life exists in action – it is made and remade constantly.424    
Symbolic interactionism provides some clues into the immanent possibilities to overcome 
predominant conceptions of water-security.  It connects us with some of the claims made 
earlier in the dissertation that the construction of the social world via human agency 
simultaneously creates spaces for alternative theorizing beyond the status quo. George 
Herbert Mead, the intellectual mentor to Blumer, wrote in 1934 that individuals are 
members of a larger social community, always working to develop integrated social 
relationships. Mead writes, “We are getting to realize more and more the whole society to 
which we belong because the social organization is such that it brings out the response of 
the other person to our own act not only in the other person but also in ourselves.”425 In 
other terms, the recognition of the other is essential for constituting the identity of the 
self. For Mead and Blumer, as interactions grow between cultures, an “international-
mindedness,” is likely to arise, whereby we can take the attitude of the other in various 
life-processes. This has significant effects because it allows for the eventual realization of 
global communication communities that share similar goals and aspirations. It is difficult 
                                                 
424
 Philip Manning and Greg Smith. “Symbolic Interactionism.” The Routledge Companion to Social 
Theory Ed. Anthony Elliott (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010): 37-39.  
425
 George H. Mead, Mind Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1972), 271. 
190 
 
to think of a goal quite as common or desirable as sustainable environmental practices. 
Writing eighty years ago, Mead was able to presciently identify the changes that occur 
cognitively from increased interaction: “A process of organization is going on underneath 
our conscious experience, and the more this organization is carried out the closer we are 
brought together. The more we do call out in ourselves the response which our gestures 
call out in the other, the more we understand him.”426 
The purpose of highlighting the role of inclusion within a critical cosmopolitan ethics of 
water security is three-fold. One the one hand, it promotes a vision of egalitarianism and 
equality, which comports with the overall aim of emancipation. Ensuring that discussions 
over water security include a wide range of actors – all actors who perceive they have 
significant stake in the outcome of the discussion – creates legitimacy and is likely to 
reduce the role of manipulation and coercion. Public participation in matters of water 
security enlarges the democratic basis of decision-making. Secondly, at the risk of stating 
the obvious, inclusion widens the range of voices at the table. The effect of this is to open 
up the space for alternative points of view that are often marginalized beneath the weight 
of dominant discourses, but yet can still offer much insight into the problems and 
solutions of water security. Acknowledgement of and communication with individuals 
and groups that experience most readily the damaging effects of conventional water 
security policies - from indigenous tribes to rural women – may produce a better 
awareness of the problems and open up more holistic sets of solutions. Thirdly, inclusion 
increases the opportunities for learning and gradual transformation. As individuals share 
experiences with water and debate the merits of their answers to water problems, the 
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dominant political and ethical structures that entrench state-directed and utilitarian 
management solutions might be radically altered, promising an open, collaborative, and 
integrated response to the dilemmas of water security. As individuals and groups interact 
with, and thus learn from one another, mutual identity formulations might emerge as the 
basis for a cosmopolitan ethic of shared responsibility when it comes to protecting scarce 
and vulnerable water resources and avoiding harm.427 Chapter six examines a number of 
cosmopolitan appeals within contemporary water management, including hydrosolidarity. 
Indeed, inclusion broadens the ethical horizons by opening up the space for legitimate 
involvement. Inclusive communication, free from coercion and arbitrary domination, can 
lead to collective learning, and effect cognitive shifts. This is no less true at the level of 
global ethics. It may (though not necessarily) expose common concerns and values across 
a range of issues, water being one. As Gerard Delanty writes,  
The purpose of inter-cultural communication is not simply communication for its 
  own sake but has the deliberative objective of settling disagreements through  
 consensual communication rather than through force or manipulation. This does 
 not necessarily require consensus as the final outcome. It does however require 
 the acceptance of discursive procedures and the inclusion of as many people as 
 possible in the discursive process.428 
It may be cliché to acknowledge how the spread of globalization has transformed the 
boundaries of political communities beyond the nation-state, but it is no less true. The 
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traditional lines of political and ethical separation between individuals, based upon rigid 
statist ontology, are blurring amidst a rapid expansion of global activity. This has 
important implications for water security. It increases the potential for a wider number of 
actors to “speak security,” communicating their experiences with water and thereby 
transforming the notion of security itself. Beyond that, the immanent possibilities for an 
emancipatory security of water can be seen in the growing awareness of the integrated 
nature of the problem and in the diverse range of responses. Water is increasingly seen as 
an interconnected problem, one that cannot be disassociated from other problems like, 
environmental degradation, poverty, weak political institutions, corruption, energy and 
food. One can look no further than the latest unclassified U.S. National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) report on water and security, produced in 2012, which highlights the 
water-energy-food security nexus.429 It is clear that single sector approaches to water 
security are insufficient for adequately dealing with the impact it has across a wide range 
of areas.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Water literally and metaphorically flows through everything; our struggle to properly 
manage it shows us the deeply troubled relationships that we have with nature and with 
each other. We cannot divorce water from issues like food production, population 
growth, climate change, species extinction, urbanization, development, gender disparity, 
social inequality, and a host of other social processes. Responding to these challenges 
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requires an integrated and holistic approach that takes stock of the nature of the problems 
as arising from, to paraphrase Adorno and Horkheimer, “the administered totality of 
modernity.” Critical theory can in this regard, contribute an awareness of the self as an 
active recipient and participant in the replication of a modern world dependent upon an 
instrumental logic of reason and the commodity form.  
The growing global water crisis creates enormous problems and important opportunities. 
Up to eighty percent of the global human population faces a high risk to water security.430  
That staggering number should give us long pause and compel us to construct alternative 
theories that can make better sense of the problem and begin to act in ways that comport 
with ethically valid principles and do so in a sustainable fashion. The aim of this chapter 
has been to do just that. By pursuing emancipation as the ultimate goal of security, it 
coincides with a young but growing tradition in security studies. Emancipation frees us to 
think about security away from traditional exclusionary means of enmity and conflict. It 
is argued here (and elsewhere) that the concept of emancipation offers humanity a means 
by which we might pursue a practical commitment to ensuring that life on this planet not 
only continues, but that it gets better. Roy Bhaskar may have put it best when he wrote 
that emancipation is “a special qualitative kind of becoming free that consists in the self-
directed transformation from an unwanted and unneeded to a wanted and needed source 
of determination.”431 In the context of water security, emancipation helps to bind our 
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knowledge of the interconnected nature of the problems with a theoretical commitment to 
“reimagining the future in genuinely liberating ways.”432 
This chapter constructed a vision of an emancipatory security of water by focusing on 
three components that could shift traditional water security towards ethical and holistic 
means. It identified inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism, as the central 
foundations of what could become an emancipatory theory of water security. Each 
component is able to offer specific insights into the various deficiencies of approaching 
water security along traditional, business-as-usual lines. Focusing on inclusion creates 
new possibilities for marginalized water stakeholders to voice their own concerns and 
wishes in a manner that respects the unique experiences of water insecurity. It also 
presents a multifaceted view of water security, critically upsetting the prevailing narrative 
of most water management strategies that hold an instrumentalist view of nature, and a 
statist understanding of international security. Focusing on inclusion in critical water 
security also requires us to adopt a constitutive-relational understanding of identity that 
avoids essentialized notions of the self and other so as to pave the road for free and open-
ended forms of communication.  
This leads to the second component of an emancipatory security of water that highlights 
the important role that communicative rationality plays in ensuring that alternative voices 
are engaged in open-ended discussions. While consensus may or may not be reached, the 
important thing to highlight is that the process of communication – the reflexive use of 
communicative rationality – encourages the creation of deliberative spaces whereby a 
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broader range of actors, including the most marginalized members of society, are given 
enhanced access. This has important effects on realizing the potential emancipation of 
individuals and encourages a more sustainable use of world water resources.  
The last component necessary for building an emancipatory security of water is a 
commitment to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism signals a commitment to a universal 
scope of moral concern, so that all individuals across the world share equal moral 
worth.433 Three main ideas were developed to construct a critical theory of 
cosmopolitanism useful for the pursuit of emancipation in water security. They 
highlighted that, 1) all people are morally equal; 2) arbitrary forms of power/domination 
are unjust and must be avoided and; 3) dialogue and inclusion over matters of public 
importance are crucial. Combined, all three ideas formed to create critical cosmopolitan 
imaginings that can propel water security towards new horizons that emphasize shared 
vulnerabilities and opportunities for integrated approaches that equitably and sustainably 
manage scarce water resources. There are signs layered in contemporary water 
approaches that signal such cosmopolitan possibilities. It is these possibilities that the 
next chapter examines.  
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6 Chapter Six: Hydrosolidarity: The Ethics of Water Security 
 
6.1 Introduction: The 2012 World Water Forum  
Since 1997, the World Water Council (WWC), a loose coalition of governments, IGOs, 
private corporations and civil society groups, has organized a tri-annual World Water 
Forum, the largest international event in the field of water.434 The 2012 Forum, held in 
March in Marseilles, France, was convened under the theme “Solutions for Water,” with 
over 35,000 participants taking part in 250 workshop sessions (critics dispute this official 
number, claiming attendance was significantly down from previous years.) In June 2012, 
a few months following the completion of the Forum, the WWC produced its final 
document, entitled Global Water Framework, which summarized discussions held during 
the preparatory meetings and the forum sessions. The document reported the diversity of 
opinions in relation to the three strategic directions of the Forum’s approaches to modern 
water management: 
1. Ensuring everyone’s well-being (social aspirations) 
a. 1.5 – Contribute to cooperation and peace through water  
2. Contribute to economic development (economic dimension) 
3. Keep the planet blue (environment) 
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The 2012 Global Water Framework is representative of the type of grand narrative that 
accompanies environmental mega-conferences, such as the World Water Forum. These 
international meetings, centred around an overarching title and theme are meant to bring 
together the widest array of actors involved in a particular issue and offer large-scale 
proclamations about the need for increased awareness and concrete actions to be taken. 
The 2012 Forum was organized under the banner “Time for Solutions,” with the 
expressed desire to “be the birthplace of strong commitments and partnerships aimed at 
the introduction and scaling up of promising solutions by all the stakeholders from the 
different regions: elected representatives, decision-makers, civil society, financial 
partners and experts.”435 The Forum was designed to provide policymakers and water 
management practitioners with strategies to better realize the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), to prepare for the post-MDG world after 2015, and to lead 
discussions in preparation for the Rio+20 Summit that took place in June 2012.  
Both the World Water Forum and the World Water Council are hugely influential and 
important actors in international field of water but they also face intense criticism from 
environmental activists convinced that they are representative of the narrow interests of 
the private sector and because they have continuously failed to affirm that water is a 
human right. The Sixth World Water Forum was no different.436 Over 2,000 individuals 
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and 150 organizations, including trade unions, environmental, humanitarian, and 
alterglobalization associations and NGOs, gathered in Marseilles, France at the same time 
as the WWF for the Alternative World Water Forum (the acronym FAME was used, 
reflecting the French translation - Forum Alternatif Mondial de l'Eau). The objective of 
FAME was to “create a concrete alternative to the Sixth World Water Forum,” and to 
“amplify the water movement by:  
• Creating and promoting an alternative vision of water management which is 
based on ecological and democratic values 
• Continuing research to find solutions to the worldwide water crisis 
• Making the water movement structure sustainable.”437 
Activist groups participating in FAME criticized the Ministerial Declaration of the Sixth 
WWF for failing to explicitly acknowledge the human right to water, which is recognized 
by the UN General Assembly,438 the UN Human Rights Council,439 and the World Health 
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Assembly.440 Instead of re-affirming the human right to water as specified in the 
resolutions the final Ministerial Declaration of the WWF instead called on signatories to 
“commit to accelerate the full implementation of the human rights obligations relating to 
access to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation…” Yet notably, ambiguous nature 
of the language stirred significant controversy among civil society groups during the 
Forum. While the declaration is not legally binding, the fact that the largest water forum 
continuously failed to affirm a human right to water was cause for concern for many 
critics for two reasons: first, it represents a failed opportunity to further the integration of 
water management discourse with the language of human rights. Secondly, it potentially 
provides a convenient way out for states to sidestep legal and financial obligations and 
pursue less stringent water strategies. According to the NGO, WASH United, “The 
language leaves room for States to individually determine whether their human rights 
obligations require them to realize the right to safe drinking water and sanitation for 
all.”441  
In contrast, the final “Declaration of the Participants at the Alternative World Water 
Forum” presents a radically different vision of water and its role in the social and 
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ecological fabric of the world. It upholds water as “a fundamental and inalienable human 
right;” argues “solidarity between present and future generations be guaranteed;” rejects 
“all forms of privatization of water;” and calls for the UN General Assembly to organize 
a “Democratic Summit on Water” that would replace the corporate-led World Water 
Forums as the legitimate voice for the global water movement. 
The presence of a dynamic alternative forum arising in opposition to the World Water 
Forum indicates the struggle over the future of water is ongoing. This struggle continues 
despite the spread over the past three decades of decentralization management practices, 
and increasing commitments to sustainability. The divisiveness between the official 
WWF and the groups that supported the counter-Forum FAME is representative of a 
continued divide on issues of water. Those on the streets of Marseilles continue to feel 
that the WWF acts as a mouthpiece for corporatist agendas that seek privatized control 
over water. One of the most vocal groups campaigning at FAME against the WWF was 
the Council of Canadians, which characterized it as “the Davos of Water…a non-
democratic forum run by multinational water corporations.”442 Official representatives of 
the WWF offered their own criticisms of the alternative forum. Loic Fauchon, the head of 
the World Water Council labeled FAME as “insignificant at best and harmful at worst.” 
What was needed, according to Fauchon, was to move beyond debate, towards 
“practicable solutions” – out of respect for those waiting for essential services.443  
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However, as the Guardian makes clear, while significant differences separate the water 
visions of WWF and FAME, there are examples that throw into question the prevalent 
cynicism that paralyzes progress. Individuals around the world do not seem to be 
“waiting” for water security to be “achieved”. Alternative models of water security, 
dependent upon ethical notions of hydrosolidarity, and pursued by a variety of water 
stakeholders may in fact demonstrate the immanent processes of reconstruction that offer 
emancipatory alternatives to the dominant discourses of water in particular and to 
security in general. 
The divide at the Sixth World Water Forum showed a deep level of contestation over the 
ethics of water. The divide between government and business officials on the one hand 
and environmental activists on the other has been a fixture of modern global ecopolitics 
for decades. The question asked here is whether or not critical alternatives exist within 
contemporary discourse over water security – whether the potential exists for 
emancipatory security practices. Such practices would integrate a variety of viewpoints, 
from all sectors of society, with a particular emphasis on the most vulnerable and 
marginalized populations. In particular this chapter applies the framework developed in 
chapter five to examine the idea of hydrosolidarity as a potentially emancipatory 
alternative to traditional, and dominant views of water security. It will show that the 
principles of hydrosolidarity - as presently laid out by a variety of authors and 
practitioners – are beginning to meet the water security needs of the most vulnerable 
populations globally, while also promoting equality and sustainable management of water 
resources for future generations and the earth itself. As it is with most things, there are no 
panaceas for the global water crisis (despite a high degree of optimism in techniques of 
desalination), and something as obscure or malleable as “hydrosolidarity” will not rid the 
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world of water scarcity. But where it may succeed is in opening up the discursive space 
for water security to accommodate ethical principles of cosmopolitan solidarity, in line 
with emancipatory aims advanced in previous chapters of this dissertation. That means 
that hydrosolidarity, as expressed both in contemporary practice and in future 
potentialities, may indeed be a crucial development that expresses critical alternatives to 
traditional approaches to security.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first details the historical development of 
the concept of hydrosolidarity. The ethics involved in hydrosolidarity have always been a 
part of human interactions over water, but in terms of its modern manifestation in water 
security discourse the concept has been developing only since the end of the 1990s. In 
this regard it is a relatively new concept, one that is still emerging so as to guide water 
management. The second section of this chapter examines the relationship between 
hydrosolidarity and the dominant water management paradigm, integrated water 
resources management (IWRM). IWRM is an approach that links the water crisis with 
other vital resources, seeking to coordinate a holistic, integrated, and equitable response. 
IWRM does not view water as a resource in isolation, but as part of an interconnected 
web of environmental and human-led processes. This means that a diverse range of actors 
and disciplines are consulted to provide a wider, more efficient, and sustainable approach 
to water management. The third and final section of this chapter examines recent political 
proclamations by a number of states, international organizations, private companies, and 
civil society groups to pursue policies of “Global Water Solidarity” (GWS). GWS is 
meant to develop, replicate, and scale up existing “decentralized solidarity mechanisms” 
(DSM) in water and sanitation. GWS and DSM were the subjects of numerous World 
Water Forum panels in 2012 and were targeted throughout the WWF6 final report as a 
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hopeful solution for facilitating international cooperation and sharing technical expertise. 
Funded by the Swiss and French governments, as well as the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP), GWS is guided by principles of “universality, subsidiary, 
additionality, leverage and institutional, environmental, and financial sustainability.”444 
GWS reflects in many ways the evolving realization that ethics must play a larger role in 
water management. It may be too soon to fully judge the outcomes of GWS, but at the 
outset of its institutionalization, it may demonstrate alternative, emancipatory trends in 
water security.  Together, the three sections comprise a detailed look into the role and 
place of ethics and emancipatory practices in contemporary water security. It argues that 
hydrosolidarity, manifested in numerous state and non-state actions, questions the 
prevailing wisdom that water’s place in international security discourse should be 
confined to warnings of violence and conflict over dwindling resources.  
6.2 The Roots of Hydrosolidarity 
Hydrosolidarity emerged in the 1990s as a conceptual marker used to overcome 
prevailing water management practices that emphasized “hydroegoism.” Hydroegoism is 
the belief that individual, competing, interests guide water allocation decisions, with 
conflict frequently resulting from the interactions by diverse stakeholders. In response to 
growing dissatisfaction with hydroegoism, a number of junior water professionals in 
Sweden convened seminars at the 1998 Stockholm Water Symposium to present 
alternative voices that promoted a new twenty-first century water management ethics 
built on justice, equality, and cooperation.  Following these discussions and the published 
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report from the Stockholm Water Symposium, famed Swedish hydrologist Malin 
Falkenmark became one of the first to use the term “hydrosolidarity” in her October 1998 
Volvo Environment Prize acceptance speech in Brussels, Belgium.445  In her speech, 
Falkenmark highlighted how,  
Much stress is presently being put on human rights to water; what is tacitly being 
referred to is not water as such, but the provision of safe household water. The 
fundamental importance for humanity's future, of finding ways for peaceful 
sharing of the precipitation falling over a joint river basin, between those living 
upstream and those living downstream, however, suggests that there is a need for 
human "water solidarity." Human water obligations have to be given equal weight 
to the human right to safe household water. Given a situation where upstream and 
downstream countries have problems in agreeing on issues relating to the sharing 
of transboundary water systems indicates the need to seek support from religious 
and philosophical circles in the search for a water ethics.446  
Falkenmark and her colleagues at the Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI), one 
of the world’s leading water think tanks, began to promote the integration of ethics and 
human rights into what had until then had been mostly technical variables of water 
management. Seminars on hydrosolidarity were organized during World Water Weeks in 
the early 2000s and a special session devoted to hydrosolidarity was a part of the 2003 
World Water Forum in Kyoto, Japan. A few special issues of academic journals were 
organized around the role of hydrosolidarity and ethics in water. Perhaps the foremost 
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journal to engage with the concept of hydrosolidarity has been Water International. It 
published a whole issue in 2000 dealing with the subject as its central theme.447 In 2003 
(the International Year of Freshwater) Falkenmark edited a special issue of the science 
journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society (B) that “assessed the current 
status and knowledge of the freshwater dimension in our biosphere and its relationship to 
human welfare.”448 The issue now reads as one of the more comprehensive attempts to 
produce a more formalized understanding of what hydrosolidarity entails, besides just an 
aversion to hydroegoism. Carl Folke, a professor at Stockholm University and a frequent 
collaborator with Falkenmark, attempted to provide a foundation for hydrosolidarity in 
his article “Freshwater for Resilience: A Shift in Thinking.” Folke concluded that 
hydrosolidarity was the necessary forward path for future water security because we are 
living in an age where change is the rule rather than the exception. As a result, “resilience 
has been eroded and the challenge facing humanity is to try to sustain desirable pathways 
for development in the face of change.” For Folke, and the early adopters of 
hydrosolidarity, resilience entails setting up the socio-ecological systems to cope with 
and live with change, uncertainty, and surprise.449 Folke concluded that effective 
management of freshwater supplies in a dynamic system requires an awareness of the 
social dimensions in developing adaptive co-management strategies. For him, the 
complex interrelationships between hydrological, ecological, and social issues requires a 
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much broader vision of water security that can acknowledge that water is the 
“bloodstream of the biosphere’s capacity.”450 Folke concluded the article by writing,   
Stewardships of freshwater in dynamic landscapes to secure and enhance social 
and economic development will no doubt be a central issue in the near future. It 
requires a shift in thinking and management of freshwater as merely a resource to 
freshwater as the breath of the Earth. It also requires a shift from trying to control 
and allocate freshwater flows in an optimal manner for various human uses to 
recognition of the necessity to actively manage the essential role of freshwater in 
dynamic landscapes faced with uncertainty and surprise. It will require that those 
involved with freshwater management foster a worldview and vision of 
stewardship of freshwater as the bloodstream of the biosphere. This broader view 
of freshwater provides the foundation for hydrosolidarity. 451 
The first articles on hydrosolidarity focused on constructing a water ethics that 
emphasized the resource’s interconnected properties and processes. In these articles, 
water was seen as the linchpin linking numerous global crises. “The crises related to land 
degradation, food security, water quality degradation, ecosystem decline, water 
insecurity, poverty, and economic losses from extreme hydrologic events are all 
interlinked, the root causes stem from government policy failures, and both the North and 
the South have much work to do to address the issues.”452 The central focus was to take 
knowledge gained from a number of river basins to address the connected issues of land 
use, water use, energy, and the protection of ecosystems while also dealing with 
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empirical cases of national upstream-downstream conflicts of interest. The intention of 
the first articles dealing with hydrosolidarity was to build awareness that water issues are 
interconnected; that water basins need to be managed with integrative approaches; and 
that engaging a diverse group of stakeholders was necessary to ensure efficient, equitable, 
and sustainable water management.453 In the first years of its usage, hydrosolidarity was 
meant to encourage cooperation based on an appreciation of these interconnections. 
Solidarity in decision-making in a river basin – between upstream and downstream, rural 
and urban, human and environmental needs – was the essential component that would 
foster stability and responsible stewardship of precious water resources.  
Since the first years, hydrosolidarity has evolved to encompass a range of approaches that 
incorporates aspects of ethics into water security. For instance, Falkenmark and Folke 
have used the concept of hydrosolidarity to argue that previous water management 
strategies failed to adequately account for the dynamic, complex, and inter-linked 
biological and social systems. Beginning from the starting point that humans both shape 
the processes of the biosphere and are simultaneously dependent on its proper 
functioning, they recently modified the original hydrosolidarity term and replaced it with 
ecohydrosolidarity. While still upholding the original intention of relying on basic 
principles of solidarity for balancing seemingly incompatible interests in a basin, the new 
term is meant to make note of smaller-scale catchment areas. Thinking in these terms 
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involves acknowledging that rainwater catchments are “interdependent social-ecological 
systems with institutions and multigovernance systems” that should develop adaptive 
management approaches in order to create ecohydrosolidarity within and between regions 
and nations.454  
An article written in 2011 by Andrea Gerlak and her colleagues produced probably the 
most comprehensive study of the concept of hydrosolidarity. In the article published in 
Water International titled, “Hydrosolidarity and beyond: can ethics and equity find a 
place in today’s water management?” Gerlak et al provided an overview of its short 
intellectual history and its evolving application, arguing that it has “emerged as a 
mechanism to inject issues of social justice and human rights into a discussion about 
water that had been largely driven by technical and political variables that influence 
water management, especially in the international arena.”455 According to the authors, 
hydrosolidarity’s most valuable contribution is its continued use as a synonym for 
ethically based behaviour.456  
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The integration of hydrosolidarity as a discursive marker for ethical behaviour in water 
security is meant to embolden alternative approaches to “business as usual” models in 
water security that continue to exploit water resources for strategic gain, with too little 
attention paid to sustainability, environmental consequences, or human suffering. By 
incorporating a sense of ethical understanding into what had largely been only 
technically-driven solutions, hydrosolidarity means to encourage a framework that 
respects common human values. As William J. Cosgrove, the former President of the 
World Water Council, wrote in 2003, “Respect for shared human values will eventually 
prove to be the key to sound management of the world’s water resources in the 
sustainable service of human development.”457 The fact that the head of the largest 
governing body of water organizations and professionals adamantly declared the 
necessity of using ethical considerations in managing increasing water stress is an 
important indication that hydrosolidarity is an attractive and useful component of twenty-
first water security.  
Some of the expansive effects that hydrosolidarity provide are helpful in formulating 
alternative security practices related to conflict management. It may not allow us to fully 
formulate what all emancipatory visions of security might look like, but it gets us closer 
to understanding the potential for emancipatory intent inherent within water and 
environmental security. The next section will examine whether the predominant 
management strategy of integrated water resources management (IWRM) can adequately 
operationalize emancipatory ethics into water security. 
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6.3 The Promise and Peril of IWRM 
6.3.1 Defining IWRM 
Hydrosolidarity encompasses a wide range of processes that broadly encourages 
incorporating ethical considerations into more technical, scientific, environmental 
planning. It can now be seen as the primary ethical component upon which the dominant 
paradigms of complex water management strategies could be built. In particular, it is 
been increasingly associated with the strategies of integrated water resources 
management, though often such ethical considerations are avoided or left 
unacknowledged. This section will define IWRM, delineate its key features and historical 
progress, and summarize the main criticisms of IWRM. It will conclude by offsetting a 
measured degree of support for IWRM with calls for much further ethical engagement. It 
leads into the final section of the chapter, which provides promising emancipatory 
alternatives to IWRM embedded in contemporary water discourse.  
IWRM is best defined as a “process that promotes the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems."458 IWRM begins by stipulating that water needs to be 
treated as a single environmental resource, allocated to the main societal water users: 
industry, agriculture, and individual households. According to IWRM frameworks, this 
allocation is most efficient and sustainable when participatory public policy frameworks 
are used involving all affected stakeholders. In this regard, IWRM incorporates social 
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factors into analyses while also taking stock of the interconnected physical attributes of 
surface water, groundwater and the ecosystems through which they flow. The idea of 
integration extends through the physical management of water resources as well as the 
wider social context through the pursuit of consensus building with the input of 
stakeholders from all levels.459  
There is no precise blueprint for implementing IWRM. It is better seen as a set of 
principles from which best practices, sensitive to specific contexts, can be implemented. 
IWRM has been formulated to combat a host of problems related to water governance – 
problems related to conflict, cooperation, distribution, protection, and sustainability of 
water resources. It would not make sense to construct a rigid set of guidelines that would 
work around the world, in every case. Instead national and regional institutions are urged 
to develop their own types of IWRM practices engaging collaboratively with those who 
would be affected as well as engaging with the emerging global consensus on the 
necessarily broad parameters of achieving sustainable and equitable resource security. In 
particular IWRM recognizes the importance of water quality issues which leads it to pay 
special attention to the poor; to the role, skills and needs of women; and to vulnerable 
areas such as small island states, landlocked countries, and desertified areas.460 
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IWRM has gained significant attention since it was first circulated as a broad idea at the 
1992 Earth Summit in Rio.461 The Global Water Partnership (GWP), created in 1996 by 
the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, and the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency, has facilitated its growing role in water 
governance. In 2000 GWP produced the first authoritative definition of IWRM. No 
unambiguous definition had been created up to that point and no answer to how its 
principles might be put into practice had been devised. GWP sought to correct this and it 
defined IWRM as a holistic approach that understands managing water demand is as 
important as managing its supply. In so doing it linked together wider social, economic, 
environmental, and technical dimensions of water management. The justification for 
these linkages is based upon a belief, to put it simply, that humans and the decisions they 
make determine how water is used or misused. Thus there must be an integrated policy-
making process that involves all the various concerned stakeholders. Because 
stakeholders often hold conflicting interests and their objectives concerning water 
resources management may be oppositional, negotiations organized with IWRM 
principles develop operational tools for conflict management and resolution. The 
important objective in preparing appropriate conflict resolution tools is to “identify and 
designate water resources management functions according to their lowest appropriate 
level of implementation; at each level the relevant stakeholders need to be identified and 
mobilized.”462 
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IWRM is the most popular approach to water management today.463 The 2012 UN-Water 
assessment survey found that since 1992, 80 percent of countries around the world had 
implemented some level of integrated water resources management strategy.464As an 
attempt to integrate previously wide-ranging and isolated water management practices 
into one holistic framework, it has become remarkably popular. The overriding criterion 
that propels IWRM is interconnectedness, between economic, social, and environmental 
conditions. IWRM approaches to water management require adherence to the conditions 
of economic efficiency in water use, social equity, and environmental and ecological 
sustainability (emphasis in original). These three pillars buttress the three central 
elements needed for successful implementation: enabling environments (e.g. creating a 
general framework of rules, laws, legislation, information), and institutional roles (e.g. 
delineating precise roles for stakeholders), and managing instruments (e.g. providing 
operational tools for effective implementation, regulation, monitoring and enforcement of 
agreed upon rules). 465  
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6.3.2 The History of IWRM 
The roots of IWRM extend as far back as the 1960s, when river basin management 
strategies were first implemented.466 However it was not until the 1977 UN-led 
Conference on Water in Mar del Plata, Argentina when IWRM began to develop into 
something wider and more holistic. At that conference, the first coordinated IWRM plan 
was introduced. The Mar del Plata Action Plan stands as one of the signposts of modern 
water management. It signaled a broad international consensus that the best way to 
approach water management was to link a range of formerly separate analyses including 
assessments of water use, efficiency, health and pollution control, policy planning and 
management, public information, and regional cooperation.467 
Today’s iterations of IWRM are principally derived from the Dublin Principles, adopted 
in Ireland at the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment held in 
Dublin, Ireland five months prior to the Rio Summit. The four Dublin Principles are: 
1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development, and the environment 
2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory 
approach, involving users, planners, and policy-makers at all levels. 
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3. Women play a central part in the provision, management, and 
safeguarding of water 
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognized as an economic good.468 
These broad principles were intended to act as guidelines for action at all levels of water 
management. The Dublin conference was not without controversy: the fourth Dublin 
Principle was singled out for criticism from representatives from the developing world, 
who felt that water development could never be sustainable without adequate attention to 
questions of equality and poverty. Other criticisms of the Dublin Principles were that they 
were elite-led, lacked third world representation, and failed to indicate just how the 
principles could be operationalized in the context of complex water management 
schemes, especially in developing countries.469 
Despite these criticisms, the Dublin Principles have been hugely influential. They were 
adopted into Agenda 21, the main substantive outcome of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio 
de Janeiro. Agenda 21 was a monumental blueprint for global action to combat 
environmental destruction and promote sustainable development. Chapter eighteen of 
Agenda 21 specifically dealt with water quality and freshwater supply. It was also the 
first instance that IWRM was explicitly mentioned as a necessary component to future 
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water management strategies. The box below details the specific clauses that incorporate 
IWRM in Agenda 21: 
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18.8. Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of water as an 
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource, and a social and economic good, whose 
quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization. To this end, water resources 
have to be protected, taking into account the functioning of aquatic ecosystems and the 
perenniality of the resource, in order to satisfy and reconcile needs for water in human 
activities. In developing and using water resources, priority has to be given to the 
satisfaction of basic needs and the safeguarding of ecosystems. Beyond these 
requirements, however, water users should be charged appropriately.  
 
18.9. Integrated water resources management, including the integration of land- and 
water-related aspects, should be carried out at the level of the catchment basin or sub-
basin. Four principal objectives should be pursued, as follows: 
a. To promote a dynamic, interactive, iterative and multisectoral approach to 
water resources management, including the identification and protection of 
potential sources of freshwater supply, that integrates technological, socio-
economic, environmental and human health considerations; 
b. To plan for the sustainable and rational utilization, protection, conservation 
and management of water resources based on community needs and priorities 
within the framework of national economic development policy; 
c. To design, implement and evaluate projects and programmes that are both 
economically efficient and socially appropriate within clearly defined 
strategies, based on an approach of full public participation, including that of 
women, youth, indigenous people and local communities in water management 
policy-making and decision-making  
d. To identify and strengthen or develop, as required, in particular in developing 
countries, the appropriate institutional, legal and financial mechanisms to 
ensure that water policy and its implementation are a catalyst for sustainable 
social progress and economic growth. countries, the appropriate institutional, 
legal and financial mechanisms to ensure that water policy and its 
implementation are a catalyst for sustainable social progress and economic 
growth.  
 
UNCED, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992. Web. 28 September, 2012. 
<http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf>  
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Further development of IWRM came during the Second World Water Forum in The 
Hague, in 2000, where the Global Water Partnership offered the first definition of 
IWRM. During the Hague meetings, IWRM grew in prominence and was firmly 
enshrined as a necessary water management strategy in the Forum’s Ministerial 
Declaration. The final document proclaimed that IWRM was the pivotal component for 
meeting the challenges of twenty-first century water management. In two of its eleven 
points of emphasis, IWRM was singled out: 
5. The actions advocated here are based on integrated water resources 
management, that includes the planning and management of water resources, both 
conventional and non-conventional, and land. This takes account of social, 
economic and environmental factors and integrates surface water, groundwater 
and the ecosystems through which they flow. It recognizes the importance of 
water quality issues. In this, special attention should be paid to the poor; to the 
role, skills and needs of women; and to vulnerable areas such as small island 
states, landlocked countries, and desertified areas. 
6. Integrated water resources management depends on collaboration and 
partnerships at all levels, from individual citizens to international organizations, 
based on a political commitment to, and wider societal awareness of, the need for 
water security and the sustainable management of water resources. To achieve 
integrated water resources management, there is a need for coherent national and, 
where appropriate, regional and international policies to overcome fragmentation, 
and for transparent and accountable institutions at all levels.470 
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The combination of the first comprehensive definition by GWP and the explicit mention 
of IWRM in the 2000 Ministerial Declaration of the Second World Water Forum marked 
a significant progression by IWRM into mainstream discourses on water policy.  It laid 
the groundwork for IWRM being adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa. By then, IWRM was seen as the 
future foundation for water governance systems and part of a broader package of 
international strategies for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.471 The WSSD 
Plan of Implementation laid out a comprehensive set of roles for IWRM to act as the 
primary conduit for future water policies. IWRM was to be used to coordinate 
national/regional strategies for river basins, to improve the efficient and equitable sharing 
of water resources and to help establish public/private partnerships and other types of 
partnerships that give priority to the poor.472 It also singled out IWRM as a necessary 
element for achieving the goal to halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of people that 
are unable to reach or afford safe drinking water, and the proportion of people without 
access to basic sanitation. In March 2012, UNICEF and the WHO declared that the MDG 
target was indeed reached, three years ahead of schedule.473  
With the publication of the WSSD Implementation Plan, IWRM was cemented as the 
pre-eminent guide for water management. Over the succeeding decade its principles have 
been repeated almost as a mantra in large environmental mega-conferences. The GWP 
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and the World Bank now consistently stress integrated approaches that take into account 
the downstream social and ecological costs of building dams, irrigation schemes, and 
other forms of water management. Every World Water Forum, every UN World Water 
Development Report, every World Water Week, points to IWRM as a set of necessary 
guiding principles.  
6.3.3 Critiques of IWRM: 
IWRM is not universally supported. It has received a fair amount of criticism that will 
likely not dislodge its position as pre-eminent water strategy, but does indicate significant 
dissension among water scholars and practitioners. The criticisms have been varied. 
Some offer pointed and specific critiques of IWRM, while broadly agreeing with its 
general framework. Biswas argues that its definition is amorphous, which can lead to 
difficulty in actually implementing most of its components.474 He also maintains that 
what works for one area cannot prima facie be expected to work for another, where 
different institutions, with different stakeholders, and interests exist. He writes, “Water 
management must be responsive to the needs and demands of a growing diversity of 
central, state and municipal institutions, user groups, private sector, NGOs, and other 
appropriate bodies. Concentration of authorities into one or fewer institutions could 
increase biases, reduce transparency, and proper scrutiny of their activities.”475 Kirshen et 
al. argue that IWRM needs to better account for hydraulic uncertainties that will arise as 
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a result of climate change.476 Jonch-Clausen and Fugl lament that IWRM has 
"degenerated into one of those buzzwords that everybody uses but that mean different 
things to different people."477  
Deeper critiques have also been levelled that question the underlying philosophy behind 
IWRM. Many point to the tendency among IWRM proponents to ignore social aspects of 
water management in favour of technical solutions that appease growing water demand. 
Many of these deeper critiques are in essence an attack on the dominance of instrumental 
rationality at the expense of politically sensitive assessments that acknowledge 
alternatives to traditional state-led management processes. Allan makes the case that 
IWRM policy makers do not realize that cultural, spiritual, and economic factors are as 
important as sustainability in managing water. For him, the political nature of IWRM 
needs to be better acknowledged.478 McDonnell argues against the dominance of narrow, 
positivist, and techno-scientific frameworks integrated in IWRM analyses.479 Rahaman 
and Varis extend this critique against IWRM's belief that privatizing the marketable 
aspects of water will result in single-purpose planning and management. For them, this 
approach ignores the ethical and practical difficulties in implementing planning strategies 
uniformly around the world. The differences between regions means full-cost recovery 
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may not be possible in great areas of the global south where infrastructure is deficient or 
incomplete.480  
As might be expected, the participants at Alternative World Water Forums have also put 
forth significant criticisms of IWRM. The Bradford Centre for International 
Development, an organizer of the 2003 Alternative World Water Forum, argued the 
global water consensus, is, “narrowly underpinned by neo-liberal principles, dominated 
by technical and managerial concerns and informed by limited methodologies and 
empirical data. NGOs and campaigning groups have questioned the pro-privatization 
focus of the consensus, the neglect of environmental and ecological concerns and equity 
issues.”481  
These deeper criticisms argue against instrumental rationality that canonizes impartial 
data collection and the innate good will of partners, essentially ignoring the deeply 
political processes at work. As has been repeated throughout this manuscript, such 
approaches are, at best, insufficient for alleviating complex and political water problems, 
and, at worst, culpable in their continuation. In making oblique reference to IWRM as 
evidence of a holistic approach to individual water securing, various constituents may 
only be providing smokescreens to further their own entrenched interests, confirming 
business-as-usual policies. The outcome, according to these critics is that entrenched 
power asymmetries are replicated, with the state acting as the sole and necessary entity to 
produce effective water security. As François Molle puts it, "the entire process appears to 
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be naturally steered by the state...with a consequent high likelihood of reproducing 
paternalistic, technocratic, and bureaucratic and top-down conventional approaches, 
modified only by whatever degree of participation is allowed."482  
6.3.4 The Promise and Peril of IWRM 
IWRM compels planners and practitioners to assess the wide confluence of factors that 
are necessary to adequately manage water resources. In this sense IWRM represents a 
more holistic approach to water security. It promotes multiple connections – connections 
in ecology by mixing water, land, and related resources; connections in economics by 
promoting efficiency and equality; connections in politics by promoting institution-
building, institutional resilience, and coordinating often competitive and segmented intra 
and inter government departments; and finally it promotes connections in society by 
encouraging the inclusion and participation of different stakeholders in water policy 
planning, and by acknowledging the specific gendered effects that water places on 
women. However, does IWRM truly exemplify emancipatory water security? Does it 
bring us closer to an ontology of security with individuals and their well being at its core? 
IWRM does represent certain emancipatory understandings of human security. It 
promotes inclusion, pursues the peaceful and efficient allocation of water across borders 
and along shared waterways, and it is claimed to be built upon a foundational ethics of 
hydrosolidarity that propounds the value of discussion, negotiation, and deliberation 
amongst different stakeholders. The components of inclusion, dialogue, and 
cosmopolitanism were drawn out in detail in chapter five as the most coherent path to 
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critical water security, and to varying degrees they are acknowledged in IWRM 
processes.  
However, to see IWRM as a wholly emancipatory alternative would be overstating its 
value and purpose for a variety of reasons, even though its constituent parts do point to a 
progressive re-ordering of water security, which was argued for in previous chapters. 
Primarily, IWRM remains at its core a statist, technically-driven platform that is designed 
and implemented from the top-down. And while such strategies may be useful for making 
large-scale policy decisions and consolidating disparate planning strategies, it too often 
results in the continuation of instrumentalist conceptions of water security, that fail to 
account for the ethical underpinnings of water management in different contexts.  
It is still possible to point to the emancipatory potentials embedded within various IWRM 
projects, particularly its commitment to rectifying historically fragmented and 
competitive management of shared water resources. But IWRM cannot, at least on its 
own, be viewed as illustrative of a sufficiently emancipatory alternative. The scientific 
and technical rationality at its heart is overemphasized at the expense of normative 
judgments. IWRM may reflect a growing awareness amongst water professionals and 
policy makers for the need for more holistic thinking in water management and security, 
but it pays little overt attention to the ethics involved in managing water security. Every 
decision that is taken with regards to water has embedded within it an ethical component 
– this is one of the key insights that critical theory teaches. To ignore that is to cede 
ground to dominant paradigms of instrumentalist control, which are so problematic in 
security contexts.  
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6.4 Global Water Solidarity: emancipatory water security or 
chimera? 
The terms of IWRM represent multiple progressive steps but they are only one partially 
realized example of the emancipatory potential in water security. While it has largely 
reflected a technical, managerialist outlook on water, at the expense of developing a 
larger, progressive ethical foundation, IWRM is not the only arbiter of global water 
relations; there are other expressed forms of hydrosolidarity that can be seen in 
contemporary global water relations.  
One new development signals an awareness of the progressive appeal of water security 
that has arisen since 2010, receiving its most explicit formulation during the 2012 World 
Water Forum, in Marseilles, France. “Global Water Solidarity” (GWS) is a worldwide 
initiative that aims to bridge the multiple levels of water stakeholders in order to advance 
cooperative ties. GWS has been established to replicate highly successful development 
efforts called “decentralized solidarity mechanisms (DSMs).” Rather, GWS seeks to 
engage the multiple levels of governance that is required to manage water resources, 
especially in vulnerable areas of the world. By placing importance on multiple actors 
across space and scale, GWS should be seen as an innovative response to the deficiencies 
of modern water security. It is defined as a, “coalition of local, regional and national 
governments public and private institutions and civil society organizations from Europe, 
Asia, and Africa.”483 It works in a variety of ways to demonstrate an embedded 
emancipatory alternative to competitive water scenarios. Principally, by focusing on the 
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nascent level of cooperation, ethical responsibility, and local participation amongst water 
users across varying degrees of distance it exemplifies the inclusive, dialogic, and 
cosmopolitan nature of emancipatory water security. The next section will explicate the 
origins of Global Water Solidarity and Decentralized Solidarity Mechanisms, and focus 
on the bridges they create towards more holistic and progressive approaches to water 
security. 
6.4.1 The History of Global Water Solidarity 
 
Originally, the GWS initiative was first proposed by the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) in late 2010 to mobilize technical and financial resources to support local 
governments from the developing world in their efforts to meet MDG 7C, which seeks 
the reduction by half of the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking and basic sanitation. It was thought that by upscaling the already existing and 
successful policies of DSMs, it would be possible to harness the existing political will to 
combat water scarcity and improve sanitation conditions for vulnerable populations in the 
developing world, with a special focus on Asia-Pacific and Africa. The impetus behind 
the upward shift from decentralized solidarity mechanisms to global water solidarity was 
a belief that it was politically feasible, technically achievable, and ethically desirable.  
Since DSMs were originally set up as a way to further the progress in achieving the UN’s 
MDGs484 related to water (specifically Target 7c), they should be seen as a success story. 
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In March 2012, just before the opening of the Sixth World Water Forum, UNICEF and 
the WHO declared that the MDG target for drinking water had been reached, well ahead 
of the 2015 deadline.485 This was one of the first MDG targets to be met, and was hailed 
as a significant achievement. Unsurprisingly, significant challenges remain, including the 
fact that 11 percent of the world’s population (783 million) still lacks access to improved 
drinking water. There have also been some that questioned whether the collected data 
was in fact accurate. A Dutch NGO, International Water and Sanitation Centre (IRC), 
pointed out that water quality was not measured in the MDG report, and the reporters also 
failed to look into whether water supplies worked or were reliable.486 The lesson to take 
away is that while DSMs have been one of the most successful tools used in getting 
closer to the water MDG, there is still much improvement to be made across the world.  
The formal creation of DSMs was based upon earlier pioneering initiatives including the 
Oudin-Santini law in France, the ‘Koppejan’ law in the Netherlands, the Platform 
Solidarit’eau in Switzerland, the Flemish Partnership Water for Development in Belgium 
and the ‘L’Acqua è di tutti’ fund in Italy.487 The initiatives helped build voluntary 
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cooperative networks across Europe that put a portion of the water and sanitation budget 
aside to assist water projects in developing countries. In France alone, where participation 
is voluntary, the Oudin-Santini Law raised about 24 million Euros in 2010, and has to 
date assisted 600 projects in 17 countries.488 One estimate from Jean-Phillipe Bayon, a 
senior water expert at UNDP put the potential European-wide mobilization of financial 
resources for GWS at €4 billion.489  
Following the success of these early initiatives, at the end of 2010, the UNDP Hub for 
Innovative Partnerships began mobilizing new technical and financial resources from 
decentralized cooperation in order to support local governments from developing 
countries in their efforts to achieve Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 7C. The 
‘triggering point’ was the possibility of scaling up at the European level a voluntary levy 
of 1 percent on water and sanitation services already functional in certain countries and 
notably in France.490  
 
The next section will detail how DSMs work and explain the rationale behind upscaling 
to Global Water Solidarity. 
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In early 2012, the GWS Steering Committee, made up of representatives from local, 
regional and national authorities, international and multilateral organizations, water 
operators, NGOs, private organizations and prominent public figures, focused its efforts 
on specifying the best ways to use small-scale DSMs in achieving the MDGs. At this 
time, DSMs were essentially a bundle of policies adopted at sub-national levels that 
harnessed financial resources, and promoted local capacity building and technology 
transfer in support of sub-national institutions’ efforts to establish water and sanitation 
services.491 All of these policies were pursued on a voluntary basis and as a sign of 
solidarity.  
During the last decade, DSMs have been a successful and resilient approach to human 
water security. They have been designed specifically to address the obstacles that sub-
national institutions faced in developing countries. As such, they reflect a broader 
understanding of the need for inclusive participation in the management of water 
resources. Their principal use has been to decrease human vulnerabilities by improving 
the availability of clean water sources and improving sanitation, the roots of individual 
health and wellbeing. Their impact has been significant and it is clear that with the 
pursuit of Global Water Solidarity, the benefits resulting from DSM have been far from 
negligible.  
The MDG goal of safe drinking water has been one of only three MDG targets achieved 
to date (together with targets to reduce slums and extreme poverty), and it was met three 
years ahead of the 2015 deadline. The proportion of people without sustainable access to 
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safe drinking water was halved and the proportion of people using an improved source of 
water (such as piped supplies and protected wells) rose from 76 percent in 1990 to 89 
percent in 2010. The number of people using improved drinking water now stands at over 
6.1 billion, an increase of over 2 billion from 1990, with increases in China and India 
making the largest gains.492 This is a measurable reflection of the positive effects that 
have occurred from increased efforts to combat human water insecurity. Part of the 
attainment of MDG Target 7c was made possible by the efforts of several European 
countries that launched DSMs. By encouraging and promoting the role of local 
authorities in water governance, DSMs operate with the understanding that water systems 
have a distinct impact on local communities, and that these communities should have a 
larger involvement in the planning and implementation of water policy.  
Perhaps the most significant reflection of the ethical foundations of DSM/GWS comes 
from its founding Charter of DSM. It provides three important acknowledgments. First, it 
recognizes that, although national governments alone maintain the legal responsibility for 
ensuring universal access to safe water and sanitation, it is also imperative that sub-
national groups must be fully involved. Secondly, it considers the fact that the continued 
lack of water security (in the form of safe water and sanitation) is primarily the result of 
economic constraints and institutional deficiencies, not due to limitations in physical 
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resources.  Thirdly, it puts special emphasis on the fact that the combined stress effects 
on water affect the poorest and most vulnerable population groups most intensively.493  
Together, these acknowledgments are a manifestation of a progressively oriented 
approach to water security and mark an important indicator of the sociopolitical drivers 
of vulnerability. The commitment to act in ways that reduce harm for vulnerable 
individuals and communities is based upon international and national dialogues that 
acknowledge that ecological and geographical factors are not disconnected from the 
social fabric and institutional context of societies.494 The commitments of the DSM 
Charter are fundamentally the product of deeper ethical thinking on the parts of the 
drafters.  
There are seven guiding principles of DSM, codified in its charter, that sustain its ethical 
foundations. The first principle is universality. This guides policies that avoid 
discrimination on any grounds, while concurrently promoting universal access by all 
groups and individuals in situations of vulnerability. The second principle is subsidiary, 
which reinforces democratic participatory planning at the least centralized competent 
authority level. The third principle – additionality - encourages a vision of DSMs as 
additions (not substitutions) to already existing Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
and other existing mechanisms. The fourth principle – leverage - transforms larger 
investments into a reduction of risk perception and reduces the transaction costs of loans. 
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The fifth principle is sustainability (institutional level). This emphasizes the need for 
good governance and capacity building by existing and future organizing institutions. The 
sixth principle is sustainability (environmental level). Proper environmental stewardship 
via IWRM and prevention and adaptation measures to natural disaster and climate change 
is required to fulfill the goals of DSM. Finally, the seventh principle is sustainability 
(financial level), which promotes adapted, inclusive, and proportional mechanisms for 
cost recovery and self-financing.495  
Organizations and initiatives that appeal to DSM funds must reflect these guiding 
principles, creating a type of benign consensus that can work to spread the principles of 
alternative water security. The explicit focus on universality, democratic participatory 
planning, and sustainability, are recognition of the mutual benefit that accrues from joint 
participation towards a goal of spreading water security strategies across borders. While 
DSMs are primarily designed for developing countries struggling to improve water and 
sanitation services, the ethical principles upon which they are founded are universally 
applicable. Indeed, the original DSMs were first implemented at the national and regional 
level within European countries. In this way they are able to answer some of the central 
criticisms levelled against MDGs, which is that they ignore problems of inequality across 
the world, “ghettoizing” development as something only to be worried about in the global 
south.496 Instead the roots of GWS show that internationalist discourses of cooperative 
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water security are being used in ways that can challenge the heretofore largely dominant 
discourse of security. 
It is clear that the principles expressed in the DSM charter represent a form of 
hydrosolidarity, which is one of the emancipatory appellations present in contemporary 
water politics. They constitute a shift to ideas that have previously been viewed as 
inimical to the realization of water security. Whereas traditional water security 
approaches have focused on national-level frameworks for managing scarce water 
sources, some of the main sponsors of DSM and hydrosolidarity champion the 
involvement of local institutions. This is an important factor in developing and 
implementing strategies to improve access to safe water and sanitation, while also 
increasing the involvement of local actors in securing basic rights and freedoms. Local 
involvement, requiring high levels of dialogue and cooperation, are central requirements 
for hydrosolidarity, and the ongoing progression of DSM into a more solidified global 
framework signals one movement to re-engineer understandings of water security to the 
individual level.  
A key indication that alternative water security norms developed in the DSM framework 
are taking root is seen by the commitment to expand the range and scope of DSM into a 
global approach to combatting water insecurity. Leading up the 2012 World Water 
Forum (WWF 6), it was decided by the DSM Steering Committee that DSMs should be 
upscaled and replicated. This has led to the transformation of DSMs into something 
larger called Global Water Solidarity (GWS). Officially launched at WWF 6, Global 
Water Solidarity expands DSMs across space and time to assume a larger role in 
promoting innovative, ethical solutions to global water problems. It does so by 
234 
 
replicating, at a larger level, successful decentralized solidarity mechanisms. 
Accordingly, financial resources are to be mobilized in order to be dispersed 
internationally. It mandates increasing technology transfer and facilitating training 
exchanges between decentralized authorities and technical services. GWS also seeks to 
promote good governance and territorial development. All of these mechanisms are 
undertaken with a special focus on the role of local governments and communities in 
providing basic services. While IWRM remains the dominant water management 
approach, DSM was singled out at the World Water Forum as an important contribution 
that is both grounded in specific ethical principles and can help in the progress towards 
achieving the minimum standards of Millennium Development Goal 7. It was for this 
reason that such a concerted effort was made at WWF 6 to disseminate and replicate 
achievements.  Unified under the theme “Time for Solutions,” WWF 6 witnessed the 
creation of GWS and its promotion was evident at numerous events. One official session 
dealt with “Innovative Finance for Local Government;” one side event was called, “1% 
Water and Decentralized Solidarity Mechanisms: Partnership Solutions in Africa for 
Water and Sanitation;” and another event looked at, “Villages for Solutions.”497 All these 
events were part of the ‘coming-out party’ for GWS.  
Funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and the Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères et Européennes de la République Française, as well as the UN 
Development Programme, GWS is undertaken on a voluntary basis, as a gesture of 
solidarity. The three funding organizations have championed the scaling up to the 
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European level of a voluntary levy of 1 percent on water and sanitation services that was 
already functional in certain countries, including France.498 The funds generated are then 
diverted to a variety of projects and organizations across the world with the aim of 
improving drinking water and sanitation for vulnerable populations. The encouragement 
of a 1 percent solidarity mechanism (a ‘voluntary tax’ in other terms) is one aspect of 
GWS, but the platform is not limited to financial packages. The needs of water and 
sanitation sectors require broader engagement than simple financial mobilization. GWS 
thus also facilitates international technical exchanges, encouraging the cross-pollination 
of best practices and the experiences from previous efforts. The closer links among 
national platforms and decentralized authorities can leverage ethical responsibility into 
real improvement in the lives of others. The emphasis on inclusive dialogue across 
borders, regions, and watersheds, and the principal role that local governments play in all 
aspects of the design and implementation of the platforms are indications of alternative 
conceptions of the way in which water security can be articulated and practiced. A range 
of actors across borders and continents, from Programme Solidarité Eau in France499 to 
Water and Sanitation for Africa,500 to Sahara and Sahel Observatory in Tunisia501 are 
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contributing to the process of re-defining what water security can mean. Going forward, 
the task becomes one of expanding hydrosolidarity, catalyzing more north-south, south-
south, and north-north linkages through progressive financing mechanisms and capacity 
sharing. The critical vision is such that these types of decentralized partnerships help 
fundamentally transform the ends towards which water security is aimed, evolving over 
time into new, vibrant alternatives that contribute to a good life for the entire community 
of life dependent on water.502  
6.5 Conclusion 
It is too soon to fully judge the outcomes of Global Water Solidarity, but at the outset of 
its institutionalization, it seems to demonstrate emancipatory practices immanent in water 
security. The eventual scaling up of solidarity mechanisms is in essence a re-articulation 
of the way in which security can be constructed – away from more technical, 
instrumental interpretations envisaged by IWRM and, even more fundamentally, away 
from the traditional security discourse of exclusion and enmity. The commitment made 
by Global Water Solidarity to increase individual water security by utilizing transnational 
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resources (both human and financial) and combining them with a central role for local 
communities signals an emancipatory alternative in ways that IWRM as a managing 
doctrine simply cannot do or promise. While it may seem contradictory for proponents to 
advocate concurrently for institutionalization and decentralization, both processes are 
necessary for the hoped-for shift in water ethics.  
Decentralization is necessary for the inclusion of disparate communities and in order to 
better manage resources upon which they depend for their livelihoods. Local 
communities can in theory provide more inclusive public participation and dialogue over 
water issues. Such participation is vital for the increase in ethical and technical legitimacy 
as well as the overall empowerment of local communities. It is clear that local knowledge 
is essential to the planning and implementation of complex water security strategies. 
Without it, there is the potential for marginalized groups to experience the effects of 
power disparities – forcing them to participate and replicate the dominant orthodoxy of 
the dominant group.  Such orthodoxy is often inimical to deeply held spiritual and ethical 
beliefs of local groups, and it may also continue to entrench larger discourses of national 
security at the expense of emancipatory alternatives.  The avoidance of past mistakes 
compels us all to re-think the purpose and utility of traditional approaches of water 
security. Shifting nationalist discourses of water security to the local individual, will do 
much to promote emancipation, can contribute to a vision of the future that is urgently 
needed.  
This dissertation has shown that the problems surrounding water security are multifaceted 
and complex. Global water problems are not just problems of inequitable or inefficient 
distribution - though these are important components that require technical solutions – 
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they are reflections of much larger attitudes and beliefs about how human society should 
be fundamentally ordered. Water scarcity, water impurity, and unequal water sharing 
practices exert wide-scale negative material consequences, but their continued prevalence 
are social constructions that stem from intersubjectively created social processes and 
ideas about what can or cannot be accomplished. The continued and growing distance 
between water supply and demand requires a larger emancipatory ethical framework that 
can promote values of sustainability, cosmopolitan responsibility, and hydrosolidarity. It 
is not enough to promote technical solutions, or better management practices. For 
entrenched practices, like IWRM, to adequately increase individual and national security, 
they will need to increasingly acknowledge the role that inclusion, dialogue and 
cosmopolitan ethics play in water management. This means that new practices, like 
GWS, must continue to incorporate te nascent principles like hydrosolidarity into their 
core operational guidelines. Otherwise, contemporary water management will be in 
danger of replicating the failures of past strategies, which focus on technical, 
deterministic solutions that do not integrate sustained ethical considerations into their 
analyses. Furthermore, the rise of IWRM as a hegemonic discourse is troubling. It is seen 
as almost heretical to question this new form of water practice in the large global water 
conferences like the World Water Forum, World Water Congress, and Stockholm 
International Water Institute. 
This chapter outlined one promising alternative – Global Water Solidarity. Global Water 
Solidarity is in its very early stages of development. It is too soon to tell what its 
successes and failures will be, and just how much it can contribute to advancing an 
alternative identity of water security that counters the exclusivist tendencies of traditional 
water security. Expectations must be tempered. That said, it is but one example - perhaps 
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an obvious one given the involvement of UNDP and state governments – of a progressive 
shift in the manner in which water security is both deliberated and practiced. Its 
promotion of the ethical norms of solidarity, decentralization, universality, and 
sustainability in the name of protecting vulnerable populations is an expression of the 
vision of emancipatory water security outlined in earlier chapters. Finally, it signifies 
how the possibility for emancipation is immanent in any political context, even in one as 
tightly bound to sovereign exclusivity as water security.503  
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7 Conclusion 
 
There has been an increasing acceptance that water is a vital security issue. Various UN 
organs and institutions have debated the concept of water security. It has been the subject 
of a major national security report in the United States.504 In 2007, The Government of 
Australia released A National Plan for Water Security.505 And clearly, a large number of 
think tanks, NGOs, and academic studies have pointed to water as a major threat to 
security. Much of the talk of water is deeply connected to a growing awareness of the 
dangers posed by climate change. In February 2013, the United Nations Security Council 
convened a meeting to discuss and debate the security implications of climate change. 
Chaired by the United Kingdom and Pakistan, the council heard appeals from UN 
officials, think tank analysts, and representatives from the World Bank, Australia, and the 
Pacific Island states of Kiribati and the Marshall Islands. The central argument, presented 
by Tony deBrum, a minister and assistant to the Marshall Islands President, was that 
climate change is, “a security issue, and not just an economic-political-social issue.”506 
The impetus for this meeting was the continued pace of climate change and its attendant 
effects being felt across the world since the last debate in 2011. The hope was that a 
stronger consensus would be reached that acknowledged and set up action on the dire 
security implications that climate changed posed. At the end of the 2011 meeting, the 
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UNSC agreed on a vague statement expressing “concern that the possible adverse effects 
of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international 
peace and security.”507 The 2013 meeting, in contrast, was galvanized by an increasing 
awareness that the frequency and severity of climate change effects, like hurricanes, 
wildfires, droughts, monsoons, and flooding, required a new sense of urgency. Given the 
deep connections between climate change security and water security, it is obvious that 
the issue will be of paramount importance in the coming years. The stress placed on 
water resources caused by exploitation, mismanagement, and climate change, will 
undoubtedly lead to intense political pressures. The result of these pressures is unknown; 
many argue they will lead to war and conflict, while others envision an increase in 
cooperation and mediation. The point is not to predict the future, but to begin 
constructing it. This study should be seen in this light.  
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to reframe the concept of water security along 
emancipatory lines. First defined by Ken Booth, an emancipatory vision of security is 
holistic, non-statist, and de-emphasizes the use or threat of force. It involves, “the freeing 
of people (as individuals or groups) from those physical and human constraints which 
stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.”508 It is obvious that the 
significant constraints imposed upon individuals and groups from a lack of sufficient 
water quantity and quality impede the potential to lead a full life. An emancipatory water 
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security counteracts traditional security approaches that present water in terms of “the 
coming anarchy.” It provides a framework for viewing water in a multiplicity of ways - 
as something much more complex and important than as currency for war strategists and 
forecasters.  
 
Water is an inherently connective substance. It shapes and alters human relationships as 
well as the ecosystems upon which they depend. Beyond human life, water is essential 
material for the functioning of the earth system. It is not substitutable in ways other 
natural resources are. Thus, a focus on water has the capacity to fundamentally transform 
the terms of security in equally profound ways. There is a widespread propensity among 
traditional security scholars and practitioners to view water as a strategic commodity. In 
such readings, water becomes another factor in the state-led calculus of vulnerabilities 
and opportunities. Such is the case of the highly securitized Nile Basin region, whereby 
state officials, journalists, and academics contribute to the perpetuation of traditional 
security narratives and conventional valuations of water.  
 
While water is often pivotal to state security, such readings belie the much more complex 
estimates of value. In fact, water’s worth is too multifaceted to label it primarily as a 
conflict variable. Such maneuvers ignore its multiple, overlapping, and interdependent 
values. Beyond the conventional understandings of water’s strategic and monetary value, 
there lie broader community values that demonstrate its inherent complexity as a security 
issue. Indeed, water also holds environmental, in-stream, and spiritual value. In 
environmental terms, water is the lifeblood of the earth. It bestows upon ecosystems the 
necessary materials required to exist and to thrive. It goes without saying that it plays an 
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integral part in the functioning of the planet. Every life form derives its being from water 
in some way. Therefore water has clear use for nature and for animals. Its environmental 
value cannot be overstated. Within river flows, water provides a multiplicity of benefits – 
both economic and non-economic. In-stream water values are apparent in terms of both 
human and non-human life. Water for fish and habitats for other animals enables 
necessary biodiversity. In human-terms, the uses derived from in—stream river flow are 
enormous. Whether through fishing or transportation water is central to the well-being 
and livelihood of a wide range of human river users. Finally, water also intersects with 
deeply held religious and spiritual beliefs. As outlined briefly in chapter three, by 
understanding the centrality of water within spiritual and religious belief systems across 
the world, it becomes clear that water has an organic or inherent value.509   
 
The non-traditional values of water indicate a highly complex confluence of differing 
uses and understandings that clearly demonstrate the need for alternative approaches to 
water security. The essentiality of water means that it cannot be relegated to one frame of 
rationality. It is by its very nature a strategic resource, one that security analysts will (and 
should) consider. But water means much more than just a strategic resource over which 
countries, or intra-state groups will fight over. As Veronica Strang writes, “The meanings 
themselves –  water as the spirit, as life, as social, connective substance, as wealth and 
power, as generative source and regenerative sea, as nature, id, emotion and unconscious 
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–  all of these permeate the interactions that people have with water.”510 To relegate 
water security largely to treatises on the inevitability of future conflict over dwindling 
resources is to vastly simplify and overlook the social meanings and material properties it 
encompasses. The argument presented in this dissertation argues against this by viewing 
water security along emancipatory lines. Emancipation allows individuals and 
organizations to envision and construct a world that moves away from fatalistic 
proclamations and towards actions that reduce human suffering and ecological 
degradation.  
 
The meanings of water “seep into every decision made about water use, wash over every 
aesthetic, religious or acquisitive vision of water, and swirl in powerful undercurrents in 
every quarrel about ownership, access and control of water resources.”511  This is also 
true of the concept of security. The meanings attached to the subject imbue the decisions 
and choices made in its name. As chapter two pointed out, an unquestioned 
understanding of rationality, knowledge, and ‘human nature’ grounds traditional security 
paradigms. When these inconsistencies, contradictions, and inadequacies work to 
construct a predominant notion of water security as Malthusian nightmare, it reveals 
much about the potential and peril of dominant paradigms. But when we reconstruct 
security along different lines and in different contexts we can see the multiplicity of 
meanings possible. Such attempts are found throughout this dissertation. Chapters five 
and six in particular are meant to convey the potential and possibility for imbuing water 
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security with ethical components. It becomes clear then just how important the concept of 
security is for managing water and just how useful water is for expanding our 
understanding of the subject of security. 
 
Thus, this dissertation should be seen as a modest attempt to reorient security away from 
traditional approaches that consistently fail to critique the underlying assumptions that 
portray water primarily as a strategic commodity. The intention is to acknowledge the 
space for alternative theorizing in the field, bringing forth multiple visions of security.  
 
Without question, water is a pressing security concern for a large number of individuals 
and communities around the world. But often the reality of individual insecurity caused 
by a lack of access to quality water supplies is obscured by discourses and policies that 
reify and preserve the status quo of statist security. Unsurprisingly, evidence of this is 
found in various national security strategies and in the debates held in intergovernmental 
forums like the UN Security Council. Indeed, this dissertation examined one of the most 
highly volatile regions of the world where water remains scarce –the Nile Basin – to 
show how water securitization generates a vision of security dependent upon a 
preservation of the status quo. The result of the continual focus on maintaining national 
and international ‘order’ and ‘stability,’ enables traditional, dominant security actors to 
position themselves as the most important security providers. More importantly, perhaps, 
are the effects this has in engendering policies that privilege a vision of the state and its 
leaders as the end of security, rather than the means: as the object of security rather than a 
facilitator of it.  
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Examining the linkages between traditional security and water leads to larger questions: 
What does security do? Who is security for? How do we understand threats? These 
questions are important for understanding how our conceptions of water security, and our 
responses to those conceptions, are intimately tied to fundamental ideas about the 
individual, society, and nature. While some question whether the concept of security is 
itself useful anymore, this dissertation believes otherwise.512 In contrast to Neocleous’ 
notion of “anti-security,” which posits that security inevitably blocks politics,513 this 
dissertation argues often that security is by its very nature political. However, the 
political nature of security does not necessarily have to lead to its abandonment 
altogether but can, with the necessary critical theoretical tools, allow for the 
transformation of security into a desirable concept through which emancipation is 
possible. It is thus argued that the political nature of security can in fact be harnessed to 
produce normatively superior ends. The intention is to create ways in which the concept 
of water security contributes to the emancipation of individuals around the world. This is 
primarily the aim of chapter five, which produced a detailed theory of emancipatory 
water security. 
 
Indeed, the concept of security is absolutely central to the argument presented here: that 
security as emancipation is something desirable and possible in human relations over 
water. This argument stems from awareness that the monumental scale of the challenges 
facing the global environment and human societies requires a reexamination of the core 
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beliefs that condition our relationship to the world. The response must then be a 
reorientation of security that can offer progressive and effective responses fundamentally 
tied to ethical norms of inclusion, communication, and cosmopolitanism. In so doing, 
cooperative and sustainable practices of water management can emerge on various scales 
- from the local to the global. 
 
This dissertation comprised two broad sections. The first section – chapters two, three, 
and four – produced a critique of the concepts inherent in traditional accounts of 
international relations, international security, and environmental security. They contribute 
to the unsettling of imagined norms of the general concept of security and of the nature of 
water security in particular. Chapter two began by interrogating the notion that the 
disciplines of international relations and international security are reflective of natural 
human tendencies towards war, violence, and strategic logic. Those interrogations are 
necessary for later interjections that work to reconstruct the security of water towards 
emancipatory ends. Chapter three built upon those insights but shines a critical light on 
the widespread tendency to equate water security with the narrative of the coming 
anarchy. Chapter four made the case that the prevailing securitization of water – seeing 
water security in purely Schmittian terms of exception – are inadequate and normatively 
problematic. All told, chapters two, three, and four worked together to deconstruct and 
problematize prevailing notions of water security. They offer the comprehensive 
groundwork necessary for the second section of the thesis – chapters five and six – that 
constructed a framework for emancipatory water security. Chapter five developed a 
vision of emancipatory security with three defining features: inclusion, communication, 
and cosmopolitanism. As it is in the critical theoretical tradition, such features are not 
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blueprints, but are part of a mutable, adaptable vision and meant to encourage reflection 
and discussion. These features derived from and expand upon the contentions made in the 
earlier chapters. They are representative of critical appeals to unsettle naturalized security 
norms and to promote a greater awareness of the security of vulnerable populations who 
are consistently denied inclusion and agency in water relationships. Chapter six took the 
features of emancipatory water security outlined in chapter five and highlighted the 
emancipatory potential embedded in contemporary water security by focusing on the 
concepts of hydrosolidarity and DSMs.  
 
Together, the two sections work in congruence to provide a nuanced picture of the 
myriad complexities of water and security. They are linked together by the emancipatory 
appeal. The first section draws upon a wide array of literature to deconstruct traditional 
security, particularly in the context of water. The second section picks up from this to 
present alternatives to the dominant paradigms. It buttresses the central argument – that 
security as emancipation is desirable and possible in relations over water. 
 
The manuscript presented here thus offers a three-fold utility. First, it produces a new 
approach to water security – an emancipatory approach that is analytically and 
normatively progressive. Secondly, it adds to our understanding of emancipation as a 
critical security concept. To date, the concept of emancipation has been left only partially 
examined. It therefore has become commonplace to dismiss its usefulness or to criticize 
its as utopian and idealistic. By establishing a set of foundational components in relation 
to an absolutely essential resource, the dissertation can answer some of the most frequent 
charges against the concept of emancipation. Thirdly, it is one of the first international 
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security manuscripts to apply hydrosolidarity in any sustained way. In this regard it 
contributes to the spread of an important hydrological idea, though further theoretical 
refinement and application is called for.  
 
In sum, this dissertation has rather modest aims. It should not be read as a treatise for the 
abolition of security, nor does it seek to take on very large philosophical questions 
regarding the ontology of the individual. Rather, what is advocated are pointed 
adjustments to our discourses of water security that show an appreciation for the myriad 
ways in which it intersects with the ability to lead a good life. Moving forward, the first 
steps taken in this dissertation are likely to contribute to a deeper engagement with 
problems of human ontology, the materiality of water and inter-human relations, and 
questions of security.  
 
Water security is an aperture – a window of opportunity – for deeper explorations of the 
social and power relationships that work to construct the world of international relations.  
Accepting the existing state of human relationships as necessary signals a moral choice, 
because reality then becomes essentialized. To argue the immutability of certain social 
and political norms in security studies, like the international state system, the pursuit of 
selfish national interests, etc., reifies and accepts specific configurations of power that 
contribute to an unjust and dangerous world. 
 
Traditional top-down, closed, and national-interest-based approaches to water 
management, no matter whether they explicitly rely upon nationalistic imperatives of 
sovereignty, or are hidden beneath the proclaimed values of hydrosolidarity, have the 
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potential to be damaging to people and the natural environment. To overcome this, the 
first step must be to uncover the deeply held assumptions that ground the analyses of 
water-security relationships in terms most familiar to state strategists and policy-makers. 
From there, considerations must be made that question the connections of security with 
an objectivist view of knowledge generation and then seek to transform security towards 
emancipation. Partial and atavistic articulations of security, like the ones associated with 
territorial preservation of the nation-state and the threat and use of force, play an 
important role in limiting the potential of individuals and groups to lead full lives. As 
long as assumptions remain unchallenged about the primacy of states, the politics of 
security, the universality of security as state security, and the benefits of objectivity, it is 
doubtful that the world will be able to transcend contemporary water problems. 
 
However, there is hope that alternative approaches can and will be harnessed to produce 
normatively desirable, and analytically superior, evaluations of water security. The goal 
has been to produce the means by which it is possible to conceptualize water security in 
emancipatory terms. This approach disrupts “settled” norms of sovereignty, and points 
toward more holistic, “nascent” norms such as emancipation. This holism can work to 
incorporate ethical concerns and create a critical, continuous dialogical engagement; a 
humble, collaborative, recognition of others. Water is seen here as an important site that 
not only demonstrates the continued dominance of traditional security, but also the 
junctures at which it becomes insufficient, illogical, and obsolete. Perhaps the most vital 
impact of water is to demonstrate the complex, and multifaceted ways in which security, 
the self, and the natural environment might coalesce to promote hopeful alternatives that 
pursue emancipation as their core responsibility. Water can never be truly bounded or 
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separated. It connects the world. The task then is to use water to catalyze and solidify 
human relationships, with each other and the natural environment, that are built upon 
shared understandings of a common future.  
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